State v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 22 January 1924
• Docket Number: 1139
• Citation: 222 P. 40,30 Wyo. 468
• Parties: STATE v. SNYDER
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

222 P. 40

30 Wyo. 468

STATE v. SNYDER

No. 1139

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 22, 1924

ORIGINAL proceedings in mandamus by the State, on the relation of the Board of County Commissioners of Goshen County, against John M. Snyder, as State Treasurer. Heard on demurrer to respondent's answer. See also 129 Wyo. 199 212 P. 771.

Erle H Reid for the demurrer.

Chapter 50, Laws 1921 was held constitutional in a former decision of the Court. (212 P. 771.); the present issue is as to the revenue loss suffered by Goshen County by reason of property exempted in 1921; an item of $ 1,546.02 may be deducted from the original claim, leaving a balance of $ 6,395.06 respondent admits a loss to plaintiff of $ 3,230.55; "County Tax" as used in the act was intended to distinguish between State and County taxes as a whole, and not to limit the reimbursement to taxes actually lost by the County as distinguished from school districts and towns within it. The intent of this law is to make the burden fall upon the State at large and thus equalize the burden of exemption as between the several counties of the State; the State Treasurer is the proper officer to audit relator's claim. Art. XVI, Sec. 7, Const. Paragraph six of the act in question requires county treasurers to submit to the State Treasurer etc.; submission is defined as yielding to authority, 37 Cyc. 345; Millver v. Wolfe, 63 Ia. 233, 18 N.W. 889; Washburn v. Lufkin, 4 Minn. 466; Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S. 161, 43 N.H. 176; Terr. v. Grant, 3 Wyo. 241, 21 P. 693. The Constitution does not direct that the State Auditor is the only officer to whom claims against the State Treasurer must be presented for audit. The provisions of Sec. 118 C. S. contains an exception which takes the act under which relator claims, out of the statute; clearly, claims of this class must be submitted to the State Treasurer, for audit, before allowance in payment. We believe the demurrer should be sustained.

Embree H. Foster and Vincent Carter, Amicus curiae.

Relator asks this Court to construe the words "County Tax" to include; general County tax; general County School tax; general bond sinking fund; taxes of Cities and Towns; and School Dist. taxes for all purposes. If it was the intention to make the State bear the burden rather than the counties, the principle of equality and uniformity should prevail, and the benefits each county derives should be based on some uniformity of ratio to the burdens imposed. Equality and uniformity could not obtain by following relator's theory. Contributions demanded must be public in nature. Cooley p. 105; Kirley v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258. The difference in the rate of levy imposed for town and city taxes differs in such a way, that the principle of uniformity is impossible when reimbursement is considered, and the same is true as to benefits derived under the exemption. A distinction not warranted by the Constitution. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 233; Hammett v. Phila., 65 Pa. St. 146; Judson p. 343. The Legislature never intended that the words "County Tax" should include the tax of school districts and cities and towns; such taxes have always been distinguished from county taxes. 2853, 2934, C. S.

D. J. Howell, Atty. Gen. and W. L. Walls, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Relator contends that the words "County Tax" as used in the Act were used to distinguish between State and County taxes as a whole; we believe the intention is unsound; the statute clearly states that reimbursements shall be for the actual amount of County tax on property exempted, less poll taxes so exempted by such county, taxes levied for State revenue; support of common schools; for county revenue for all purposes and a poll tax of $ 2.00 on all persons over the age of twenty-one and under fifty, for school purposes are all of the purposes for which a county is authorized to levy taxes for actual county purposes; a county is a distinct body corporate independent of other subdivisions of the State. 1300 C. S., so are school districts. 2237 C. S., and cities and towns 1624-1655-1695 and 1751; under 2238 C. S. school districts vote district tax to meet their particular needs; this district tax is collected by the County, but is not county tax, 2853 C. S., it is therefore an actual county tax, as the term is used in the exemption statute. There is nothing in Section 1, of Chap. 50, Laws 1921 requiring the State Treasurer to audit relator's claim; the words "audit" and "submit" have a different meaning. The Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 7 describes the manner in which State money shall be paid out, and sub-division of Sec. 118, C. S. 1920 makes it the duty of said Auditor to audit and settle claims against the State.

