State v. Spates

• Decision Date: 19 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 05-0883.,05-0883.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Deangelo SPATES, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

779 N.W.2d 770

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Christopher Deangelo SPATES, Appellant.

No. 05-0883.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 19, 2010.

Clemens A. Erdahl, Eric D. Tindal, and Sara L. Smith of Nidey Peterson Erdahl & Tindal, PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Joel Dalrymple and D. Raymond Walton, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Christopher Spates, was convicted of first-degree felony murder for the killing of a bystander during a gun battle between rival groups in Waterloo, Iowa. Spates raised several issues on appeal, but they were all rejected by the Iowa Court of Appeals. This court subsequently granted his application for further review for purposes of considering two allegations of trial court error: (1) the failure to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and (2) the submission of a "mutual combat" instruction.

We conclude error was not preserved on the trial court's decision not to submit voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. In addition, we hold the trial court did not err in instructing on the theory of mutual combat as a basis for the defendant's culpability as an aider and abettor. We vacate that portion of the court of appeals' decision addressing the defendant's allegations of instructional error and affirm the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the early morning hours of October 10, 2004, a fight occurred between two rival groups, the "L-Block" and "The Hood," in the parking lot of a Waterloo bar. Although the defendant was not present at this fight, several members of his extended family, including his brother, Carl, and cousins, Dorondis and Damean, were involved either as members or associates of The Hood. After the fight, Carl, Dorondis, Damean, and three other Hood members or associates, who had been at the bar fight, drove to the house where the mother of the defendant and Carl lived. The men were angry and decided to "go find" the L-Block members. Carl went into the house and returned with an assault rifle.

The group then proceeded to Damean's house where they met up with the defendant who was driving his mother's GMC Yukon Denali, which he was purchasing from her. The defendant agreed to join in the effort to find the L-Block group. They knew L-Block members sometimes hung out at 130 Harrison Street, so they proceeded to that location, a third car joining them en route. This caravan of cars was captured on video by a police officer who happened to have his camera turned on during an unrelated traffic stop. A trial expert testified that the vehicles shown on this video were consistent with the three cars driven to 130 Harrison, including the defendant's Denali.

Seeing a number of persons outside 130 Harrison, the group parked their vehicles a block away and proceeded on foot to 137 Harrison, an area across the street from 130 Harrison. According to testimony of witnesses at trial, the defendant had a shotgun, his brother had the assault rifle, and other members of the group had additional weapons. Although there was conflicting evidence about who fired the first shot, it is undisputed that shots were fired by the defendant's group. Numerous casings were found at the scene, including evidence that two shotguns had been fired. During the gunfire, a woman in the kitchen of 130 Harrison was killed. Ballistic evidence confirmed the bullet that struck this bystander was shot by an assault rifle, but the bullet could not be linked to any specific weapon.

After the shooting, the individuals in the defendant's group fled the scene. Dorondis had been shot in the shoulder. Accomplice testimony indicated the defendant took Dorondis to a nearby hospital, and DNA evidence confirmed that blood found in the Denali belonged to Dorondis.

Twelve days later, the defendant, his brother, Carl, and his cousins, Dorondis and Damean, were charged with first-degree felony murder. The trial information alleged the defendants killed the victim while participating in a forcible felony. See Iowa Code § 707.2 (2003). The defendant pled not guilty. In exchange for testifying against the defendant and Carl, Dorondis and Damean entered into plea agreements pleading guilty to unspecified crimes with an aggregate term of twenty-five years.

The charges against the defendant and his brother were jointly tried to a jury. The first-degree murder charge was submitted under felony-murder instructions allowing the jury to find either defendant guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor.¹ The predicate forcible felonies were those listed in the information: intimidation with a dangerous weapon or assault causing serious injury. The jury was also instructed on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, but returned a guilty verdict on the first-degree murder charge. The defendant's posttrial motions were denied, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

The defendant's subsequent appeal was transferred to the court of appeals. That court affirmed the defendant's conviction and judgment of sentence. We granted the defendant's application for further review to consider two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and (2) whether the district court erred in giving an instruction on the subject of "mutual combat." See Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005) ("On further review, we can review any or all of the issues raised on appeal or limit our review to just those issues brought to our attention by the application for further review.").

II. Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction.

On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder. The State claims the defendant failed to preserve error on this issue.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(3) requires the trial court to instruct on lesser-included offenses, "even though such instructions have not been requested." Notwithstanding the trial court's duty in this regard, we have a long-standing requirement that, to preserve error on a trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense, "a defendant must request a lesser-included offense instruction or object to the court's failure to give it." State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 1988); accord State v. Wallace, 475 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1991); cf. State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 2006) (requiring defendant to object to trial court's instruction on lesser-included offense to preserve error). A corollary of this requirement is the rule that "a defendant may expressly waive a lesser-included offense instruction." Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d at 737; accord State v. Greer, 439 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1989). Even when a defendant waives submission of lesser-included offenses, the State retains the right to demand submission of a lesser offense. See Greer, 439 N.W.2d at 200. In Greer, this court recognized that the State may also have "a legitimate interest in having a lesser-included offense ... submitted to the jury," and therefore, the defendant does not have "veto power ... to block submission of any lesser-included offense which the accused does not fancy." Id.²

The record reveals the trial court submitted its proposed instructions to the county attorney and to the attorneys for the defendant and his brother, Carl, before final arguments. These instructions did not include an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The trial court specifically directed the attorneys' attention to the subject of lesser-included offenses. The county attorney, Mr. Ferguson, stated that murder in the second degree and involuntary manslaughter should be submitted. The court then asked Mr. Standafer and Mr. Bevel, the defendant's attorneys, for their response. The following discussion ensued:

MR. BEVEL: Well I think we would just—we would ask voluntary manslaughter—

(Discussion was had between Mr. Bevel and Mr. Rauch.)

MR. STANDAFER: Judge, this is one of them unique situations, I guess it happens sometimes, but as co-counsel I think Mr.—I just got to be honest with the Court, Mr. Bevel and I disagree. I don't think it's appropriate to submit— and I think I addressed this to the Court earlier—I don't think it's appropriate to submit voluntary manslaughter in this case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FERGUSON: Just so the record is clear, Your Honor, voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included under a legal theory, but it would not be under the facts as submitted, the evidence in this case—³ MR. STANDAFER: That's what I have a problem with.

THE COURT: Okay. That's your position and Mr. Ferguson's position. Mr. Bevel thinks—

MR. BEVEL: Well I'll—I'll—

MR. STANDAFER: I think Mr. Ferguson is correct. And—and for strategic—I'll just say for the record on behalf of my client, for strategic reasons, also, and based on the facts, I don't think it's in my client's best interest to submit voluntary manslaughter.

At that point, the attorneys for codefendant, Carl Spates, requested that voluntary manslaughter be included in the court's instructions, claiming it was a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder and there was substantial evidence to support its submission. The trial court ultimately determined there was not a factual basis for this offense and did not submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury.

We do not think the defendant preserved error on this issue. The only position articulated to the court on behalf of the defendant was Mr. Standafer's opinion that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was not supported by the evidence and was not desirable for strategic reasons. Although the trial court was...