State v. Solis

Decision Date04 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. SD 32312.,SD 32312.
Citation409 S.W.3d 584
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jean Marie SOLIS, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

409 S.W.3d 584

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Jean Marie SOLIS, Appellant.

No. SD 32312.

Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District,
Division One.

Oct. 4, 2013.


[409 S.W.3d 588]


Alexa I. Pearson, of Columbia, Missouri, for appellant.

Chris Koster, Attorney General and Mary H. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, of Jefferson City, Missouri, for respondent.


WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., C.J.

A jury convicted Jean Marie Solis (“Solis”) of the class B felony of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of section 195.211, RSMo Cum.Supp. (2003).1 Solis was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. Solis alleges the trial court erred in overruling her motion to suppress and admitting that evidence at trial, and that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. This appeal followed. Finding no merit to Solis's claims, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural Background

Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's denial of Solis's motion to suppress and the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at the motion hearing and at trial. See State v. VanOrsdel, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, No. SD31926, 2013 WL 2255868, at *1 (Mo.App.S.D. May 23, 2013); State v. McDonald, 321 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Mo.App.S.D.2010).

At the time of trial, Officer Scott Parish (“Officer Parish”) had been a certified law enforcement officer with the Lake Area Narcotics Enforcement Group (“task force”) for approximately twelve years. The task force investigated narcotics-related incidents in six counties, including Crawford County.2 Officer Parish had investigated “hundreds” of methamphetamine labs in his twelve-year career. In the year before Solis's arrest, the task force had investigated fifty-four methamphetamine labs, either active or dumpsites, in Crawford County alone.

On April 21, 2011, Officer Parish was at the Walmart in Cuba, Crawford County, Missouri, to pick up a soda. As he went back to his vehicle, Officer Parish saw Solis and Daniel Means (“Means”) enter the Walmart parking lot and park their vehicle. Officer Parish had previous encounters with Solis and Means involving methamphetamine laboratories and arrests. Officer Parish waited in his vehicle, and moments after Solis entered Walmart, Officer Parish was alerted by the “National Precursor Log Exchange” system (“NPLEx”) 3 that Solis had just purchased 120 milligrams of pseudoephedrine. Solis then exited Walmart with a small bag in her hand and got back into the vehicle. Means then exited the vehicle and went into Walmart alone. When Means came out, Officer Parish did not see a bag in his hand, so Officer Parish called the Walmart Pharmacy and confirmed that Means had also purchased pseudoephedrine.

[409 S.W.3d 589]

Officer Parish then called Sergeant Andrew Swearingin with the Missouri State Highway Patrol and Officer Adam Carnal with the Cuba Police Department for assistance in what he perceived and believed to be a narcotics investigation. All three officers followed Solis and Means, in their separate vehicles, to a storage unit in Crawford County; Solis was the driver of the vehicle. As the officers pulled up, Solis was near the vehicle in front of an open storage unit, Number 15, and Means appeared to throw something into the vehicle.

When Officer Parish first arrived, he made contact with Solis and Means and asked about the transactions at Walmart; Solis was deceptive and not forthcoming about what happened. Officer Parish then asked permission to search the vehicle Solis was driving and the storage unit. Solis gave verbal consent to the requested search, and was cooperative and cordial; Officer Parish did not request a signed consent. From the vehicle, officers seized a box of pseudoephedrine and a bottle of Heet.4 Heet is commonly used as a solvent in manufacturing methamphetamine.

From the storage unit, officers seized lye, mason jars with modified lids, tubing, a transfer hose, and a propane tank. A blue duffle bag containing fertilizer stakes, acid, lye, and tubing was also seized. In relation to manufacturing methamphetamine, these items could be used in the manufacture of methamphetamines; for example, lye is used in the absence of anhydrous ammonia, and propane tanks can be used for storing anhydrous ammonia or to cool down gas ammonia into a liquid. The search also revealed matchbooks with the striker plates removed. The striker plates are used in the “Red” and “Black” methamphetamine manufacturing methods.5

A search of Means resulted in officers finding a baggie that field testified positive for the presence of methamphetamine, and a box of pseudoephedrine pills in Means' back pocket.

