State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 18 April 1936
• Docket Number: No. 592.,592.
• Citation: 184 A. 494
• Parties: STATE v. SMITH et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

184 A. 494

STATE

v. SMITH et al.

No. 592.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 18, 1936.

Case certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.

George W. Smith and others were indicted for conspiracy to steal, defendants Anderton and Goldberg filed demurrers and motions to quash the indictment, and the trial justice certified the question raised thereby.

Question answered, and case remanded.

John P. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., and Michael De Ciantis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

George Hurley, Walter Adler, and Walter V. Moriarty, all of Providence, for defendants.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This is an indictment which charges that the defendants conspired together between certain dates to steal the property of the National & Providence Worsted Mills, a Rhode Island corporation. In the superior court, the defendants Anderton and Goldberg filed demurrers and motions to quash the indictment on the ground that the law under which said indictment was drawn is unconstitutional.

The trial justice, upon motion of the defendants and pursuant to the provision of section 1, c. 348, of the General Laws 1923, certified the question thus raised to be determined by this court. This question, as far as it may be considered as properly certified, does not require us to construe the statute in its relation to all possible evidence that may or may not be contemplated in a future trial. Upon this certification, we are concerned with only that much of the constitutional question which has been formally raised and which we have found necessary for determination according to the record before us.

The indictment is brought according to the form authorized in section 3, clause 5, of chapter 1954 of the Public Laws of 1932 (page 302), entitled: "Of Proceedings in Criminal Cases," which section reads as follows: "The following forms may be used in the cases in which they are applicable: * * * Conspiracy.—A. B. and C. D. conspired together to murder E. F. (or to steal the property of E. F., or to rob.

E. F.)."

The indictment before us charges: "The Grand Jurors of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations and for the Counties of Providence and Bristol, duly impanelled and sworn in said County of Providence, on the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty-four upon their oaths present, that George W. Smith, alias John Doe, Herman P. Goldberg, alias Richard Roe, and Arthur J. Lessard, alias John Doe, all of Providence in said County of Providence, and Raymond J. Anderton, alias Richard Roe, of Newport in the County of Newport on, to wit, the first day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two with force and arms, at Providence in the aforesaid County of Providence, and on divers other dates thereafter from time to time between, to wit, the first day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two and, to wit, the thirtieth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty-three, did fraudulently and unlawfully, conspire together to steal the property of The National and Providence Worsted Mills, a Rhode Island corporation. Against the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State."

The defendants contend that this is not an indictment by the grand jurors as contemplated in the Constitution; that it charges no crime known to the common law or described in any statute; that if either of such crimes be charged, it fails to set out sufficiently the nature thereof and the cause of the accusation; that it fails to charge any crime with sufficient certainty to enable the defendants to plead their acquittal or conviction thereon as a defense to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense; and because of these alleged deficiencies, the indictment is in violation of their rights under sections 7 and 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island, and also is repugnant to the provisions of section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The state takes a contrary position in respect to all of the contentions made by the defendants.

The constitutional question thus raised and presented for our immediate determination may be stated as follows: Is that portion of section 3, clause 5, of chapter 1954 of the Public Laws of 1932, entitled "Conspiracy," repugnant to and in violation of sections 7 and 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of Rhode Island or of section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore invalid?

In view of our conclusion, expressed later in this opinion, upon the sufficiency of this indictment under our law and Constitution, it is unnecessary to quote the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or to consider at length the allegations of these defendants to the effect that this indictment and statute deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and without guaranteeing to them the equal protection of the law of the land. Suffice it to say, that similar contentions were made by the defendant in the case of Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 11 S.Ct. 224, 34 L.Ed. 816, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States considered and answered adequately the same arguments in this regard as are advanced by the defendants before us. In that case, the indictment, following the Texas statutory form of expression, charged the defendant substantially with killing a person. The defendant, upon pleading "not guilty," was tried accordingly, and convicted thereon of murder of the first degree. The defendant filed his motion for a new trial which the trial court denied, and the defendant thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he contended that the indictment was so insufficient in substance that it violated the provisions of the Constitutions of the state of Texas and of the United States. The Texas Court of Appeals, 28 Tex.App. 566, 14 S.W. 122, however, sustained both the sufficiency of the indictment and the consequent conviction. A writ of error was allowed to be sued out to the United States Supreme Court, and the case was there heard upon the state's motion to dismiss, and this motion was granted and the writ of error dismissed.

The Supreme Court there held 137 U.S. 692, at page 697, 11 S.Ct. 224, 226, 34 L. Ed. 816: "By the fourteenth amendment the powers of the states in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited, but no state can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law. Law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and, when secured by the law of the state, the constitutional requisition is satisfied. 2 Kent Comm. 13. * * * No question of repugnancy to the federal constitution can be "fairly said to arise when the inquiry of the state court is directed to the sufficiency of an indictment in the ordinary administration of criminal law, and the statutes authorizing the form of indictment pursued are not obviously violative of the fundamental principles above adverted to. * * * The plaintiff in error was not denied the equal protection of the laws, nor deprived of the process due by the law of the land. The constitution of Texas secured to him the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the state court determined, as was its province, that this demand was satisfied by the indictment in question. His objections were in effect to the technical sufficiency of the indictment, but not that his rights had been determined by any other rules than those applied to the rest of the community, nor that the court had done more than commit errors in the disposition of a subject within its jurisdiction."

The requirements of the Constitution of Texas in regard to the rights of one indicted for crime are substantially similar to the requirements of the Rhode Island Constitution; the contentions of the defendant in the Caldwell Case invoked the benefit of the same basic constitutional safeguards as are here claimed; the arguments were addressed as here to the technical or legal sufficiency of the indictment; and otherwise they were substantially the same as made by the defendants in the instant case. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the specifications in the defendants' motion to quash alleging violation of their rights under article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States will be answered adequately in accordance with the Caldwell Case, supra, if we find that the indictment here is sufficient according to our laws and Constitution.

The remaining contentions presented by the defendants are important and require a consideration of our Constitution, of the statutes, and of the indictment.

The pertinent parts of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which the defendants have invoked in their behalf, read:

"Section 7. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment by a grand jury. * * * No person shall, after an acquittal, be tried for the same offence."

"Section 10: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; * * * nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."

In addition to the portion of clause 5, § 3, c. 1954, previously set forth, the following portions of this statute will help us to understand the purpose of the General Assembly, and to pass upon the sufficiency of the form of indictment authorized therein and followed in the indictment before us. These clauses are as follows: "Section 3. Clause 1. No indictment, complaint or criminal process shall be abated or quashed for any want of form,...