State v. Sodders, 68931
| Citation | 872 P.2d 736,255 Kan. 79 |
| Decision Date | 15 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 68931,68931 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Robert L. SODDERS, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court
1. General and specific statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the specific statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling.
2. Where there is a conflict between two statutes, the latest legislative expression ordinarily controls.
3. K.S.A. 22-2401a is a specific statute setting limitations on the jurisdiction of certain law enforcement officers and controls over K.S.A. 22-2505, a more general statute limiting the execution of search warrants to law enforcement officers.
4. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, and there is no need to resort to statutory construction.
Stephen M. Howe, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Paul J. Morrison, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief for appellant.
Michael J. Bartee, Asst. Dist. Defender, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This is an interlocutory appeal by the State from a district court order suppressing evidence. The district court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the police acted outside their jurisdiction. The Kansas Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, 18 Kan.App.2d 657, 856 P.2d 1360 (1993), affirmed the district court. This court granted the State's petition for review.
The facts are not in dispute. On March 14, 1990, Overland Park Police Detectives Russ Gardner and Mark Meyer obtained a search warrant from Johnson County District Judge Earle D. Jones. The search warrant was for the apartment of the defendant, Robert L. Sodders, in Lenexa, Johnson County, Kansas.
Prior to execution of the warrant, the Overland Park police detectives contacted Lenexa Police Sergeant Dave Burger, told him they were going to execute a search warrant in Lenexa, and requested assistance. The Lenexa Police Department dispatched three uniformed officers to provide security at the apartment. Detective Meyer obtained a key from the apartment manager and used it to enter the residence. All five officers entered the apartment. Detectives Meyer and Gardner executed the search warrant. The three Lenexa officers were there for security only and did not participate in the search.
In the residence, the detectives found two plastic bags containing green leafy vegetation, one wallet, one letter, O'Haus scales, plastic Baggies, a brown marble box, one plate, Zig-zag papers, one address book, and one telephone bill. Detective Gardner testified that there was marijuana on the plate and in the marble box. Detective Gardner filled out and signed the "Inventory, Receipt and Return to Search Warrant" form.
The defendant filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. The court granted defendant's motion, finding the Overland Park police officers executed the warrant outside their jurisdiction in violation of K.S.A. 22-2401a.
This case involves the interpretation and interaction of two statutes. First, K.S.A. 22-2505 states: "A search warrant shall be issued in duplicate and shall be directed for execution to all law enforcement officers of the state, or to any law enforcement officer specifically named therein."
The second statute, K.S.A. 22-2401a, states in relevant part:
"(2) Law enforcement officers employed by any city may exercise their powers as law enforcement officers:
(a) Anywhere within the city limits of the city employing them and outside of such city when on property owned or under the control of such city; and
(b) in any other place when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person." (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that the Lenexa officers never requested or sought assistance from the Overland Park police. The State contends that K.S.A. 22-2505 authorizes police officers statewide authority to execute search warrants. The State maintains that both a proper application of the rules of statutory construction and the legislative history surrounding the passage of K.S.A. 22-2505 demonstrate that the Overland Park police detectives were acting within their authority in executing a search warrant in Lenexa.
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the language of K.S.A. 22-2401a places a geographic limitation on the exercise of all law enforcement powers, including the execution of search warrants. In pertinent part, the Court of Appeals stated:
18 Kan.App.2d at 658-69, 856 P.2d 1360.
The State's first and primary argument in opposition to the lower court's ruling is that the court failed to apply the proper rules of statutory construction in interpreting the two statutes. Specifically, the State contends that the Court of Appeals failed to consider and apply the "general versus special statutes rule." That rule states: "General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling." Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 244 Kan. 343, 353, 770 P.2d 423 (1989).
It is the State's contention that K.S.A. 22-2505, a statute dealing solely with the execution of search warrants, is the more specific statute, and not K.S.A. 22-2401a, a statute setting forth a limitation upon the territory in which law enforcement officers may operate. However, while K.S.A. 22-2505 admittedly applies only to the execution of search warrants, the language of that statute simply cannot be read as an exception to the clear geographic limitation set forth in K.S.A. 22-2401a. This conclusion is supported by this court's decision in State v. Hennessee, 232 Kan. 807, 658 P.2d 1034 (1983).
In Hennessee, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant in Pratt County on a charge of theft. The Pratt County sheriff traveled to the defendant's residence in Stafford County and arrested the defendant pursuant to the arrest warrant. Although both an agent of the KBI and the local Stafford County sheriff were present at the arrest, the Supreme Court ruled that the Pratt County sheriff had no authority to make the arrest in Stafford County. 232 Kan. at 807-09, 658 P.2d 1034. In its ruling, the Supreme Court determined that the specific language of K.S.A. 22-2401a controlled over the general provision of K.S.A. 19-812 (Ensley 1981), which stated:
"The sheriff, in person or by his undersheriff or deputy, shall serve and execute, according to law, all process, writs, precepts and orders issued or made by lawful authority and to him directed, and shall attend upon the several courts of record held in his county, and shall receive such fees for his services as are allowed by law."
In pertinent part, the court stated:
"The State relies on K.S.A. 19-812 for the proposition the Pratt County sheriff was acting within his authority when he arrested Ms. Hennessee. Admittedly the statute places no limitation upon the territory in which a sheriff may operate. Further, the statute applies to the execution of an arrest warrant since 'process' refers to a 'warrant, writ, order, mandate or other formal writing, issued by some court, body or official having authority to issue process....'
(Emphasis added.) 232 Kan. at 808-09, 658 P.2d 1034.
In Hennessee, we held:
232 Kan. 807, 658 P.2d 1034, Syl. p 2.
As stated previously, it is undisputed that the Lenexa officers did not request assistance from the Overland Park officers and were present solely as a courtesy to the Overland Park officers who requested their assistance.
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