State v. Spidle
Decision Date | 10 April 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 51808,No. 1,51808,1 |
Citation | 413 S.W.2d 509 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Louis Otto SPIDLE, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Norman A. Selner, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Clayton, for respondent.
Louis Otto Spidle, pro se.
The information charged defendant with the offense of assault with intent to kill with malice. The jury found him guilty of assault with intent to kill without malice and assessed the maximum punishment, five years' imprisonment. Defendant has appealed.
Because it bears directly on the question discussed below of whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling a challenge for cause of a juror, we point out first the principal witnesses in the case were the arresting trooper on one side and the defendant on the other. Their versions as to whether this was a case of assault or self-defense differed sharply, as shown by the following summary of their testimony:
The trooper, R. L. Owens, testified that while in uniform and driving an official highway patrol automobile, he stopped defendant at night on U.S. highwas 36 near St. Joseph, Missouri, by means of his horn and red light, after observing defendant's car weaving on the highway, crossing the center line. The trooper took defendant back to the patrol car (he testified defendant was staggering) and there told him he was under arrest for careless and imprudent driving. While the two men were seated in the front seat, with Owens writing a traffic ticket, defendant swore at the trooper, lunged at him, swinging his right arm, striking the trooper two hard blows, first on the left ear and then at the junction of the right shoulder and neck, with an open pocketknife with a two-inch blade, penetrating the trooper's overcoat and shirt and inflicting two stab wounds requiring medical attention. The wound in the neck was two inches long and one and one-half inches deep. The trooper subdued defendant by striking him across the back of the head with his service revolver and kicking him out of the car down into a ditch. Assistance was then obtained by radio.
Defendant's version was that he was driving in a reasonable manner, on his own side of the highway at all times, not weaving, when the trooper without cause signalled him to stop. The trooper demanded to see his driver's license, gave no explanation or statement of authority, ordered him out of his car, cursed him, kicked him violently on the ankle, injuring it (defendant said this was why he staggered in going to the patrol car), forced him into the patrol car, told him he was going to take him to jail and then when defendant started to get out of the patrol car, hit him over the head with his gun, stunning defendant 'pretty good', 'I was knocked silly' (defendant's medical evidence was there was a laceration one and one-half inches long and one-quarter inch deep on the back of his head). Defendant got his knife out of his right-hand pocket some way and started fighting. He said he did not in any way intend to kill the trooper and his reason for getting his knife out was to defend himself. He testified he 'was getting tired of that stuff' (referring to his being kicked and hit over the head). The fight ended when the trooper kicked him out of the car. Defendant testified the knife produced by the trooper as the one defendant dropped when the trooper hit him with the revolver was not his knife; that he did have a pocketknife which he used to defend himself, but that it was not as big as the knife in evidence and was of a different color.
The only one of defendant's contentions we need reach is that the trial court erred in overuling his challenge for cause of a prospective juror, who said he had first heard of the case by reading a newspaper article, and whose voir dire interrogation then went as follows (emphasis ours):
'
'* * *
'
Upon examination by defendant's counsel immediately following the above, the juror answered as follows:
'
Thereupon defendant's counsel challenged the juror for cause and the court took over the questioning as follows:
'THE COURT: Would you convict a man and send him to the penitentiary from what you have read in the paper?
Thereupon the court overruled the challenge but defendant's counsel continued examination as follows:
'Q. I still feel you are somewhat undecided on your position in this matter and it is somewhat difficult to overcome.
'A. Not difficult.
'* * * '
Defendant's counsel thereupon renewed his challenge for cause, which was again by the court overruled.
We are not convinced the court exercised sound discretion in overruling the challenge for cause. One's initial reaction to the voir dire examination above quoted is that the trial court should have sustained the challenge. This feeling persists as the case is studied.
The juror first said that while he did not know all the facts, he might be prejudiced toward the trooper, that the way he read it in the paper the trooper was assaulted and he could not see any reason for the assault. He then said he could put all this aside, base his verdict solely on the evidence and give both sides a fair trial, but he then said he guessed he still felt defendant was guilty of assaulting the trooper, that he did not know the facts, that nothing had happened to cause him to change his mind; that he thought he could set this aside and go into the jury room with his mind free and clear, but he could not say yes or no until he heard the facts.
Then the court took over the questioning and the juror said no, he would not convict a man and send him to the penitentiary from what he read in the paper, but then said that if there were a difference in the evidence heard from the witness stand as to what he read in the paper, he 'would have to take the officer's word for it', that he would believe what he heard in...
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Spidle v. State
...On appeal, the conviction was reversed because of error in the trial court's failure to excuse a juror for cause. State v. Spidle, Mo.Sup., 413 S.W.2d 509. Upon a second trial on the original information, a jury, on December 14, 1967, found the defendant guilty of assault with intent to kil......
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Spidle v. Swenson, Civ. A. No. 18136-3.
...for failure of the trial court to excuse a juror for cause and remanded the case to the state trial court for a retrial (State v. Spidle, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 509); that petitioner was again tried in the state trial court and found guilty by a jury of the greater offense of assault with intent t......
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State v. Brown
...made of whether or not the party seeking review made a motion to quash the panel at the close of the voir dire examination. State v. Spidle, 413 S.W.2d 509 (Mo.1967), was reversed and remanded for error in not sustaining a challenge for cause; State v. DeClue, 400 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.1966), was r......
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State v. Holliman
...in that case'. . . .' State v. Land, supra, at 292; State v. DeClue, supra, at 57; State v. Harris, supra, at 155; and State v. Spidle, 413 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Mo.1967). The case of State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.3d 841 (1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L......