State v. South, Docket No. 31107 (Idaho App. 4/16/2009)
| Decision Date | 16 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31107. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHAEL S. SOUTH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonner County. Hon. Steven C. Verby and Hon. James R. Michaud, District Judges.
Order of the district court denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas, affirmed; judgment of conviction and sentence, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Michael S. South appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. South also contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation prior to and in aid of sentencing and that the sentence imposed was excessive. We affirm.
South was charged with felony domestic battery, Idaho Code § 18-918(3)(6), and second degree kidnapping, I.C. §§ 18-4501, 18-4503. These charges stem from an altercation involving South, his wife Monika (the victim) and another male acquaintance, in which, after an evening of drinking, the victim was struck and, when she attempted to flee, was forcibly returned to and confined in her automobile until she was able to successfully flee. Pursuant to a plea agreement, South pled guilty to both charges, and the State dismissed charges in unrelated cases and agreed to recommend a sentence of no more than two to fifteen years but with the court to retain jurisdiction. The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with seven years determinate for kidnapping. During the appellate process, after determining that the district court had not imposed sentence on the felony domestic battery charge, by stipulation of the parties, the matter was remanded for sentencing. The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years with seven years determinate for felony domestic battery, to run concurrent with the sentence on the kidnapping charge. South filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied.
South contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714 P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action. Id. Also of importance is whether the motion to withdraw a plea is made before or after sentence is imposed. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that a plea may be withdrawn after sentencing only to correct manifest injustice. The stricter standard after sentencing is justified to ensure that the accused is not encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. Freeman, 110 Idaho at 121, 714 P.2d at 90. Accordingly, in cases involving a motion to withdraw a plea after sentencing, appellate review is limited to reviewing the record and determining whether the trial court abused its sound discretion in determining that no manifest injustice would occur if the defendant was prohibited from withdrawing his or her plea. State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). It is the defendant's burden to establish manifest injustice. State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 930, 894 P.2d 159, 163 (Ct. App. 1995). South's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was filed after sentencing.
Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional standards, which require that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002). Compliance with these standards turns upon whether: (1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Id. The validity of a plea is determined by considering all the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record. State v. Hawkins, 117 Idaho 285, 288, 787 P.2d 271, 274 (1990). South contends that the charging document did not adequately set forth the elements of the crimes charged and that his attorney failed to review the elements of the crimes with him. He claims, therefore, that he was unaware of the nature of the charges when he entered his pleas and, as such, his pleas were not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered.
In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, and voluntariness requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he or she is pleading guilty. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484, 861 P.2d 51, 54 (1993); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). Due process does not require, however, that an explanation of every element of the offense must always be given to the defendant on the record before a valid guilty plea may be taken. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). Regarding the necessity of description of every element of an offense, the United States Supreme Court, in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), stated:
There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the offense; we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is required.
Morgan, 426 U.S. at 647 n. 18 (emphasis added).
An adequate understanding of the offense to permit a valid guilty plea may be gained by a defendant in ways other than an explication from the court. Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583. One factor to be considered is whether the charge or a pleaded element of the charge is a self-explanatory legal term or so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that a lay person understands it. Id. In Mayer this Court held that, when the district court referred to a charge as battery with intent to commit rape, the court sufficiently conveyed that the charge alleged an intent to sexually penetrate the victim. Id. at 648-49, 84 P.3d at 584-85. This Court reasoned that the common meaning of the word "rape" is sexual penetration under circumstances in which the victim does not consent. Id. at 648, 84 P.3d at 584.
In this case, as to the felony domestic battery charge, the information stated:
The Defendant, Michael S. South, on or about the 15th day of August, 2003, in the County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did actually, intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the person of Monika D. Jones, aka Monika D. South, against her will by striking her in the mouth, face and nose with his fists and choking her. Where the Defendant and Monika D. Jones, aka Monika D. South are household members.
South contends that the information was insufficient to convey the nature of the charge because the information lacked any allegation that the infliction of traumatic injury was done "willfully," as required in I.C. § 18-918, as it existed in 2003. The State argues that words "actually" and "intentionally," as used in the information, are substitutes for "willfully," and adequately convey that the action was done on purpose.
The district court held that "intentionally" and "striking" connote willfulness. We agree. While it may be preferable for the charging document to utilize the statutory language, the information adequately conveys the charge that the conduct alleged was willfully committed. In addition, the district court referenced our decision in State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 459, 95 P.3d 76, 77 (Ct. App. 2004), where we held that use of the word "striking" in the information sufficiently implied willful or intentional conduct under the domestic battery statute. While Sohm addressed the sufficiency of the information for jurisdictional purposes, the meaning and connotation of these words are not changed by that context.
As to the kidnapping charge, the information alleged:
The Defendant, Michael S. South, on or about the 15th day of August, 2003, in the County of Bonner, State of Idaho, did willfully seize, confine, kidnap and/or take Monika D. Jones, Monika D. South within the State of Idaho with the intent to cause her to be kept or detained against her will and did force her into a motor vehicle to be so confined, kept or detained. South contends that the information was insufficient to convey the nature of the charge because the information lacked any allegation that he acted "without authority of law," as required in I.C. § 18-4501. The State argues that South was aware the kidnapping charge included the unlawful nature of the confinement and that the violent nature of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, including the victim's multiple efforts to escape, informed him of the unlawfulness element in the charge. The State also points to the language in the information, following the charge, which states: "All of which is contrary...
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