State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 19 October 1999 |
| Citation | 5 S.W.3d 595 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Rodney Smith, Appellant Case Number: 73913 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of City of St. Louis, Hon. Thomas C. Grady
Counsel for Appellant: Dave Hemingway
Counsel for Respondent: Krista D. Boston
Opinion Summary: Rodney Smith appeals the circuit court judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree murder and armed criminal action.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Division One holds: The trial court erred in denying Smith's challenge to the prosecutor's use of her peremptory strikes against a venireperson. The reasons given by the prosecutor, such as age, were pretextual and not gender neutral. The state violated Batson's prohibition against gender discriminatory peremptory challenges when it struck a female teacher based on her sex and possible maternal instincts and not a similar male teacher.
Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Simon and J. Dowd, JJ., concur.
Appellant, Rodney Smith ("defendant"), appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, after a jury convicted him of murder in the first degree, section 565.020, RSMo 1994,1 and armed criminal action, section 571.015. We reverse and remand.
On May 10, 1995, the police found the body of Toriano Burston on the floor of a vacant building. The victim died of multiple gunshot wounds. Defendant and co-defendant, Phillip Shaw, ("co-defendant"), were charged with the victim's death. Both were charged by indictment on January 21, 1997, with Class A felony of murder in the first degree, section 565.020, the class A felony of robbery in the first degree, section 569.020, and two counts of the accompanying class A felony of armed criminal action, section 571.015. Both defendant and co-defendant were tried jointly. The jury convicted defendant of murder in the first degree and armed criminal action, and acquitted him of robbery in the first degree. The court sentenced the defendant to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or probation. The sentences are to run consecutively. The defendant appeals.
The defendant raises five points on appeal. Because the first point is dispositive of the case, we need not address the remaining points raised by the defendant. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenge to the prosecutor's discriminatory use of her peremptory strikes against venireperson, D. M., based on her race and gender. We agree with the defendant that D. M. was peremptorily struck by the State because of her gender.
An appellate court will reverse the trial court's decision on Batson challenges only upon a showing of clear error. State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Mo.banc 1998). In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited peremptory strikes based on race. After Batson, this court reversed and remanded a conviction for assault in the first degree and armed criminal action because the State utilized its peremptory jury challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion. State v. Holman, 759 S.W.2d 902, 903 (Mo.App.E.D. 1988). See also, State v. Price, 763 S.W.2d 286 (Mo.App.E.D. 1988) ().
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court extended the Batson prohibition to peremptory strikes based on gender. In J.E.B., the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case solely because that individual happens to be a male or a female. Id. at 146. The Court noted that:
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceedings. . . . The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.
Id. at 140. The Court further stated that:
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women. Because these stereotypes have wreaked injustice in so many other spheres of our country's public life, active discrimination by litigants on the basis of gender during jury selection 'invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law.' Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 412, 111 S.Ct., at 1371.
After J.E.B., Missouri extended Batson prohibition to peremptory strikes based on gender bias. State v. Hayden, 878 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Mo.App.E.D. 1994). We noted that "the substance and procedures established by the Batson line of cases are equally applicable to challenges made to peremptory strikes based on gender bias." Id.
In Missouri, if the defendant wishes to challenge the State's peremptory strike, the appellant must first raise the challenge by identifying the cognizable protected group to which the venireperson belongs. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d at 302. The State must then provide an explanation that is neutral as to race or gender for striking the venireperson. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the State's explanation was pretextual and that the strike was actually motivated by the venireperson's race or gender. Id. "A legitimate reason for exercising peremptory challenges is not one 'that makes sense' but one 'that does not deny equal protection.'" State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 15 (Mo.banc 1996) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). "Crucial to the analysis is whether similarly situated white venirepersons escaped the state's challenge." State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 509 (Mo.banc 1995). Similarly, crucial to our analysis is whether similarly situated male venirepersons escaped the State's challenge.
In our case, during jury selection, the defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's peremptory strike of venireperson, D. M. and the following occurred:
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