State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 25 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 52323-0-II,52323-0-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. KEONTE AMIR SMITH, Appellant. |
CRUSER, J. — Keonte Smith appeals his sentence for second degree human trafficking. Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion when failing to fully and meaningfully consider his youth as a mitigating factor during sentencing, and the community custody supervision fee, collection fee, and the interest accrual provision on his nonrestitution legal financial obligations (LFOs) should be stricken from his judgment and sentence.
We hold that the trial court considered Smith's youth as a mitigating factor and acted within its discretion when it denied his request for an exceptional sentence downward and affirm his sentence. However, we remand to the trial court to vacate the interest accrual provision on his nonrestitution LFOs from Smith's judgment and sentence.
On November 24, 2016, law enforcement received a complaint regarding an unwanted person in a motel room. Upon their arrival to the motel room, law enforcement found Smith in the room with a handgun next to him. Smith was arrested and placed in detention.
While Smith was in detention, law enforcement reviewed recorded detention phone calls between Smith and his girlfriend, HH. HH met Smith two months prior to Smith's arrest. In several of the phone calls, Smith and HH discussed prostitution and prostitution-related activities. During multiple phone conversations, HH spoke of "bringing money in" and told Smith about other males who wanted HH to work on their "team." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 186. Smith expressed frustration about HH pairing up with other males. Smith told HH that it was not "safe" to go on hotel dates while he was in detention and that if she needs help, to call his sister or a mutual friend. Id. Smith directed HH to put money on his phone account in detention and warned her that she better not be "with someone else." Id. at 187. At the time, HH was 16 years old and Smith was 17 years old.
After Smith's arrest, the defense interviewed HH. During the interview, HH stated that she and Smith jointly decided to engage in prostitution when they "decided to make money together." Id. at 60. HH explained that Smith would help her set up dates and get hotel rooms. HH kept all the money and would not give any to Smith, although he often would steal some of the money for himself. HH also put some of the money she made on dates on Smith's phone account while he was in detention.
The State charged Smith with second degree human trafficking, promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The State moved for the juvenile court to decline juvenile jurisdiction pursuant to former RCW 13.40.110(2) (2009). After considering testimony from multiple witnesses, arguments from counsel, and the pleadings, the court granted the State's motion and ordered Smith to be transferred for adult criminal prosecution. Among other considerations, the court noted that the adult court would be required to consider youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing in the event Smith was convicted.
Smith pleaded guilty to second degree human trafficking and the State dropped all other charges.
The trial court calculated Smith's offender score as 2.5. Based on that offender score, Smith faced a standard range sentence of 111 to 147 months of incarceration and 18 months of community custody. Smith requested an exceptional sentence of 36 months of incarceration followed by 18 months of community custody. In juvenile court, second degree human trafficking carries of sentence of 103 to 129 weeks of confinement.
Smith submitted a 75 page sentencing memorandum to the court. In his sentencing memorandum, Smith highlighted revisions to the Juvenile Justice Act that took effect in June 2018, less than a year after Smith was denied juvenile jurisdiction.1 The legislature revised the act to eliminate the crime of second degree human trafficking as a basis for declining juvenile jurisdiction to a respondent. Smith argued that the change supported an exceptional sentence aligned with a sentence Smith would be facing if sentenced in juvenile court.
Also in his sentencing memorandum, Smith provided information about his upbringing. Throughout his childhood, Smith's father was in and out of jail. His mother used drugs extensively and drank heavily. His mother often left Smith with others or would abandon him with strangers. Smith witnessed his father abuse his mother starting at a young age. Smith remembers his father stuffing a sock into his mother's mouth and beating her when he was a toddler. Smith frequently witnessed his father beat his mother with his fists, a belt, or other objects. His mother was oftenhospitalized, and his father was often arrested for these assaults. Smith stated he frequently has nightmares about the violence.
Smith's childhood worsened when he was 12 years old. Smith's father took Smith and his older brother to a lake to swim after his parents got into an argument. Smith could not swim, but remembers watching others frantically search for his brother in the lake after his brother was heard screaming for help and seen flailing his arms. Their efforts were unsuccessful. Smith remembers watching a rescue team bring his brother's body out of the water 45 minutes later. Smith expressed how he suffers daily trauma from this event, including nightmares of how his brother looked when the rescue team pulled his body from the water.
After this incident, Smith became depressed and anxious. He started doing poorly in school and he dropped out of his sports teams. Smith described becoming less social and getting into trouble more often. Less than six months after his brother's death, Smith was arrested for his first offense at age 13. Smith has been in and out of custody ever since.
Also, after his brother's death, Smith's father moved out of the home. His mother moved another man into the home, who was a known drug dealer and former pimp. He would give Smith drugs to sell so that Smith could earn his own money. Smith started using marijuana in sixth grade; by ninth grade, Smith used marijuana, Xanax, and alcohol on a daily basis.
Smith presented a forensic assessment by Dr. Ronald Roesch, a clinical psychologist, for consideration by the court during sentencing. Smith had "very high scores on the Anxiety and Depression scales." Id. at 141. Roesch concluded that Smith was a low to moderate risk for recidivism and low risk for future violent behavior. The factors that elevated these risks were not in Smith's control, which included his unstable and abusive home life, negative adult role models,and lack of social support network, which forced Smith to leave his home to survive at an early age. Roesch also noted that Smith had a low risk for violent behavior because prior to his arrest, Smith did not have a history of violent behaviors or anger issues.
Roesch concluded that Smith's level of maturity and sophistication was lower than other youth offenders. He noted that young individuals with Smith's maturity and sophistication "have a diminished capacity for judgment, do not tend to weigh the costs and benefits of a given behavior before acting, and do not fully understand the consequences of their actions." Id. at 144.
[Smith] did not have at the time of his arrest, sufficient sophistication or maturity to function autonomously. His scores on the Sophistication-Maturity scale described earlier in this report indicated that he had difficulty appreciating the long-term consequences of decisions, was less capable of imagining risky consequences of decisions, and more likely to only consider only a restricted number and range of consequences. In terms of his involvement in the behavior that led to his charge of human trafficking, it does not appear that he perceived the magnitude or the long-term consequences of this offense. Indeed, it appears that he may not have grasped that what he was doing was wrong, either morally or criminally. As noted earlier in this report, [Smith] said He told me Certainly, ignorance of the law is not an excuse for engaging in this criminal act, but his thinking does reflect his lack of maturity and sophistication. A review of the telephone calls he made from detention reflects this lack of appreciation. He was aware his calls were monitored yet he did not try to be discrete in discussing the acts of prostitution with H.H.
Roesch also explained Smith's low maturity and sophistication level as related to his cognitive development.
In my clinical opinion, although [Smith] was living what appeared to be an adult lifestyle when he was arrested at age 16, he did not have the maturity and cognitive development to appreciate the choices he was making. He was clearly engaged in a delinquent lifestyle, and had been since age 13. This type of lifestyle is virtually all he learned through the adults in his life. . . . As the research on brain development clearly shows, [Smith's] capacities for reasoned decision making and controllinghis impulses were not developed during his teen years prior to his arrest. He was also using drugs quite heavily, which I expect was further clouding his judgment about his life choices.
The assessment also concluded that Smith scored above most young offenders in amenability to treatment. Roesch submitted that Smith ...
To continue reading
Request your trial