State v. Smith, No. A07-2426 (Minn. App. 8/5/2008)

• Decision Date: 05 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. A07-2426.,A07-2426.
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. James Anthony Smith, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. James Anthony Smith, Respondent.

No. A07-2426.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed August 5, 2008.

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

Appeal from the Dakota County District Court, File No. K3-07-62, Minge, Judge.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Lawrence F. Clark, Assistant County Attorney, Dakota County Judicial Center, Hastings, MN, (for appellant)

Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, MN, (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Wright, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MINGE, Judge.

The state brings this pretrial appeal to challenge the suppression of evidence, arguing that the officer's investigatory stop was justified based on the commission of what an officer believed to be a traffic violation and based on an outstanding warrant for respondent's son. Because the district court did not clearly err in determining that the stop was impermissible, we affirm.

FACTS

Just after 11 p.m. on January 3, 2007, Sergeant Scott Durdall ran a warrant search from his squad car's portable-data computer. Rick Austin Smith's name came up with an outstanding warrant for shoplifting and theft. Sergeant Durdall proceeded to Rick Smith's residence to make the arrest.

Sergeant Durdall observed a vehicle being operated near the listed address and ran the license plate number. The registered owner was respondent James Anthony Smith, who had the same last name and registered address as Rick Smith. Based on what he could see of the driver's hair, Sergeant Durdall concluded that the driver was male. Because the vehicle was registered to someone with the same last name and address as Rick Smith, and because it was driven by a male, Sergeant Durdall concluded that the driver of the vehicle could be Rick Smith and began following the vehicle.

Sergeant Durdall testified that when the vehicle approached a controlled intersection, the vehicle's tires passed the stop sign before coming to a complete stop. He believed that this constituted a traffic violation, and continued to follow the vehicle. Because he was a new officer, he requested assistance in making the stop and potential arrest.

When Sergeant Durdall approached the vehicle, he learned that the driver was not Rick Smith, but the registered owner, respondent James Smith, who is Rick Smith's father. The officer noticed indicia of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes and the smell of alcohol. Respondent was subsequently charged with two counts of first-degree driving while impaired and one count of driving in violation of a restricted license.

A contested omnibus hearing was held on December 12, 2007. The district court concluded that the investigatory stop of respondent's vehicle was unlawful and that, as a result, evidence of his intoxication must be suppressed. Charges against him were therefore dismissed, and the state appeals.

DECISION

"In an appeal of a pretrial ruling suppressing evidence, this court will only reverse the district court if the state demonstrates `clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996) (quoting State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992)). Here, respondent does not dispute that the district court's suppression of the evidence related to the stop critically impacted the outcome of the trial. Thus, this court need only consider whether the district court clearly and unequivocally erred in suppressing the evidence of the stop.

"In reviewing a district court's determinations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo." State v Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000); see also Berge v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985). This court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and accords great deference to the district court's credibility determinations. Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87; State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff'd, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). A reviewing court gives "due weight to the inferences drawn from [factual findings made] by the district court." State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).

The district court may make reasonable inferences from the facts. Groe v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 615 N.W.2d 837, 842 n.2 (Minn. App. 2000) (finding that although the district court's choice of words, "medical staff indicated," appeared to be in error, the finding itself was not clearly erroneous as it could be inferred from other testimony), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 2000). Findings may be implicit in the district court's conclusion. See Modaff v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 664 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that implicit in the district court's decision was the finding that the officer's account of the event was credible and the testimony of the driver and his passengers was not); Umphlett v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. App. 1995) (concluding that Umphlett was not denied an opportunity for a second chemical test based on implicit finding by the district court), review denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995); Daley v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that it was implicit in the district court's determination that the district court found the alcohol-concentration test to be reliable).

Following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), an officer must have a specific and articulable suspicion of a violation before stopping a vehicle. Marben v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980), review denied (Minn. Aug. 1, 1980). The stop must be based upon "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion [of an investigatory stop]." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

I.

The state argues that Sergeant Durdall's observation of what he believed to be a traffic violation under Minn. Stat. § 169.30(b) (2006) justified the investigatory stop. Minnesota cases "do not require much of a showing in order to justify a traffic stop. Ordinarily, if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle." State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997); see also State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Minn. 1980) (finding stop lawful, despite no actual violation of traffic laws, where defendant's car was proceeding at an exceptionally slow speed and weaving in its lane just after bars had closed). But a stop may not be based on mere "whim, caprice, or idle curiosity." Marben, 294 N.W.2d at 699.

In State v. George, an officer stopped a motorcycle because it appeared to have three headlights, a lighting configuration that the officer incorrectly believed to be in violation of state law. 557 N.W.2d at 577. In fact, the motorcycle had a legally permissible number of headlights. Id. at 578. Because the officer was incorrect regarding the lighting statute, the supreme court held that the officer "did not have an objective legal basis for suspecting that . . . George was driving his motorcycle in violation of any motor vehicle law (or that he was violating any other law)." Id. at 578.

The rule that "an officer's mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop" has since been affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824 (Minn. 2004). An officer's subjectively reasonable interpretation of a statute that has not been so interpreted by appellate courts does not provide a basis for a stop, because the determining factor is whether the officer correctly concluded that the driver was violating the traffic law, not whether the officer subjectively believed that this was the case. Id. at 823; State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. App. 2007) ("When a stop is premised on an ostensible violation of a traffic law, a mistaken interpretation of that law cannot provide the requisite objective basis for suspecting the motorist of criminal activity.").

In Minnesota, "[e]very driver of a vehicle shall stop at a stop sign or at a clearly marked stop line before entering the intersection, except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal." Minn. Stat. § 169.30(b). Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, a driver must stop at a stop sign "before entering the intersection." Id. An intersection is

(a) . . . the area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.

(b) Where a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. In the event such intersecting highway also includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of two roadways of such highways shall be regarded as a separate intersection.

Minn. Stat. § 169.01, subd. 36 (2006).

The only published case considering the manner in which a person must stop at a stop sign in order to comply with this statute is Bohnen v. Gorr, 234 Minn. 71, 77, 47 N.W.2d 459, 463 (1951). "One of the main purposes of the statute requiring a vehicle to stop before entering a through highway is to afford the driver of the vehicle a reasonable...