State v. Smith
Decision Date | 19 February 1907 |
Citation | 56 S.E. 528,61 W.Va. 329 |
Parties | STATE v. SMITH. |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under an indictment for selling spirituous liquors, the state resting her case on evidence that defendant, as a railroad agent, delivered a box of liquors transported from Cincinnati consigned C. O. D. to a person who had not ordered the liquors, in violation of chapter 40, § 1, p. 130, Acts 1903 [Code 1906,§ 954], the defendant has a right to introduce evidence for the purpose of showing that he made inquiry to learn whether the consignee had ordered the liquors to be sent him for his personal use, and acted bona fide in making such delivery.
Question. Is that clause of page 130, c. 40, § 1, Acts 1903 [Code 1906 § 954], prohibiting railroad agents from delivering liquors to consignees not ordering the same, contrary to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution?
Error from Circuit Court, Barbour County.
Charles Smith was convicted of an illegal sale of liquor, and brings error. Reversed and remanded.
Wm. T George and Fred O. Blue, for plaintiff in error.
C. W. May, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Charles Smith was indicted and fined in Barbour county; the indictment charging that he did unlawfully sell spirituous liquors without license. The state's evidence in support of the prosecution was that Smith, as agent of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, delivered to Arthur M. Blake boxes marked "Glass" proven to contain whisky, shipped by a liquor dealer in Cincinnati, consigned C. O. D. to Blake, and received payment from Blake for the articles; and that Blake had not ordered the liquor to be sent to him. The statute on which the state would ask conviction is chapter 40, § 1, p. 130, Acts 1903 [[[Code 1906, § 954], reading as follows: "That any agent or employé of any person, firm, or corporation, carrying on the business of a common carrier, or any other person, who, without a state license for dealing in intoxicating liquors, shall engage in the traffic or sale of such liquors, or be interested for profit in the sale thereof, or act as the agent or employé or consignor or consignee of the same, or who shall solicit or receive any order for the sale of any intoxicating liquors, or deliver to any person, firm, or corporation, any package containing such intoxicating liquors, shipped 'collect on delivery' or otherwise, except to a person having a state license to sell the same, or to the bona fide consignee thereof who has in good faith ordered the same for his personal use, shall be deemed to have made a sale thereof contrary to law, and guilty of a misdemeanor." On the trial, in connection with his own evidence that he believed that Blake had ordered the goods from Cincinnati, and had no reason to believe to the contrary, the defendant, as well as the state, proved that when Blake called for the liquor, after being informed by letter from Cincinnati that the consigned article was at the railroad office, before Smith would deliver him the article he required Blake to sign, and he did sign, a receipt reading as follows:
The court refused to admit the receipt in evidence.
Was the receipt admissible? This depends on the question whether inquiry by the jury was proper as to Smith's knowledge or ignorance of the fact that the liquor had not been ordered by Blake to be sent to him from Cincinnati. The statute does not in words require that for conviction the act of delivery shall be with knowledge that the consignee had not ordered the liquor. It may be said simply to prohibit the act. We find in 12 Cyc. 148, the following: It will there appear that the authorities are many each way. I think the principles stated in Bishop's Statutory Crimes, § 1022, are pertinent. It is beyond question that our own cases say that where a statute simply prohibits the sale of liquor in certain cases, as to minors, without some word like "knowingly" or other expression, the doing of the act fixes the offense, no matter about the knowledge or ignorance or intent of the accused. It need not be alleged in the indictment that the party knew the purchaser to be a minor, or intoxicated, or in the habit of becoming so. State v. Baer, 37 W.Va. 1, 16 S.E. 368; State v. Farr, 34 W.Va. 84, 11 S.E. 737; State v. Cain, 9 W. Va. 559. Nor can it be relied on in defense. Those cases rest on statutes making the mere act an offense. But I draw a line of difference between those cases and this. The statute we are construing allows the delivery of a liquor consignment by the agent to one "who is a bona fide consignee thereof, who has in good faith ordered the same for his personal use." Thus, the statute introduces into the case the question whether the person is one who has in good faith ordered the liquor for his personal use. It does not so qualify other clauses, evincing design to make a difference as to the act of delivery. This surely allows the agent to make inquiry touching this matter. Can he not take precaution as to this to protect himself; to know whether he ought to deliver the article? Does the statute mean that the agent must infallibly, in every instance, guaranty that the consignee is one who in good faith has ordered the liquor for his personal use? Does it mean that when the agent has taken care to make such reasonable investigation as to that as a prudent person would adopt, but it turns out that the consignee did not order the liquor, the agent is nevertheless guilty? I think not. I think that he can show in his defense that he instituted prudent investigation to learn the truth. Therefore, we conclude that the receipt, a part of the res gestae, containing Blake's direct statement that he had ordered the box for his own personal use, should have gone to the jury, as tending to show that Smith acted in good faith and believed that Blake was a bona fide consignee, to enable the jury to say whether, under all the circumstances, Smith acted honestly and in good faith. If such agent delivers a box or package containing liquor, but not disclosing the character of its contents, does the statute mean that he is guilty, though he may not have known the contents? Must the agent investigate every box? How? He cannot break the box. If he makes fair investigation, and has reasonable ground to believe the box does not contain liquor, is he nevertheless guilty? Is that the real meaning of the statute? This doctrine may, in many cases, defeat the design of the statute; still, we must not give the act a construction to promote injustice, and inflict punishment on the innocent agent.
The question of the validity of this act under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the Union is raised. The act does not forbid the consignment of liquor to licensed dealers, or to consignees under real purchase. It does not forbid...
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