State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 30 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 59743-0,59743-0
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Phillip Arthur SMITH, Petitioner. En Banc

Page 51

123 Wn.2d 51

864 P.2d 1371

The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Phillip Arthur SMITH, Petitioner.

No. 59743-0.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Dec. 30, 1993.

Andrew P. Zinner of Washington Appellate Defender Association, for petitioner.

Norm Maleng, Pros. Atty., and Michael J. Lang, Deputy, for respondent.

DURHAM, Justice.

Petitioner Phillip Arthur Smith raises several challenges to the exceptional sentences he received for three burglary convictions. We affirm imposition of the exceptional sentences, but remand for reconsideration of sentence duration.

After a jury trial, Smith was convicted on three counts of second degree burglary for stealing items from three apartments in the early morning hours of April 7, 1990. During all three thefts, people were present in the respective apartments. Smith was apprehended after a noise woke up one of the victims and she discovered petitioner crouched in front of her television set. He ran out of the apartment and the victim called the police. Smith was arrested leaving the area of the apartments with a car load of stolen televisions, stereo speakers, and video tape recorders--items which were identified as having come from the burglarized apartment units.

These convictions were not unique. As the trial judge found, Smith has a lengthy criminal record:

March 6, 1982 [C]ommission of a residential burglary concluding in a rape; defendant convicted of rape 1 (82-1-03890-0);

March 9, 1982 [C]ommission of residential burglary, burglary conviction (82-1-00805-9);

March 13, 1982 [A]ttempted commission of a residential burglary of which defendant was convicted (82-1-00805-9)[;]

October 16, 1982 Defendant released from jail on the above causes (82-1-00805-9)[;]

October 18, 1982 Commission of another residential burglary, convicted (82-1-3223-5)[;]

March 30, 1983 Defendant sentenced on above cause and a series of rapes and his deferred sentence for burglary convictions was revoked (rape convictions overturned on appeal and defendant subsequently plead guilty to one count of rape 1)[;]

February 13, 1987 While in custody defendant sentenced to 72 months for rape 1 (82-1-03890-0)[;]

January 14, 1988 Defendant paroled from prison[;]

November 7, 1988 Defendant attacks a woman he met at a bar and takes her money, convicted of robbery 2 (88-1-05590-1)[;]

March 17, 1989 Defendant sentenced to 13 months for above robbery[;]

September 13, 1989 Defendant released[;]

April 7, 1990 Three residential burglaries which are the basis for the current convictions were committed.

Clerk's Papers (CP), at 51-52.

Smith's prior convictions, when combined with his current offenses, resulted in an offender score of "10" for each burglary. The standard range for second degree burglary with an offender score of "9 or more" is 43 to 57 months, served concurrently. The prosecutor, citing several aggravating factors, urged the judge to impose an exceptional sentence of 120 months for each burglary count, served consecutively. The trial judge agreed with the prosecutor on the presence of aggravating factors, and made the following findings of fact:

1. The defendant committed crimes against multiple victims and the multiple offender policy results in a too[-]lenient presumptive sentence.

2. The defendant has consistently demonstrated that he [is] a danger to the community in that:

a. he has consistently re-offended very shortly after being released from prison;

b. he has consistently burglarized occupied residences;

3. The defendant has the following criminal history: [summarized above][;]

4. The defendant[']s offender score exceeds the maximum matrix score of nine.

CP, at 51-52. The trial judge concluded that the aggravating factors justified an exceptional sentence of 100 months on each burglary count, served consecutively. CP, at 52-53.

Smith appealed the exceptional sentences, as well as several other issues which are not relevant to our review. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for reconsideration of the sentence duration. In doing so, it held that the trial court's reliance on the "multiple victims" factor was incorrect as a matter of law, and that a recent decision by this court precluded consideration of future dangerousness. ¹ 1] Nonetheless, imposition of an exceptional sentence was justified because Smith's offender score exceeded the maximum matrix score of 9, thereby resulting in a presumptive sentence that was "clearly too lenient". "Although a high offender score alone cannot justify an exceptional sentence, current multiple offenses may justify a sentence exceeding the standard range when those in excess of the number necessary to reach the maximum range would otherwise go unpunished." State v. Smith, 67 Wash.App. 81, 91, 834 P.2d 26 (1992). The appellate court further held that an exceptional sentence was justified because the burglaries occurred in occupied residences. Imposing an exceptional sentence under such circumstances "is consistent with public policy". Smith, at 92, 834 P.2d 26.

