State v. Smith
Decision Date | 10 May 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 19322.,19322. |
Citation | 138 A.3d 223,321 Conn. 278 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Dante SMITH. |
Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom were Russell C. Zentner, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Peter A. McShane, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
, C.J.
This certified appeal requires us to construe the scope of the public safety exception to Miranda1 as articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984)
. The defendant, Dante Smith, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–60 (a)(1). See State v. Smith, 149 Conn.App. 149, 160, 86 A.3d 524 (2014). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his statements made (1) at the crime scene and (2) later at the police station during his booking. Because we conclude that the public safety exception applied, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural background are relevant to the defendant's claim. “On the night of March 9, 2010, the victim, Justin Molinaro, was driving his Audi [A6] in the vicinity of Maplewood Terrace, a public housing complex in Middletown known to be a high crime area. As he drove past the complex, two unidentified men flagged him down and informed him that his cousin, the defendant, wanted to speak with him. The victim drove his car into a parking lot at Maplewood Terrace, where he saw the defendant get into the backseat of another car. The victim exited his Audi and asked the defendant what he wanted. While the victim was waiting for the defendant, he saw Tykeem Privott, who was also in the car with the defendant. The victim noticed that Privott had a supply of marijuana on his lap and began to chastise Privott for his drug use. As the victim talked to Privott, the defendant got out of the car wielding a Louisville Slugger aluminum baseball bat, which he used to strike the victim on the head. The blow knocked the victim to the ground, and the victim asked the defendant, ‘[W]hat the hell is going on?’ The other occupants of the vehicle then exited the car and began to kick and punch the victim as he lay on the ground.
“After treating the victim, the police processed the crime scene and secured the area surrounding Maplewood Terrace, where a crowd had gathered. Approximately forty minutes after the assault took place, a black male calmly approached [Detectives] Dan Smith and Nicholas Puorro [of the Middletown Police Department]. As he drew near, he stated, ‘I am Dante Smith, my grandmother said the police were looking for me.’
. At the police station, the defendant repeated the statements he made to the police at the crime scene after receiving Miranda warnings. Id., at 154, 86 A.3d 524
.
“The defendant was charged in a seven count amended information, which included two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59 (a)(1)
. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the police at the crime scene and during his booking at the police station, arguing that they were inadmissible pursuant to Miranda .... A hearing on the motion to suppress was held during which the defendant argued that the statements he made to the police while he was handcuffed at the crime scene should be suppressed because he was in police custody and interrogated without having received Miranda warnings.” (Citation omitted.) Id., at 153–54, 86 A.3d 524. The trial court denied the motion, finding in its memorandum of decision both that “the Terry2 stop [of the defendant] was amply justified and the length and intrusiveness of the stop were lawful pursuant to Terry ” and, despite the defendant's argument that he should have been given his Miranda rights or had the handcuffs removed immediately after the pat down revealed no weapons, that “under all the circumstances, the investigative detention was properly continued, especially in view of the officers' concerns for public safety and their own safety and the extremely brief duration, one to two minutes at most.”3 “The [trial] court also found, with respect to the statements made at the police station during his booking, that the defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights and that he waived his rights when, during his booking, he repeated the statement[s] he made to the police at the crime scene.
“Following a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a–60 (a)(1)
, and rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense. The defendant was found not guilty of all other charges. The court merged the two assault convictions and sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of five years incarceration, execution suspended after forty months, followed by five years probation with special conditions.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 149 Conn.App. at 154, 86 A.3d 524.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant argued that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his statements to the police violated his fifth amendment rights and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings at the crime scene. Id. The Appellate Court disagreed and held that the Quarles public safety exception did apply without deciding whether the defendant was in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Id., at 155, 159, 86 A.3d 524
. Consequently, because the questioning at the crime scene of the defendant was justified, the Appellate Court found the doctrine articulated in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616–17, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), which requires the suppression of a subsequent, voluntary confession when the police intentionally violate Miranda in obtaining the initial confession, to be...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Burgos
...n.3, 122 A.3d 608 (2015).29 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).30 See State v. Smith, 321 Conn. 278, 288, 138 A.3d 223 (2016) ("[t]he definition of interrogation [for purposes of Miranda ] can extend only to words or actions on the part of police ......
-
State v. Garrison
...questions asked to the crime committed is highly relevant." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith , 321 Conn. 278, 288, 138 A.3d 223 (2016).We begin by examining the factual circumstances of the police conduct surrounding the defendant's statements. Each of th......
-
State v. Edwards
...they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith , 321 Conn. 278, 288, 138 A.3d 223 (2016) ; see also State v. Betances , 265 Conn. 493, 500, 828 A.2d 1248 (2003).In order to establish that he was entitled to Miran......
-
State v. Sumler
...asked to the crime committed is highly relevant." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith , 321 Conn. 278, 288–89, 138 A.3d 223 (2016).In the present case, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that Officer Aklin's conversation with the defend......
-
A Survey of Criminal Law Opinions
...grounds, 327 Conn. 984, 175 A.3d 561 (2017). [250] Id. at 777-78. [251] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). [252] State v. Smith, 321 Conn. 278, 288, 138 A.3d 223 (2016) (quoting State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419, 428, 11 A.3d 116 (2011)). [253] Id. [254] 321 Conn. 278, 138 A.3d 223 (201......
-
A Servey of Criminal Law Opinion
...grounds, 327 Conn. 984, 175 A.3d 561 (2017). [250] Id. at 777-78. [251] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). [252] State v. Smith, 321 Conn. 278, 288, 138 A.3d 223 (2016) (quoting State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419, 428, 11 A.3d 116 (2011)). [253] Id. [254] 321 Conn. 278, 138 A.3d 223 (201......