State v. Smith
Decision Date | 05 May 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 14209,14209 |
Citation | 222 Conn. 1,608 A.2d 63 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Sean SMITH. |
Francis T. Mandanici, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, were Brian S. Carlow and Erskine D. McIntosh, Asst. Public Defenders, and Daniel E. Dilzer, certified legal intern, for appellant (defendant).
James A. Killen, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and Elpedio Vitale, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.
The defendant, Sean Smith, appeals from a murder conviction 1 claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) prohibited certain voir dire questions regarding racial prejudice and predisposition to convict; (2) allowed the state to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse two black venirepersons; (3) prohibited the defense from introducing certain evidence concerning the violent proclivities of the victim; and (4) gave the jury an incomplete "Chip Smith" charge. We affirm the judgment.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. In February, 1990, the victim, Darrell Brantley, made an arrangement with Devonya Inman whereby Inman permitted him to sell drugs out of her apartment in Meriden in exchange for money and drugs. During the same month, the defendant moved into Inman's apartment and began working for the victim selling drugs there. One or two months later, the victim and the defendant had a dispute over drug money, which culminated in an incident in which the victim and his friends beat the defendant on the head with a pot. After that conflict the defendant entered into his own agreement with Inman to sell drugs from her apartment, and the victim's previous arrangement with her terminated. Although no longer on friendly terms, the victim and the defendant did meet on occasion without incident.
On April 17, 1990, at approximately 10 p.m., the defendant was standing on the porch of Inman's apartment when he observed the victim in the driveway selling drugs. He angrily shouted to the victim to move out of the driveway, to which the victim responded, "Well, why don't you move me?" The defendant then entered the apartment where he began pacing and telling his girlfriend that he was tired of the victim "messing with" him. He then retrieved his rifle from a closet and returned to the porch, where he told the victim, "I'm going to move you." The victim, who had his hand in his coat as though concealing a weapon, turned to run from the defendant, according to the state's evidence. According to the defendant, the victim had reached inside his coat for a weapon. 2 The defendant fired one bullet that struck the victim's shoulder and another that hit him in the back. These injuries proved fatal. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder.
During voir dire defense counsel asked the first prospective juror, a white person, a series of questions designed to discover any possible racial prejudice he might harbor against the defendant, a black person. In the course of that questioning, defense counsel asked, "How would you feel if a relative of yours, son, daughter, brother or sister ... expressed an intent to you that he wanted to marry a black person?" The state objected on grounds of relevancy, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel took exception to the ruling. When questioning the next venireperson, defense counsel did not ask the prohibited question, but pointed out that he had not done so because he "gathered your Honor would sustain the objection." The court responded that it would have again disallowed the question and would do so if defense counsel asked it of any other prospective juror. Defense counsel then registered a continuing objection.
Although the trial court forbade defense counsel from asking the question about interracial marriage, it allowed him to ask the venirepersons many other questions aimed at uncovering bigotry. These included whether they worked with black people; whether they had black superiors at work; whether they had ever been passed over for a promotion in favor of a black person due to a racial quota system; whether they had friends and neighbors who were black; whether they ever had black people as social guests in their homes; whether they ever had lunch with black people; whether they had had any negative experiences with black people; whether they had ever formed an opinion about a situation based on the race of the people involved; whether their attitudes about race had changed; whether they had a subconscious bias against black people; whether they had ever hesitated to do something with someone because that person was black; whether they felt that black people have been given too many advantages that they do not deserve; and whether they had any general feelings about black people. The trial court remarked to defense counsel, after explaining that it would not allow the interracial marriage question,
The defendant acknowledges that he was allowed to probe extensively into the prospective jurors' attitudes about race. He maintains, however, that the trial court's exclusion of the interracial marriage question was an abuse of its discretion that resulted in the deprivation of his state and federal constitutional rights because that question, unlike any other he had asked, was a "litmus test" for racial bias. He claims that the answer to that one question would have given "a better picture of the juror than the answers to a thousand other bland questions on race." Even if answers to this question would have been as illuminating as the defendant claims, we decline to find error in the trial court's exclusion of the question because the multitude of other questions pertaining to potential racial prejudice that defense counsel was permitted to ask provided a sufficient basis for discovering any racial bias that might have tainted members of the venire. Cf. State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 638, 669-70, 534 A.2d 1199 (1987).
State v. Hill 196 Conn. 667, 671, 495 A.2d 699 (1985). 3 (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) State v. Marsh, 168 Conn. 520, 523, 362 A.2d 523 (1975). Subject to these principles, the trial court is vested with broad discretion to determine the extent of the voir dire examination. State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 381, 528 A.2d 794 (1987); State v. Dolphin, 203 Conn. 506, 511-12, 525 A.2d 509 (1987). We therefore will not disturb its rulings in this regard unless the court has clearly abused its discretion such that prejudice to one of the parties has resulted. State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 601, 512 A.2d 906 (1986); State v. Rogers, 197 Conn. 314, 318, 497 A.2d 387 (1985).
Although we believe that the question on interracial marriage was relevant 4 in that it might have revealed subconscious racism on the part of a prospective juror, we do not look at that question in isolation to determine whether the defendant's claim has merit. Instead, we assess the claim in the context of the entire voir dire to determine whether the defendant was afforded a sufficient opportunity to expose racist attitudes among the prospective jurors. State v. Fritz, 204 Conn. 156, 162, 527 A.2d 1157 (1987). As noted previously, defense counsel was allowed to ask each prospective juror a host of questions about race, some of which could be said to test the existence of subconscious as well as overt prejudice. See State v. Dolphin, supra, 203 Conn. at 512, 525 A.2d 509. In view of the far-reaching inquiry on race conducted by defense counsel, we do not believe that the exclusion of the question on interracial marriage significantly hampered the defendant's right to inquire about potential racial prejudice among the venirepersons.
During voir dire, the state was examining a prospective juror who had expressed indecision about his ability to return a verdict. After the state had asked him a number of questions, the trial court interjected to inquire whether, after hearing all the evidence in the case and deliberating with the other jurors, he would have any difficulty in finding the defendant guilty, if the state had proved his guilt or, conversely, in acquitting him, if the state had not. The venireperson responded in the negative. When the court asked whether he would find it easier to do one than the other, he replied that he would have to listen to the case. After further questioning, this prospective juror indicated that he might have a harder time convicting than acquitting. The court then asked, "Would it be easier for you to find somebody not guilty than to find somebody guilty?" He said it would not, the questioning ceased and the state then exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse him.
While questioning the next prospective juror, defense counsel asked, "Do you feel that after you have heard all the evidence et cetera, and you are weighing the case that you might find it easier to reach a verdict of guilty compared to not guilty?" When the person...
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