State v. Spates

• Citation: 176 Conn. 227,405 A.2d 656
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 07 November 1978
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph M. SPATES.

Page 656

405 A.2d 656

176 Conn. 227

STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph M. SPATES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 3, 1978.

Decided Nov. 7, 1978.

Joseph M. Spates, pro se, the appellant (defendant), and, as his legal advisor, Donald D. Dakers, Asst. Public Defender.

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty. and John J. Kelly, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

LONGO, Associate Justice.

The defendant was charged in a four-count information with first degree manslaughter, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3), with second degree robbery, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-135(a)(2), and with two counts of first degree unlawful restraint, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95(a). The defendant was convicted by a jury and, from the judgment rendered on the verdict, he has appealed claiming that the trial court erred in certain of its instructions to the jury, in its denial of his request for instructions, in its charge concerning the elements of manslaughter under § 53a-55(a)(3), in its denial of his motion to dismiss, and in its denial of his motion to set aside the verdict.

From a review of the evidence, the jury could have found the following: In the early afternoon hours of May 3, 1974, Mr. and Mrs. Elwyn Murdock of Hamden, Connecticut, received a telephone call from the defendant, identifying himself as Dr. J. Merriwether, who inquired as to whether the Murdocks had antique jewelry and silverware for sale. The Murdocks used a portion of their residence for the sale of antiques by appointment, and arrangements were made for a visit that afternoon by the defendant. At approximately 4 p. m., the defendant arrived and, after viewing the Murdocks' antiques, made arrangements to return later that evening with funds to purchase the items of antique silver that he had selected. During the conversation of that afternoon, Mrs. Murdock, thinking that the defendant was a medical doctor, informed him that her husband had retired to their home to conduct the antique business because of his health, that he had previously had four heart attacks, and that she was now working together with Mr. Murdock. The defendant replied that Mr. Murdock had been lucky so far. At about 9 p. m., the defendant returned and, after casual discussion over a cup of coffee with the Murdocks, drew Mr. Murdock aside and handed him a note informing him that he (the defendant) intended to rob Mr. Murdock. The defendant then forced the Murdocks down to the basement of their home, displaying what appeared to the Murdocks to be a handgun.

Upon reaching the basement, the defendant produced from a briefcase two sets of handcuffs and some rope. He handcuffed Mrs. Murdock's hands and tied her legs, forcing her to lie on her stomach on the basement floor. Mr. Murdock was similarly bound, but the defendant allowed him to lay face up on the floor. At this point, Mr. Murdock began to breathe very heavily and said to the defendant, "Please call a doctor. I'm having a heart attack." After this plea had been repeated several times, the defendant propped up Mr. Murdock's head with a vase; a doctor was never called, however. The defendant then left Mr. and Mrs. Murdock in the basement and proceeded through the house, taking several items of value, and approximately $300 in cash.

After the defendant left the house, Mr. Murdock again stated that he could not breathe and Mrs. Murdock, upon freeing herself, was able to summon an ambulance, which arrived within ten minutes. Mr. Murdock was given mouth-to-mouth cardiopulmonary resuscitation at the Murdocks' residence, but appeared unresponsive. He was pronounced dead at the Yale-New Haven Hospital shortly after arrival. Medical testimony at trial established that the cause of Mr. Murdock's death was a heart attack, brought on by the emotional stress resulting from the action of the defendant. Medical evidence further established that Mr. Murdock had suffered at least two previous heart attacks and was, on May 3, 1974, under a doctor's care for his heart condition. An autopsy performed subsequent to Mr. Murdock's death confirmed the testimony that he had had several prior heart attacks, leaving his heart in a weakened condition.

At the outset, we note that the defendant testified at trial and conceded virtually all of the state's case, with two exceptions, hereinafter to be discussed. Thus, the issues that merit our attention have, by virtue of the defendant's testimony, been considerably narrowed. The defendant's primary claim of error involves two related concepts. He claims that actual, direct physical injury is an element of the crime of manslaughter, as defined by General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3), ¹ and, in relation to this, that the infliction of external physical injury upon a victim must be found before a causal relation between the defendant's conduct and the victim's death may be found to exist. Thus, the defendant argues, the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury concerning "proximate causation" in relationship to the defendant's "conduct" under § 53a-55(a)(3). The defendant appears to argue that since the cause of Murdock's death was not a physical blow inflicted by the defendant, but rather a heart attack caused by the stress of the situation into which the defendant had placed Murdock, he could not, as a matter of law, be found to have "caused" Murdock's death. We disagree.

It may have been the law at one time that there could be no culpable homicide that was not the result of some kind of corporal harm inflicted upon the victim. See, e. g., Regina v. Murton, 3 Fost. & Fin. 492, 176 Eng.Rep. 221 (1862). Today, however, almost all courts have rejected this view of criminal liability. See annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1072. In the present case, we have only to look to the words of the manslaughter statute. Section 53a-55(a)(3) merely proscribes "Conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person." (Emphasis added.) We find no case where this court has construed that word to require the actual infliction of a physical blow. ² We hold that the acts of the defendant constituted "conduct" ³ within the intendment of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3), and that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that they could convict the defendant of manslaughter if they found that the defendant inflicted "emotional injury, stress or trauma" which proximately caused Murdock's death, notwithstanding that the death-inducing act of the defendant was not a physical blow. In this connection, we are further of the opinion that the consequences of the defendant's act of binding Murdock and placing him in extreme fright and shock, which act was the proximate cause of Murdock's heart attack, are not excused, nor is the defendant's criminal liability lessened, by the preexisting heart condition of Murdock which rendered him unable to withstand the situation which the defendant had thrust upon him. See 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, §§ 18, 20, p. 313; annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1072, 1077; LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, Causation, § 35, p. 257. The defendant took Murdock as he found him: "Every person is held to be responsible for the natural consequences of his acts, and if he commits a felonious act and death follows, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated to produce that result." State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 61, 147 A. 118, 121; State v. Alterio,154 Conn. 23, 30, 220 A.2d 451; see Perkins, Criminal Law (2d Ed.), Causation, § 9, p. 727; People v. Stamp, 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819, 91 S.Ct. 36, 27 L.Ed.2d 46; Commonwealth v. Tatro, 346 N.E.2d 724 (Mass.App.). If Murdock's death came about as a result of the conjunction of his heart disease and the violence, shock or excitement caused by the defendant's acts, it was still brought about by the criminal "conduct" of the defendant, for the consequences of which he is answerable. People v. Stamp, supra; see State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E.2d 238.

The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of "proximate cause" under General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3) is without merit. "Proximate cause" in the criminal law does not necessarily mean the last act of cause, or the act in point of time nearest to death. The concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of death. An act or omission to act is the proximate cause of death when it substantially and materially contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient, intervening cause, to the resulting death. It is the cause without which the death would not have occurred and the predominating cause, the substantial factor, from which death follows as a natural, direct and immediate consequence. See State v. Tomassi, supra; State v. Leopold, supra; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 11(b), p. 854; see, generally, Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, pp. 81 et seq.; Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33 Harv.L.Rev. 633. It is unnecessary for "proximate cause" purposes that the particular kind of harm that results from the defendant's act be intended by him. In many situations giving rise to criminal liability, the harm that results is unintended, yet is directly or indirectly caused by an act of the defendant. ⁴ In such cases, where the death or injury caused by the defendant's conduct is a foreseeable and natural result of that conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the defendant criminally responsible. See People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848, 321 N.E.2d 773, rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part, 431 U.S. 145, 97 S.Ct. 1730, ...