State v. Snyder, 1998-KA-1078.

• Citation: 942 So.2d 484
• Decision Date: 06 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1998-KA-1078.,1998-KA-1078.
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Allen SNYDER.
• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

942 So.2d 484

STATE of Louisiana v. Allen SNYDER.

No. 1998-KA-1078.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

September 6, 2006.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 2006.

Capital Appeals Project, Jelpi P. Picou, Jr., Marcia A. Widder, Aneel L. Chablani, for applicant.

Charles C. Foti, Jr., Attorney General, Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, James A. Williams, Alfred A. Olinde, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WEIMER, Justice.^*

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, this court ultimately affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. Currently, the case is on remand from the United States Supreme Court, which directed that we again review defendant's Batson claims, this time in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). After reviewing defendant's Batson complaints cumulatively in light of the entire record as directed by Miller-El, we find the trial court did not err in determining the veni-repersons were not excused by the State in a racially discriminatory manner. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, the judgment affirming defendant's conviction and sentence is reinstated.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was indicted in Jefferson Parish for the first-degree murder of Howard Wilson.¹ On June 28, 1996, defense counsel was notified in writing that the State was seeking the death penalty. A trial was subsequently held. During voir dire, defendant charged that the State exercised several of its peremptory challenges against African-American prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court denied defendant's Batson challenges. Consequently, defendant, who is African-American, was tried by an all-white jury. On August 29, 1996, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. After finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance,² the same jury unanimously determined defendant should receive the death penalty. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of death.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence directly to this court pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D), which provides that a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a penalty of death actually has been imposed. This court reviewed defendant's Batson claims and concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in its denial of the claims. State v. Snyder, 98-1078, p. 11 (La.4/14/99), 750 So.2d 832, 842 (Snyder I). Thus, we conditionally affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, but remanded the case to the trial court for a retrospective determination of defendant's competency at the time of trial, if one could be made. Id., 98-1078 at 43, 750 So.2d at 863.

Following our remand, the trial court held a bipartite hearing to determine whether a nunc pro tunc ruling could be made with respect to defendant's competency at the time of trial and whether defendant was competent to proceed with trial. The trial court ruled that a retrospective determination of defendant's competence was possible and that defendant was competent at the time of trial. Defendant appealed these rulings to this court. Upon finding the trial court complied with procedural due process requirements and the testimony and evidence supported the trial court's determination of competency, this court unconditionally affirmed the judgment of the trial court and sentence of death. State v. Snyder, 98-1078, p. 11 (La.4/14/04), 874 So.2d 739, 745 (Snyder II).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United States granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of this court, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317.³ Snyder v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d 884 (2005).

LEGAL PRECEPTS

The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits engaging in purposeful discrimination on the grounds of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. The Miller-El decision that forms the basis for this remand was the third in a trilogy of Supreme Court opinions related to the allegedly discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges in criminal trials. The trilogy presents a pendulous treatment by the Court of the issue of the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that equal protection has been denied through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude individuals from the petit jury on the basis of race.

In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the Supreme Court recognized that a State's purposeful or deliberate denial of participation as jurors on account of race violates the Equal Protection Clause. Reviewing the "very old credentials" of the peremptory challenge system, the Court noted the "long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." Id., 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 835. The majority of the Court sought to accommodate both the prosecutor's historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control and the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service on account of race. Because the State may not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held it was impermissible for a prosecutor to use challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial" or to deny to them "the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population." Id., 380 U.S. at 224, 85 S.Ct. at 838. Thus, proof by a defendant that members of his race were struck from his jury was insufficient; a defendant's burden was to show the circumstances under which prosecutors were responsible for striking minority jurors beyond the facts of a particular case. Id. 380 U.S. at 223-228, 85 S.Ct. at 838-840. Proof of repeated striking of African-Americans over a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Twenty-one years after Swain, the Court swung the pendulum in the opposite direction, finding that the evidentiary formulation of Swain was inconsistent with standards that had developed during those years for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause. In Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93, 106 S.Ct. at 1721, the Court called the Swain requirement "a crippling burden of proof" that had made prosecutors' peremptory challenges "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." The Court held that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. Evidence of a pre-existing pattern of discrimination in previous cases was no longer required.

Another 19 years later, in Miller-El, the Supreme Court moved the pendulum back toward middle ground. Stating that although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant free to challenge the prosecution without having to cast Swain's "wide net," the Court noted the net should not have been consigned to history; Batson's individualized focus had an inherent weakness of its own caused by its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor might give. "If any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain." Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. at 2325. Thus, the Court reiterated—this time in a habeas proceeding⁴—Batson's explanation that a defendant may rely on "all relevant circumstances" to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id.⁵

Nevertheless, the Court left the Batson test intact in Miller-El and reaffirmed that position in Rice v. Collins, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). Louisiana law codifies the Batson ruling in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 795(C), which provides:

No peremptory challenge made by the state or the defendant shall be based solely upon the race of the juror. If an objection is made that the state or defense has excluded a juror solely on the basis of race, and a prima facie case supporting that objection is made by the objecting party, the court may demand a satisfactory racially neutral reason for the exercise of the challenge, unless the court is satisfied that such reason is apparent from the voir dire examination of the juror. Such demand and disclosure, if required by the court, shall be made outside of the hearing of any juror or prospective juror.

The race-neutral explanation need not be persuasive or even plausible. Collins, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 973-974, quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). It will be deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation. The ultimate burden of persuasion as to racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the peremptory challenge. State v. Tyler, 97-0338, p. 3 (La.9/9/98), 723 So.2d 939, 942, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 1472, 143 L.Ed.2d 556 (1999). The trial court's findings with regard to a Batson challenge are entitled to great deference on appeal. Id. at 4;⁶ see also, State v. Juniors, 03-2425, p. 28 (La.6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 316. When a defendant voices a Batson objection to the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge, the finding of the absence of discriminatory intent depends upon whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. "Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how...