State v. Smith
| Citation | 47 Del. 334,91 A.2d 188,8 Terry 334 |
| Parties | , 47 Del. 334 STATE v. SMITH. |
| Decision Date | 26 August 1952 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Motion to suppress evidence relating to a sobriety test given to the defendant as being in violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under the provision of Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution of this State.
At about the hour of 5:00 p.m. on November 2, 1951, the defendant, Ernest M. Smith, was involved in an automobile collision on Route 896 near Glascow, Delaware. Within a short time after the occurrence of the collision Delaware State Trooper John M. Sullivan appeared on the scene. The Trooper upon his arrival found the defendant, Smith, present and, based upon his observation of him, concluded that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. After attending to certain routine police duties at the scene of the collision, the Trooper under the authority vested in him by the provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act, being Chapter 304, Volume 48, Laws of Delaware, placed the defendant in legal custody. He took the defendant to Troop Headquarters for questioning. During the first two hours of detention the Trooper examined the defendant rather extensively in order to determine the extent of his intoxication. The examination entailed the customary sobriety test, including the writing of his name and the performing of certain acts from which his muscular reflexes and mental reactions could be closely observed.
After examining and observing the defendant, as aforesaid, over a two hour period, and having the opinion that the defendant was then so intoxicated that he did not know what was going on, the Trooper placed him in a cell at Troop Headquarters until the next morning, at which time he was taken before a Justice of the Peace and there formally placed under arrest for having operated a motor vehicle on the preceding afternoon while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The case was later transferred to the Court of Common Pleas for New Castle County, where the defendant was tried for having committed the offense as indicated. He was found guilty as charged. He has appealed to this Court.
Since his appeal is to be tried de novo, the defendant has filed a motion under which he seeks an order directing that any evidence relating to the results of the sobriety test, given to him by the Trooper during his first two hours of detention on the afternoon of November 2nd, be suppressed and not admitted in evidence during the trial against him.
In support of his motion the defendant contends as follows:
(1) Since the defendant was not arrested and charged wlth crime upon the expiration of the two hour period of detention, or then released, any evidence obtained from the defendant, as a result of the sobriety test conducted during the first two hour should be ordered suppressed;
(2) That any evidence obtained from the defendant as a result of the sobriety test during the first two hours of his detention is inadmissible and should be ordered suppressed for the reason that such tests, under the circumstances then existing, violated the accused's constitutional privilege against self incrimination under the provisions of Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution of this State.
The pertinent provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act, supra, are as follows:
'(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
'(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
The pertinent provision of Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution is as follows:
The defendant's motion was set down for argument. During argument the Attorney General suggested that he be permitted to produce Trooper Sullivan as a witness in order that I should have a clear understanding of what occurred from the time the defendant was detained by the Trooper on November 2nd until his formal arrest the following day. Trooper Sullivan was sworn as a witness. His testimony, relating to the factual circumstances that occurred from the time that he arrived upon the scene of the collision until the defendant's arrest the next day, is in substance the same as I have previously indicated.
John M. Bader, Wilmington, for defendant.
Stephen Hamilton, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.
Two contentions are asserted under the defendant's motion to suppress. Under the first contention he suggests that if a person, such as himself in the present case, is taken into custody and, thereafter, detained under the provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act, supra, and during the first two hours of his detention, thereunder, submits voluntarily to a sobriety test, but is not arrested and charged with crime or released by the detaining officer at the expiration of two hours from the commencement of his detention, then such neglect or default on the part of the detaining officer renders inadmissible all evidence relating to the results of the sobriety test, to which he voluntarily submitted.
The defendant's position under this contention is without merit. He was in legal custody at the time the test was given to him. If he voluntarily submitted thereto, then the Trooper's neglect in not placing him under arrest or releasing him at the expiration of the two hour period of detention under the act can have no effect upon the admissibility of testimony tending to show the results of the test. I am not called upon to determine the admissibility of evidence procured as a result of a sobriety test made upon a defendant after the first two hours of detention under circumstances such as exist in the present case. Compare Rickards v. State, Del., 77 A.2d 199.
It should be noted in passing, however, that if officers of the law are prone to disregard the clear and unequivocal language of the act relating to their powers and duties thereunder, then they subject themselves to probable prosecution by reason thereof.
The question to be determined under the defendant's second contention presents quite a different problem and a most interesting one; that is, was the defendant's constitutional privilege against self incrimination violated by reason of the sobriety test, given to him by the detaining officer in the light of the circumstances then existing.
Under this contention the defendant interposes the following arguments: (1) that in order to render the results of a sobriety test admissible in evidence against him the State must clearly establish that he fully understood his constitutional rights, was presented with an option of taking the test or not taking it, appreciated at the time the probable consequences thereof, and under such circumstances voluntarily submitted thereto. Otherwise, his constitutional guarantee against self incrimination under Article 1, Section 7, of our Constitution would be invaded, and evidence relating to the results of such a test should be held to be inadmissible against him during his trial; (2) that the Trooper's course of conduct in the present case in insisting that the accused take the sobriety test in the light of his then intoxicated condition, as indicated by the Trooper's testimony, evidenced what should be held to be tantamount to compulsion on the Trooper's part and, as such, is conduct in violation of the accused's constitutional privilege against self incrimination, thereby rendering any evidence obtained as a result of such test...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Conterno
...(or 501) and the search is the gathering of breath in the balloon of an intoximeter in a reasonable manner. Cf. State v. Smith, 1952, 8 Terry 334, 47 Del. 334, 91 A.2d 188, 193, as to intoximeter; cf. People v. Morgan, 1956, 146 Cal.App.2d 722, 304 P.2d 138. Accord: State v. Berg, supra, 19......
-
State v. Asherman
... ... Timmons then assigned Troopers Bieluch and Bernstein, who had arrived with him, to guard the scene of the crime. They both went to the scene after which Bieluch brought Philip Aranow and Lane down to the Jones' residence. In the meantime Lieutenant Smith, commander of the Canaan barracks, and Trooper John McGoldrick arrived. Troopers Bieluch, Calkins and McGoldrick were then assigned to interview individually the witnesses Aranow, the defendant, and Lane, respectively. Bieluch gathered all three witnesses together in the closed-in porch of the ... ...
-
Olson v. State
... ... 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) ... 8 In the following decisions, the court rejected the argument that 'to give evidence' under their respective state constitutions indicated a broader scope than the federal provision. State v. White, 102 Ariz. 162, 426 P.2d 796, 797 (1967); State v. Smith, 8 Terry 334, 91 A.2d 188, 192 (Del.Super.1952); Opinion of Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 650 (Me.1969); Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963); State v. Moore, 79 Wash.2d 51, 483 P.2d 630 (1971) ... Contra: The dissenting opinion in State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 457 ... ...
-
State v. Halko
... ... The cited Act was held applicable, therefore, under Delaware law evidence obtained as shown to be the case here is admissible. Cannon v. State, ---- Storey ----, 168 A.2d 108 (1961); State v. Smith, 8 Terry 334, 47 Del. 334, 91 A.2d 188 (1952) ... It is in no way appropriate for me--in light of the Supreme Court's rulings--to now hold that a person parked on a street bed in a car before a business property in which he has 100% stock control is not 'abroad' within the ... ...