State v. Smith, 19CA33
| Decision Date | 20 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19CA33 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAN EARL SMITH, AKA: SALAH BEY Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
James A. Anzelmo, Gahanna, Ohio, for Appellant.
Judy Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Sean Earl Smith, a.k.a. Salah Bey, hereinafter "Appellant," appeals the "Entry of Jury Verdict of Guilty, Entry of Sentence, and Advisement of Discretionary Post Release Control" filed September 25 2019, in the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas. Appellant raises six assignments of error. Upon review of the record and analysis of the pertinent Ohio law, we find no merit to Appellant's assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On February 1, 2019, Appellant was indicted on three counts (1) Having Weapons While Under Disability with Specification R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; (2) Possession of Drugs with Specification, R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(2)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and (3) Possession of Marijuana with Specification, R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(3)(b), a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. Appellant's charged offenses arose from a traffic stop which occurred in Pickaway County on January 6, 2018. Appellant was stopped by Trooper Kevin Large of the Ohio State Highway Patrol.
{¶3} On March 13, 2019, Appellant was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty. He was initially represented by retained counsel, but later completed the necessary forms and was found indigent. The court appointed Attorney Lori Rankin as Appellant's counsel.
{¶4} On May 29, 2019, the matter came on for a motion hearing. The hearing began with Appellant being uncooperative, refusing to acknowledge his legal name, and interrupting the judge. Attorney Rankin explained the hearing had been scheduled at her request. Attorney Rankin explained that Appellant disagreed with her analysis of his case and how the matter should proceed. Appellant's uncooperative conduct continued throughout the hearing.
{¶5} Based upon Appellant's conduct, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. Appellant continued to interrupt, contending that the trial court had no jurisdiction over him. As the hearing ended, Appellant was removed from the courtroom. On that same date, Appellant filed several irregular documents, the first captioned as "Revocation of Power of Attorney Fiduciary Termination Notice."
{¶6} Appellant's competency hearing took place on July 24, 2019. The trial court announced, having received a competency report, that Appellant functioned well and was capable of assisting his counsel in his own defense. Appellant was found competent to stand trial. Appellant addressed the court and the attorneys, again arguing that he had filed an affidavit challenging the court's jurisdiction and arguing that he had been "misclassified, misidentified" by the courts. The trial court made a finding that it did have jurisdiction over Appellant and his case. Appellant was again removed from the courtroom, arguing as he was taken away that his rights were being violated and there was no jurisdiction over him or the case.
{¶7} On August 22, 2019, another hearing took place to determine whether Appellant was capable of representing himself at trial. Appellant immediately began objecting about his constitutional rights, objecting to being called "Mr. Smith," stating that he did not consent to the proceedings, and demanding his release. The trial court scheduled the matter for trial and ordered Attorney Rankin to remain as counsel. Appellant refused to sign the trial notice.
{¶8} Appellant's trial commenced on September 19, 2019. The proceeding began in the jury room but outside of the presence of the prospective jurors. The trial court wished to have the plea discussions disclosed but Appellant continually interrupted. Appellant stated his refusal to participate in the jury trial. He purported to terminate Attorney Rankin. Appellant was speaking so fast he was cautioned to slow down so that the court reporter could catch his statements. After several fruitless attempts to allow Appellant to conform his conduct appropriately, the court ordered that Appellant be taken to the county jail to watch the proceedings. Appellant returned to the courtroom for his own testimony in the defense case and remained in the courtroom for the rest of the trial.
{¶9} Appellant was convicted of all counts and sentenced to a 36-month prison term on Count One. The trial court imposed jail sentences on Counts Two and Three which were to be served concurrently to Count One.
{¶10} This timely appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth, where pertinent.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SMITH WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, IN VIOLATION OF THIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS [SIC] UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING SMITH'S MOTION TO DISMISS HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
III. WHEN THE TRIAL COURT REMOVED SMITH FROM THE COURTROOM DURING HIS TRIAL, THE COURT FAILED TO SAFEGUARD SMITH'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
IV. SMITH RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING SMITH'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL, PURSUANT TO CRIM. R. 29, WHICH WAS MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTIONS TEN AND SIXTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
VI. SMITH'S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTIONS TEN AND SIXTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED SMITH, IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE, SECTION SIXTEEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶11} Appellant asserts that this court must reverse his conviction because he was not competent to stand trial. Appellant argues that throughout the proceedings he made incoherent, rambling and nonsensical statements, as well as demonstrating paranoia regarding his own counsel and the trial court. While Appellant concedes that a psychiatrist found him competent to stand trial, his bizarre conduct persisted throughout the trial. Appellant concludes that the record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not competent to stand trial.
{¶12} In response, the State of Ohio points out that the trial court followed the requirements of RC. 2945.37 in ordering a competency evaluation. The forensic psychologist's report contained findings that Appellant was capable of understanding the nature of the legal proceedings against him and was capable of assisting his counsel in his own defense. Therefore, the State argues that the trial court did not err when it found Appellant competent to stand trial.
{¶13} A trial court's decision on competency will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Lechner, 4th Dist. Highland No. 19CA3, 2019-Ohio-4071, at ¶ 24; State v. Clark, 71 Ohio St.3d 466, 469, 1994-Ohio-43, 644 N.E.2d 331. An "abuse of discretion" requires more than an error of judgment; it implies the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Id. at 470. "Thus, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's competency determination if the record contains 'some reliable, credible evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that appellant understood the nature and objective of the proceedings against him.'" Lechner, supra, quoting State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19, 490 N.E.2d 906 (1986); State v. Stewart, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 91CA24, 1992 WL 174699, *3 (July 22, 1992).
{¶14} Due process requires a criminal defendant be competent to stand trial. See Lechner, supra, at ¶ 25; State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359 1995-Ohio-310, 650 N.E.2d 433. "It has long been accepted that a person who lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial." Drope v. Missouri, 95 S.Ct. 896, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Thus, "[c]onviction of an accused while he or she is legally incompetent is a violation of due process." State v. Merryman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA28, 2013-Ohio-4810, ¶ 14.
{¶15} "The United States Supreme Court established the test for competency and requires the court to determine if an accused 'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding―and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Lechner, supra, at ¶ 26, quoting Dusky v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Ohio has codified the competency test in R.C. 2945.37(G) as follows:
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, because of the defendant's present mental condition, the...
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