State v. Sopher
| Citation | 30 N.W. 917,70 Iowa 494 |
| Parties | THE STATE v. SOPHER |
| Decision Date | 21 December 1886 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Mahaska District Court.
DEFENDANT was convicted of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for life, in accord with the verdict of the jury fixing the punishment. He now appeals to this court.
REVERSED.
W. S Kenworthy, for appellant.
A. J Baker, Attorney-general, for the State.
I.
The defendant was convicted of the murder of his father, Moses H. Sopher, Sr. The evidence tends to establish the following facts: The deceased, defendant, and another man, named Dunn, in June, 1884, visited in company a village in the neighborhood of the residence of deceased. They rode together in a spring wagon. The defendant was then about twenty-one years of age, and married; the father, about forty-two. While in the village they all drank intoxicating liquors, and two of them carried with them away from the town bottles containing the same kind of liquor. They were under the influence of the liquor, and to some extent intoxicated, while pursuing their way home-ward. An altercation arose among them, and the father used violence towards the son, who, in a conflict, inflicted eleven wounds upon the father with a pocket knife, all of them upon the breast, belly and abdomen, except one upon the thigh. One of the wounds in the belly penetrated the cavity of the body, causing death from injuries inflicted upon the bowels. The record discloses the old story, so frequently repeated in the proceedings of our courts, of crime committed while the criminal is under the maddening influence of intoxicating liquors. By this crime two families are broken up; the father of one being consigned to the tomb, and of the other to the penitentiary for life. The county is subjected to great expense, and humanity disgraced by a patricide. Whence this dreadful crime? From the traffic in intoxicating liquors, forbidden alike by the laws of God and man.
II. We will proceed to consider the various objections to the judgment raised by defendant's counsel in this court. Certain jurors were challenged by defendant for cause, on the ground that they disclosed in their respective examinations upon voir dire that each had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of defendant, which rendered him incompetent to sit in the case. Each stated in substance that he had knowledge of facts said to be connected with the crime, gained from newspapers or otherwise, upon which he had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence; but such opinion was subject to change or modification, upon the juror's learning that the facts differed from information which he had before acquired, and that the opinion he entertained would not prevent him from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence to be submitted at the trial. Such an opinion does not render a juror incompetent. Code, § 4405. And the juror himself may show on his voir dire that his opinion is of this character. State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa 530.
III. Certain admissions of the defendant to the effect that he committed the crime were made to the officer who first arrested him while he was in the officer's custody. The officer testified to these admissions, against defendant's objection. It appears that the admissions were freely and voluntarily made, and were not influenced by hope or fear, and were not even made in response to questions asked by the officer. The evidence was rightly admitted, and no objection can be based upon the fact that the admission was made to the officer while defendant was in his custody after the arrest. State v. McLaughlin, 44 Iowa 82.
IV. Counsel insist that the verdict ought to have been set aside by the court below, for the reason that the evidence shows death resulted from the negligence and want of professional skill of the physician and surgeon who attended the deceased after he received the wounds. We need not inquire whether the facts alleged by counsel, if established, would be a mitigating circumstance demanding a different verdict, for the reason that the evidence upon the questions of care and skill exercised by the physician is conflicting, and the jury may well have found that the wound causing death was necessarily mortal, and no treatment, however skillful and careful, would have saved the life of the wounded man.
V. Upon the branch of the case considered in the preceding point, the district court gave the jury an instruction in the following language: "Whether the wound claimed by the state to be mortal was or was not in fact such, or, if not mortal whether death resulted solely from mismanagement or maltreatment, you should determine after counseling...
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