POTTER, Chief Justice. BLUME and KIMBALL, JJ., concur.

OPINION

POTTER, Chief Justice.

This court's original jurisdiction in mandamus as to state officers granted by the constitution is invoked by this proceeding. The relator, the Board of County Commissioners of Goshen County, seeks to have the state treasurer required to reimburse that county to the actual amount of the county tax on property exempted in said county in 1921 under the provisions of an act approved February 15, 1921, known as the Soldier's Exemption Statute, and published as Ch. 50 of the Laws of that year. That act amended Sec. 2753, Comp. Stat. 1920, declaring certain described property to be exempt from taxation. The section was thereby amended by reenacting the 4th and 5th paragraphs thereof and adding a 6th paragraph. The 5th paragraph of the section had declared exempt the property of all honorably discharged veterans of the Civil War to the amount of $ 2000 in assessed valuation, and it was amended and reenacted by the statute in question so as to exempt to said amount of assessed valuation the property of all honorably discharged veterans of the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and the World War, their widows during their widowhood, and all nurses who served during the World War, and by adding a provision that no person shall be entitled to such exemption unless he or she be a bona fide resident of this state.

The case was previously heard on a demurrer to the application for the writ (212 P. 771) raising certain questions as to the constitutionality of the statute, and the statute was held to be valid in every respect in which it was assailed, including the 6th paragraph again before us, this time for construction. We might add to the authorities then cited sustaining the validity of that paragraph the following:

Bexar Co. v. Linden, 110 Tex. 339, 220 S.W. 761; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 85 Okla. 161, 204 P. 910; Town of Milton v. Cook, 244 Mass. 93, 138 N.E. 589. The court say in the Texas case:

"The effect of the statute * * * is to set apart the excess fees of District Attorneys and other officials as State funds for governmental purposes of the State with whose execution the counties, as instrumentalities of the State, are charged. Such a dedication is in no true sense a grant of public money. It is but an appropriation of funds of the State for the uses of the State. It is therefore a constitutional use, having no character of a bounty or gratuity."

The said 6th paragraph is generally understood and may be described as providing for reimbursement by the state to the several counties for tax losses on account of such exemptions. It reads as follows:

"Sixth. --It shall be the duty of the several county treasurers throughout the State of Wyoming to submit to the state treasurer, on or before the first day of March in each year, a certified statement of the exemptions allowed by said counties under the provisions of this act, and on or before the first day of May following, said state treasurer shall reimburse each of such counties to the actual amount of the county tax on such property exempted, less poll taxes so exempted by such counties."

The original application for the writ alleged that the county treasurer of Goshen County had submitted to the State Treasurer a certified statement of the exemptions in said county under the statute, showing a loss to the county in taxes amounting to $ 7941.08; that the State Treasurer had failed, refused and neglected to reimburse the county therefor, notwithstanding that an appropriation for the purpose had been made by the legislature at its said session in 1921. It was suggested in concluding the opinion disposing of the demurrer to the application for the writ, that it might be necessary for an issue to be made up respecting the amount of the county's claim properly payable out of the state treasury under the said sixth paragraph of the statute. Following that suggestion an amendment to the application for the writ was filed, separating the amount claimed for such exemptions by said county for the year 1921 into its various items as follows: State tax $ 1546.02; General County tax $ 1951.33; General County School tax $ 924.60; General bond sinking fund tax $ 354.62; Special school district tax $ 2564.19; School district bond interest fund tax $ 108.91; Taxes levied for the town of Lingle, $ 90.70; Taxes levied for the town of Torrington, $ 392.71.

An answer was thereafter filed by the respondent admitting everything alleged in the petition or application as amended except: It denies that Goshen County lost through said exemptions the total amount alleged, or any sum greater than $ 3230.50, the aggregate of the loss of $ 1951.33 of the general county tax, $ 924.60 of the general county school tax, and $ 354.62 of the general county bond sinking fund tax, and that the respondent is willing and able to pay said amount. And it alleges that the respondent is prohibited from paying money from the state treasury except upon warrant drawn by...