A court may impose an exceptional sentence when "it finds, considering the purpose of [the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981], that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence". RCW 9.94A.120(2). ² In reviewing an exceptional sentence, an appellate court undertakes a 2-part inquiry:

First, it must decide if the record supports the sentencing judge's reasons for imposing the exceptional sentence. Because this is a factual question, the sentencing judge's reasons must be upheld if they are not clearly erroneous. State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514, 517-18, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986). Under the second part of RCW 9.94.210(4)(a), the appellate court must determine independently, as a matter of law, if the sentencing judge's reasons justify the imposition of a sentence outside the presumptive range. Nordby, at 518 . The reasons must be "substantial and compelling". RCW 9.94A.120(2). They must "take into account factors other than those which are necessarily considered in computing the presumptive range for the offense." Nordby, at 518, 723 P.2d 1117.

State v. Fisher, 108 Wash.2d 419, 423, 739 P.2d 683 (1987).

Smith first argues that the trial court erred by relying on the "clearly too lenient" aggravating factor in imposing an exceptional sentence. Under RCW 9.94A.390(2)(f), the court may consider as an aggravating factor whether "[t]he operation of the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.400 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter". In Fisher, we explained that "[i]t is proper to rely on this aggravating factor when there is some extraordinarily serious harm or culpability resulting from multiple offenses which would not otherwise be accounted for in determining the presumptive sentencing range." 108 Wn.2d at 428. This inquiry is automatically satisfied whenever "the defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in 'free' crimes--crimes for which there is no additional penalty". State v. Stephens, 116 Wash.2d 238, 243, 803 P.2d 319 (1991).

Here, the defendant had multiple current offenses which resulted in an offender score of 10--1 point over the sentencing grid's "9 or more" category. ³ Given that each second degree burglary conviction counts for two points, in effect, Smith is receiving one-half of a "free" crime; petitioner admits as much in his brief. Petition for Review, at 9. Accordingly, the trial court properly considered "clearly too lenient" as an aggravating factor in imposing Smith's exceptional sentence. ⁴

Next, Smith argues that the trial court incorrectly considered the fact that the residences he burglarized were occupied when imposing an exceptional sentence. Although Smith does not dispute the trial court's finding that "he has consistently burglarized occupied residences", petitioner argues that consideration of this factor is an ex post facto application of the recently passed residential burglary statute, RCW 9A.52.025.

We disagree. Although the appellate court cited the residential burglary statute in upholding the trial court decision, it did so merely to illustrate a long-standing public policy favoring the protection of residential dwellings. There is no indication that the trial court relied upon an ex post facto application of RCW 9A.52.025 in arriving at Smith's exceptional sentence. Indeed, the trial court did not impose the sentence for burglarizing dwellings; rather, it imposed the sentence because people were present in the dwelling.

Consideration of the victim's presence is an appropriate aggravating factor when meting out an exceptional sentence for burglary. ⁵ A 2-part test determines the legal adequacy of an aggravating factor:

First, a trial court may not base an exceptional sentence on factors necessarily considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sentence range. Second, the asserted aggravating factor must be sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.

State v. Grewe, 117 Wash.2d 211, 215-16, 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). The first factor is satisfied because the victim's presence is not a necessary component of burglary. ⁶ The second element is supported because the presence of victims makes it more likely that a serious injury might result from the commission of a burglary. We agree with the appellate court that burglary of occupied residences presents a higher seriousness level. Smith, 67 Wash.App. at 92, 834 P.2d 26. Thus, consideration of the victim's presence during a burglary is an appropriate aggravating factor for an exceptional sentence. ⁷

Smith further argues that the trial court acted improperly by imposing an exceptional sentence which was both beyond the standard range, and consecutive. Petitioner cites language from State v. Batista, 116 Wash.2d 777, 808 P.2d 1141...