State v. Spady

• Decision Date: 30 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. DA 14–0089.,DA 14–0089.
• Citation: 380 Mont. 179,2015 MT 218,354 P.3d 590
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Robert E. SPADY, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

380 Mont. 179
354 P.3d 590
2015 MT 218

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant
v.
Robert E. SPADY, Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 14–0089.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued April 27, 2015.
Submitted April 28, 2015.
Decided July 30, 2015.

354 P.3d 593

For Appellant: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy A. Hinderman (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Bernie Cassidy, Lincoln County Attorney, Joseph Cik, Deputy County Attorney, Libby, Montana.

For Appellee: Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender, Koan Mercer (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana.

For Amicus Curiae: David M. McLean, Mark R. Taylor, Jessie L. Luther, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C., Helena, Montana.

Opinion

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

380 Mont. 180

¶ 1 The State of Montana appeals from the order of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County, remanding the case to Justice Court with instructions to allow Robert Spady to withdraw his plea and grant

380 Mont. 181

his motion to dismiss the contempt charges. On February 19, 2015, we issued an order assuming supervisory control over this proceeding. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and address the following issue:

¶ 2 Whether the District Court erred when it granted Spady's motion to dismiss and concluded that the 24/7 Sobriety Program is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Responding to the alarming levels of drunk driving in Montana, the 2011 Legislature enacted the Montana 24/7 Sobriety Program Act, §§ 44–4–1201 through 1206, MCA¹ . The stated purpose of the Act is “to protect the public health and welfare by reducing the number of people on Montana's highways who drive under the influence of alcohol or dangerous drugs; and to strengthen the pretrial and posttrial options available to prosecutors and judges in responding to repeat DUI offenders.” Section 44–4–1202, MCA.

¶ 4 To this end, § 44–4–1205, MCA, permits a court, as a condition of pretrial release of an individual accused of a second or subsequent drunk driving offense, to require the individual to submit to twice-daily alcohol breath tests and payment of the associated fees. Participants pay $2 per test. A person commits the offense of criminal contempt by purposely failing to comply with the testing requirements of the 24/7 Sobriety Program. Section 45–7–309(1)(g), MCA.

¶ 5 Lincoln County officers arrested Robert Spady on April 20, 2013, and charged him with Driving Under the Influence and Careless Driving. Two days later, he appeared in Lincoln County Justice Court for his Initial Appearance and entered a plea of not guilty. Justice of the Peace Sheffield ordered Spady to participate in the 24/7 Sobriety Program as one of eight conditions of his release on bond. Spady had a prior DUI conviction in November 2006.

¶ 6 Spady missed three tests while enrolled in the 24/7 Sobriety Program. On August 7, 2013, after 113 days of participation, he filed a motion to lift the testing requirement. The Justice Court granted the motion. The Lincoln County Attorney's Office charged Spady with three counts of criminal contempt under § 45–7–309(1)(g), MCA, for the three missed tests. Spady moved the Justice Court to dismiss all contempt charges, arguing that § 44–4–1205, MCA, was unconstitutional on the following grounds: (1) the statute was

380 Mont. 182

unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) it violates

354 P.3d 594

the Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail;² (3) it violates the Equal Protection Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment due to its disparate impact on indigent defendants, specifically infringing their right to travel, right to a jury trial, and their right to privacy from governmental examination of their breath sample; and (4) it violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process right to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Spady also argued § 44–4–1205(3), MCA, was unconstitutional as applied to him because he had no opportunity to present evidence of his ability to pay and was charged with a first offense DUI.

¶ 7 The Justice Court denied Spady's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the condition imposing the 24/7 Sobriety Program was appropriate due to Spady's diminished privacy expectation and analogized the fees to other fees historically borne by pretrial defendants. The court noted that Spady presented no evidence of his inability to pay the fees, could have moved to amend the imposed conditions at any time under § 46–9–108(2), MCA, and was granted his request to stop participation after 113 days in the program.

¶ 8 On September 23, 2013, Spady entered into a plea agreement with Lincoln County prosecutors. Pursuant to the agreement, Spady agreed to plead nolo contendere to the contempt charges in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the DUI and Careless Driving charges. Spady asked the court to apply the amount he paid in 24/7 Program fees to his fines on the contempt charges, although there is no indication this actually occurred. Additionally, he expressly reserved his right to appeal the Justice Court's order denying his Motion to Dismiss “based on constitutional challenges to Mont.Code Ann. § 44–4–1205(3).”

¶ 9 In October 2013, Spady appealed to the District Court and filed a motion to dismiss the contempt charges. After a hearing, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. The District Court concluded that § 44–4–1205, MCA, specifically the phrase “second or subsequent violation,” was unconstitutionally vague and “leads to arbitrary and prejudicial results.” Additionally, the District Court concluded that the 24/7 Sobriety Program constituted an improper delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General for failure to provide objective criteria on the determination of the fee. Finally, the District Court disagreed with the Justice Court's conclusion regarding the fees,

380 Mont. 183

holding that the 24/7 Sobriety Program, as a condition of bond, constitutes pretrial punishment that violates the due process rights of criminal defendants.

¶ 10 Although Spady asked the District Court to remand with instructions to dismiss, the court found that such relief was not within the scope of § 46–12–204(3), MCA. Instead, the District Court remanded the case to the Lincoln County Justice Court with instructions to allow Spady to withdraw his nolo contendere plea, to grant his motion to dismiss the contempt charges, and to proceed to trial on the original charges dismissed under the plea agreement if the State sought to renew them.

¶ 11 The State appealed the District Court's order to this Court. Although this case was initially filed as a direct appeal, this Court has decided to exercise its power of supervisory control because of the unique procedural obstacles presented in this case. The Court determined supervisory control was necessary to review two questions: (1) the constitutional issues upon which the District Court relied in its order declaring the 24/7 Sobriety Program unconstitutional, and (2) the Fourth Amendment search and seizure implications of the pre-trial 24/7 Sobriety Program. Article VII, Section 2(2) of the Montana Constitution provides this Court with general supervisory control over all other courts. The Supreme Court may exercise its supervisory power over all other courts, on a case-by-case basis. M.R.App. P. 14(3). This extraordinary remedy can be invoked when the case involves purely legal questions and urgent or emergency factors make the normal appeal process inadequate. M.R.App. P. 14(3) ; Redding v. McCarter, 2012 MT 144A, ¶ 17, 365 Mont. 316, 281 P.3d 189. The case must meet one of three additional

354 P.3d 595

criteria: (a) the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice; (b) constitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved; or (c) the other court has granted or denied a motion for substitution of a judge in a criminal case. M.R.App. P. 14(3)(a–c). We have elected to exercise our power of supervisory control over this case because the case presents purely legal questions, there may not be an adequate remedy on appeal, and constitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved. Oral argument was held on April 27, 2015.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. A party challenging a statute's constitutionality must establish, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute is unconstitutional, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute.”

380 Mont. 184

State v. Michaud, 2008 MT 88, ¶ 15, 342 Mont. 244, 180 P.3d 636. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Knudson, 2007 MT 324, ¶ 12, 340 Mont. 167, 174 P.3d 469. When reviewing a question of constitutional law, including the issue of...