State v. Sparks, 47685
| Decision Date | 10 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 47685,47685 |
| Citation | 217 Kan. 204,535 P.2d 901 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Kenneth D. SPARKS, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a criminal case, the issue on appeal is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the evidence is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the state.
2. A verdict of guilty in a criminal case will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury could draw a reasonable inference of guilt.
3. The probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar and there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned to each.
4. Malice, as an element of murder in the second degree, may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
5. Incriminating statements or admissions which are made freely and voluntarily without threat of force or compulsion are not barred under the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, but are admissible in evidence.
6. The court is not required to define phrases or words in an instruction unless from a fair reading of the instructions as a whole there is likelihood the jury will be misled or left to speculate without further explanation.
Michael Lerner, of Barnett & Lerner, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Salvatore A. Scimeca, Jr., County Atty., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., was on the brief for appellee.
Defendant (Kenneth D. Sparks) appeals from a conviction by a jury of murder in the second degree. (K.S.A. 21-3402) The victim was LaDonna King, the two-year-old stepdaughter of defendant. The state's case against defendant rested largely upon circumstantial evidence and the sufficiency thereof is the paramount question on appeal.
Because of the nature of the questions raised we have called for and examined the original trial transcript in addition to the record on appeal. The evidence dicloses that about 7 p. m. during the evening of March 18, 1971, defendant drove his automobile into a service station in Junction City. LaDonna and her mother, Linda Sparks, wife of defendant, were in the automobile. Defendant stopped at the station to telephone for an ambulance for LaDonna, who was having difficulty breathing. While defendant was telephoning, Linda screamed for help. Defendant left the telephone and carried LaDonna into the station. Two servicemen, Forrest Campbell and Sergeant Hall, stationed at nearby Fort Riley who had driven into the station for gasoline, responded to the screams by leaving their automobile and running into the service station where they administered mouth to mouth resuscitation to the little girl until the ambulance arrived. Campbell testified that LaDonna was gasping for breath and he observed bruise marks on her neck.
LaDonna was taken by ambulance to Irwin Army Hospital at Fort Riley. She was accompanied by defendant and Donald Sears, as ambulance attendant. The ambulance was driven by Roger Kramer who, as the evidence at trial disclosed, was also employed by the Junction City Police Department as a patrolman. Sears testified that while enroute to the hospital he asked defendant what had happened. Sear's testimony appears in the trial transcript as follows:
Sears also testified that he noticed a bruise about two inches in diameter on LaDonna's right cheek.
On arrival at Irwin Hospital, LaDonna was taken to the emergency room where she was examined by Dr. Andrew J. Gaizuinas, a surgeon. Dr. Gaizuinas testified that he examined the entire body of the child and found multiple bruises over the forehead, chin, arms, trunk and lower extremities; that she was comatose; and that her pupils reacted to light very sluggishly. He defined the word 'bruise' as blunt trauma or physical injury. After seeing the multiple distribution of bruise marks over LaDonna's body, Dr. Gaizuinas had the opinion that the most probable and likely possibility was that she was a so-called 'battered child syndrome.'
After examining the child Dr. Gaizuinas testified that he wanted to find out what happened to her. He went into the lounge, adjacent to surgery, and asked defendant what had happened to cause all the bruises on the child's body. The doctor testified:
A few minutes later, defendant made a further statement to Dr. Gaizuinas. The nature of this statement and the circumstances under which it was made were described by the doctor as follows:
After Dr. Gaizuinas saw the seriousness of the child's condition he called for anesthesia and the assistance of Dr. Hoffman, a pediatrician. The doctors concluded that neurosurgical assistance was needed and Dr. Joseph C. Mirabile, a neurosurgeon, was called. Dr. Mirabile described LaDonna's condition:
Dr. Mirabile went on to say that the main problem seemed to be neurological-a head injury and that the physical symptoms were those of a blood clot on the left side of the brain, and that surgery, which was immediately performed, revealed that the brain was contused, slightly swollen with areas of bruises on it; and that in his opinion these conditions were caused by some physical force applied to the brain.
After surgery to relieve the pressure of a blood clot, LaDonna's condition was stabilized and she remained in Irwin Hospital until March 22 when she commenced convulsions and was sent to Stormont-Vail Hospital in Topeka, where she received further treatment until her death on March 28, 1971.
An autopsy was performed by Dr. Wike Scamman, a pathologist and deputy district coroner. He testified that based upon his examination and reasonable medical certainty, death was caused by swelling of the brain resulting from repeated trauma to the head. It was his opinion that there had been a number of blows to the head, causing the brain to move back and forth inside the skull, and causing multiple small areas of disruption. He further stated that it would require a fairly severe blow to bruise the brain of a child of LaDonna's age.
Defendant took the stand in his own behalf. He testified that he had reprimanded LaDonna for fussing with her mother and that:
Defendant denied that he hit or struck LaDonna or that he intended to kill her. On cross-examination defendant's testimony was uncertain as to whether LaDonna fell over from a sitting or standing position after he sat her down.
Defendant specifies numerous points on appeal. His arguments on points Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 all go to the proposition that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Defendant first contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's evidence. The basic thrust of his argument is that the circumstantial evidence presented did not nor could it prove corpus delicti. Defendant implies that circumstantial evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a murder conviction. Such is not the case. It is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that a conviction of even the gravest offense may be sustained by circumstantial evidence. (State v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 529 P.2d 90, and State v. Hale, 207 Kan. 446, 485 P.2d 1338.) In the recent case of State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728, we held:
'The probative values of direct and circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar and there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Heath
...the issue of the qualifications of the expert witness. See State v. Rowell, 256 Kan. 200, 207, 883 P.2d 1184 (1994); State v. Sparks, 217 Kan. 204, 206, 535 P.2d 901 (1975). Other courts, however, have held that battered child syndrome is an accepted medical diagnosis and has been held to b......
-
State v. Grissom
...1360 (1981); State v. Knoxsah, 229 Kan. 36, 622 P.2d 140 (1981); State v. Johnson, 222 Kan. 465, 565 P.2d 993 (1977); State v. Sparks, 217 Kan. 204, 535 P.2d 901 (1975); State v. Sagebiel, 206 Kan. 482, 480 P.2d 44 The most pertinent case is State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 532 P.2d 1309 (1975)......
-
State v. Dargatz
...according to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death will follow the contemplated act. State v. Sparks, 217 Kan. 204, 209, 535 P.2d 901 (1975). The existence of malice may be inferred from the circumstances attending the assault, such as the use of a deadly weapo......
-
State v. Hutton, 54353
...according to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death will follow the contemplated act. State v. Sparks, 217 Kan. 204, 209, 535 P.2d 901 (1975). The existence of malice may be inferred from the circumstances attending the assault, such as the use of a deadly weapo......