State v. Soto
| Decision Date | 05 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 12–17–05,12–17–05 |
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 459,94 N.E.3d 618 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Travis SOTO, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Short, for Appellant.
Lillian R. Shun, for Appellee.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Travis Soto ("Soto"), brings this appeal from the April 13, 2017, judgment of the Putnam County Common Pleas Court denying Soto's motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy.
{¶ 2} On or about January 23, 2006, Soto's toddler son was killed. Soto represented to law enforcement and the Lucas County Coroner that his son was struck while Soto was driving an all-terrain vehicle ("ATV") and that his son died as a result. Consistent with Soto's representations to law enforcement, the coroner concluded that the child died of blunt force trauma caused by an ATV accident.
{¶ 3} On March 31, 2006, Soto was charged with Child Endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) /(E)(1)(c), a felony of the third degree, and Involuntary Manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a felony of the first degree. It was alleged that Soto committed Involuntary Manslaughter by causing the death of his son while committing the predicate felony offense of Child Endangering.
{¶ 4} Subsequently, Soto entered into a negotiated plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to Child Endangering and in exchange the Involuntary Manslaughter charge was dismissed. As a result of Soto's conviction, the record indicates that Soto was sentenced to serve 5 years in prison.
{¶ 5} On or about July 25, 2016, Soto voluntarily appeared at the Putnam County Sheriff's Office and allegedly indicated that he wanted to provide a "truthful" account of what happened to his son. Soto told the police that he had actually beat his son to death back in 2006 and that he had staged the ATV accident scene.
{¶ 6} The Lucas County Coroner's original 2006 report was then reviewed by a pediatric abuse specialist who concluded that the toddler had actually died of multiple blunt force trauma due to Soto's violent actions. The expert concluded that Soto's original 2006 misrepresentations "led to the reasonably yet faulty conclusions of the Lucas County Coroner." (Doc. No. 29).
{¶ 7} On August 15, 2016, Soto was indicted by the Putnam County Grand Jury for Aggravated Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(C), an unclassified felony, Murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), an unclassified felony, Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01, a felony of the first degree, and Tampering with Evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree.
{¶ 8} On October 11, 2016, Soto filed a "Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Double Jeopardy." In the motion, Soto argued that in his original 2006 prosecution, a charge of Involuntary Manslaughter was dismissed when he pled guilty to Child Endangering. Soto contended that the judgment entries and transcripts from that case did not address whether the matter would be dismissed with or without prejudice, but the "entries in the record makes one think that a change of pleas [sic] to child endangering also disposed of the involuntary manslaughter charge." (Doc. No. 28). Soto contended that Involuntary Manslaughter was a lesser included offense of both Murder and Aggravated Murder, which he argued would bar a subsequent prosecution of Soto on those charges.
{¶ 9} On October 18, 2016, the State filed a response. The State contended that pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), Aggravated Murder contained different elements than Involuntary Manslaughter, which would allow multiple prosecutions. As to the Murder charge, the State argued that pursuant to State v. Bridges , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-602, 2015-Ohio-4480, 2015 WL 6522860, ¶ 11, a negotiated guilty plea only barred successive prosecutions where the defendant would " ‘ "reasonably believe that his or her plea would bar further prosecutions for any greater offense related to the same factual scenario." ’ " Bridges citing State v. Church , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-34, 2012-Ohio-5663, 2012 WL 6048724, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Edwards , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94568, 2011-Ohio-95, 2011 WL 213041, ¶ 23.
{¶ 10} The State contended that because of his prior false narrative Soto could not have reasonably believed that his negotiated plea to Child Endangering would bar prosecution of subsequent homicide charges based on the truth. Further, the State argued that subsequent prosecution on a more serious crime was not barred in a situation where the State was unable to proceed on a more serious charge because the additional facts necessary to sustain the charge had not yet occurred or had not yet been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence. See Brown v. Ohio , 432 U.S. 161, 169, fn. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2227, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
{¶ 11} On April 13, 2017, the trial court filed its judgment entry determining Soto's motion to dismiss. The trial court found that pursuant to Blockburger , Felonious Assault, Kidnapping, Tampering with Evidence, and Aggravated Murder all required proof of an element not required or included in the original prosecution of Child Endangering and Involuntary Manslaughter, which would permit multiple prosecutions. As to the Murder charge, the trial court determined that Soto could not have reasonably believed that his 2006 negotiated plea based on his prior false narrative of events would bar prosecution of a purposeful homicide. Further, the trial court indicated that Involuntary Manslaughter with a Child Endangering predicate was not the same offense as Murder with a Felonious Assault predicate. Finally, the trial court determined that the facts to support the 2016 indictment could not have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence until the additional evidence was uncovered. Thus the trial court overruled Soto's motion to dismiss.
{¶ 12} It is from this judgment that Soto appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our review.1
The trial court erred [in] overrul[ing] Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds.
{¶ 13} In Soto's assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Specifically, Soto argues that his 2006 plea that resulted in the dismissal of the Involuntary Manslaughter charge should bar the current prosecution because Involuntary Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of Aggravated Murder and Murder. Further, Soto argues that the trial court did not support its finding that Soto could not have reasonably believed that the earlier dismissal would bar future prosecution for the death of Soto's son. Finally, Soto argues that the State did not reserve any right to bring additional charges in the original dismissal of his Involuntary Manslaughter charge.
{¶ 14} Appellate courts review the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy de novo, "because it is a pure question of law." State v. Mutter , 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 13, citing State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 16, citing Castlebrook, Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd. Partnership, 78 Ohio App.3d 340, 346, 604 N.E.2d 808 (2d Dist.1992).
{¶ 15} "Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the double jeopardy guarantee serves ‘a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit.’ " State v. Liberatore, 4 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 445 N.E.2d 1116 (1983), quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). The question in this case is whether the State would violate that guarantee if it prosecuted Soto for Aggravated Murder and Murder after a charge of Involuntary Manslaughter was dismissed pursuant to a 2006 plea agreement with Soto for actions resulting in the death of his son.2
{¶ 16} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this protection applies to individuals prosecuted by the State of Ohio. State v. Brown , 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 10, citing Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 786, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). Similarly, the Ohio Constitution provides, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. The Supreme Court of Ohio has described the protections afforded by the Ohio and United States Constitutions' Double Jeopardy Clauses as "coextensive." Mutter , supra at ¶ 15, citing State v. Martello , 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7, citing State v. Gustafson , 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996).
{¶ 17} Principally, "The Double Jeopardy Clauses [of both Constitutions] protect against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’ " Mutter at ¶ 15 quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).
{¶ 18} "In determining whether an accused is being successively prosecuted for the ‘same offense,’ the [Supreme Court of Ohio] * * * adopted the ‘same elements' test articulated [by the Supreme Court of the United States] in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 [.]’ " State v. Zima , 102 Ohio...
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