Solis was charged by amended information in the Circuit Court of Crawford County as a prior and persistent offender with attempt to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of section 195.211. Prior to trial, Solis's defense counsel filed a “Motion to Suppress Evidence,” which was seized from her “personal vehicle and her rented storage shed.” A hearing was held on the motion and it was denied. During the jury trial, Solis's counsel objected to the admission of this evidence; the trial court overruled the objection.

The jury convicted Solis of attempt to manufacture a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Solis as a prior and persistent offender.

Solis contends the trial court erred in: (1) overruling her motion to suppress and admitting evidence at trial that was seized from her truck and storage unit because the “investigatory detention” was not based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Solis did not voluntarily consent to a search, and Officer Parish did not have statutory authority to engage in this conduct outside of Camden County where he worked; and (2) the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that: (1)

[409 S.W.3d 590]

the search was valid because Solis gave her consent for the search; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to prove each element of the charged offense.

The primary issues necessary for resolution of this appeal are:

1. Did the trial court err in overruling Solis's motion to suppress and in admitting evidence at trial that was seized from Solis's truck and storage unit?

2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Solis committed the crime of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine?

Point I: Motion to Suppress

In her first point, Solis claims the trial court erred in overruling her motion to suppress. Specifically, she contends the investigation done by the officers violated her right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure because it was conducted without reasonable suspicion. Solis also argues she did not voluntarily consent to a search of her vehicle. In the alternative, Solis argues that the search exceeded the scope of the consent, and Officer Parish was acting outside of his jurisdiction so he did not have lawful authority to conduct the detention, search, or arrest.

Standard of Review

“A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. banc 2007). “This Court defers to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, and considers all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Whether conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Id.

Analysis

Solis first argues “the investigatory detention was unlawful since it was not based on reasonable suspicion and the officer's belief that criminal activity was afoot was admittedly based on past encounters.” “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that individuals will not be subject to unreasonable searches or seizures.” Id.

Under the principles outlined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer may make an investigatory stop of a person, in the absence of probable cause, when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. For such a stop to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity.

State v. Hawkins, 137 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Mo.App.W.D.2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted).


Reasonable suspicion is an objective determination based on the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officer had a basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. “A suspicion is reasonable when the officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). Knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement cannot alone provide the requisite “reasonable suspicion,” but can be one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis. State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. banc 2011).

Here, there was reasonable suspicion for Officer Parish to talk to Solis and investigate based on her behavior, along

[409 S.W.3d 591]

with Means' behavior, at Walmart: Solis entering Walmart alone to purchase pseudoephedrine and returning to her vehicle; Means entering Walmart alone to purchase pseudoephedrine; neither Means nor Solis making any other purchases in Walmart; an alert by NPLEx that Solis had just purchased 120 milligrams of pseudoephedrine; and confirmation from Walmart Pharmacy that Means also purchased pseudoephedrine. Officer Parish testified two people purchasing pills at the same time is an indicator that manufacture of methamphetamine is going to occur. See State v. Brand, 309 S.W.3d 887, 895 (Mo.App.W.D.2010) (holding officer, through his training,...

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2 cases
  • State v. Cady
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 2014
    ...product containing pseudoephedrine, whereupon the buyer's name is immediately recorded into the national database.” State v. Solis, 409 S.W.3d 584, 588 n. 3 (Mo.App.2013). 4. Defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the subsequent entry into the shop building based upon information ob......
  • State v. Pierce
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 2016
    ...756, 769 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citations omitted); accord State v. Cady, 425 S.W.3d 234, 243 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014); State v. Solis, 409 S.W.3d 584, 591 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). The subject's mental state, such as a state of intoxication, is also relevant to the voluntariness of consent to searc......

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