State v. Spenst
Decision Date | 10 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. M2-2,M2-2 |
Citation | 662 P.2d 5,62 Or.App. 755 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Norman L. SPENST, Respondent. ; CA A24211. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Stephen L. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Michael F. Najewicz, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 487.540. He moved to suppress certain statements he made, evidence of observations by the arresting officer and the results of sobriety tests performed by defendant on the ground that the officer's stop of defendant and subsequent inquiry were unlawful. The trial court granted the motion. The state appeals, and we reverse and remand.
The trial court incorporated by reference in its order, a letter opinion that stated, in part:
The issue is the nature of the encounter between defendant and the officer. In State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493, 497, 624 P.2d 99 (1981), the court described three kinds of encounters between police and citizens: (1) an arrest, justified only by probable cause; (2) a stop, "a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place," ORS 131.605(5), justified by a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime, ORS 131.615(1); and (3) mere conversation, questioning without restraint of liberty, which needs no justification.
If the encounter here was a stop, the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress, because the officer admitted that, before the conversation at defendant's car, he had no reason to believe defendant had committed a crime and that he did not intend to stop defendant for failure to use his signal. See State v. Henry, 55 Or.App. 503, 638 P.2d 1167 (1981), rev. den. 292 Or. 863, 648 P.2d 850 (1982). If the encounter was mere conversation, which requires no justification, the trial court erred in granting the motion.
The test to determine whether an encounter is a stop is whether the police, through physical force or a show of authority, restrained the liberty of the person encountered so that a reasonable person would not feel free to refuse to cooperate or leave the scene. State v. Hanna, 52 Or.App. 503, 508 n. 4, 628 P.2d 1246, rev. den. 291 Or. 662, 639 P.2d 1280 (1981); State v. Brown, 31 Or.App. 501, 506, 570 P.2d 1001 (1977). In applying the facts here to this test, we are bound by the historical facts found by the trial court and supported by the record. However, contrary to the dissent's assertions, we are not bound by the trial court's legal conclusions. State v. Miller, 43 Or.App. 421, 424, 602 P.2d 1141 (1979). Therefore, we are not bound by the trial court's conclusion that the officer's conduct here constituted a stop, nor are we bound by the fourth "factor" relied on by the trial court and the dissent, quoted above, because it is no more than a legal conclusion that the officer's contact with defendant was a stop.
The initial encounter here was not a stop. Defendant pulled off the road and stopped his car voluntarily. The officer had the same right as defendant to drive on a public highway. Although the officer was following four car lengths behind, he did not have on his overhead lights. There was no use of physical force or show of authority by the officer that would cause a reasonable person to believe he must stop. Cf. State v. Gibbons, 21 Or.App. 339, 535 P.2d 561 (1975), overruled on other grounds, State v. Valdez, 27 Or.App. 329, 556 P.2d 132, reversed on other grounds, 277 Or. 621, 561 P.2d 1006 (1977) ( ).
Nothing the officer did after defendant pulled over constituted a stop. He pulled up next to defendant to see what he was doing. The officer had a right to stop there, either to render assistance to a motorist stopped on a snowy road at night or to satisfy normal curiosity. The fact that defendant would have had to maneuver around the police car to leave the scene does not constitute a restraint on his liberty. Because defendant stopped voluntarily, the location of the police car did not force him to alter his conduct; he was free to drive away. See State v. Porter, 38 Or.App. 169, 171, 589 P.2d 1156 (1979).
Finally, the officer's act of approaching defendant's vehicle to converse with him did not transform this encounter into a stop. Defendant initiated the conversation. Because the officer could not hear defendant, he left his vehicle and approached the car. Defendant again initiated the conversation. Clearly, the officer's act of approaching defendant to respond to a conversation initiated by defendant did not restrain defendant in any way. The officer's observations of defendant during their conversation gave him a reasonable belief that defendant was intoxicated. Consequently, the court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Unless we are prepared to require that trial courts accept a police officer's unlikely version of the historical facts, there was sufficient evidence here to support the...
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