State v. Spillman

• Decision Date: 06 April 1920
• Docket Number: 15656.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SPILLMAN.

188 P. 915

110 Wash. 662

STATE v. SPILLMAN.

No. 15656.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 6, 1920

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; David W. Hurn, Judge.

William Spillman was convicted of having intoxicating liquor other than alcohol in his possession, and he appeals. Affirmed.

S. A. Mann and Robertson, Miller & Robertson, all of Spokane, for appellant.

Joseph B. Lindsley and T. T. Grant, both of Spokane, for the State.

BRIDGES J.

The information in this case charged that the defendant did, in Spokane county, Wash., on or about the 1st day of March 1919, 'unlawfully and feloniously carry about with him intoxicating liquor, to wit, whisky, for the purpose of the unlawful sale of the same.' The defendant was found guilty of having intoxicating liquor, other than alcohol in his possession. He has appealed from the judgment pronouncing sentence upon him.

It is first contended that the state did not prove the corpus delicti by competent testimony. In State v. Gray, 98 Wash. 279, 167 P. 951, this court laid down the rule that the confession of a defendant, with other circumstances in the case, can be shown to establish the corpus delicti. The state's testimony was, in substance, as follows: The appellant, together with one Cheatham and Ludlum, took a Milwaukee train at Butte, Mont for Spokane. A policeman met Cheatham at the railroad station at Spokane, and disguised as a taxi driver invited him into his taxi. Cheatham directed the policeman to drive towards the eastern outskirts of the city. However, before they had gotten to the place Cheatham wanted to go, he recognized the driver of the taxi as a policeman. The result was that Cheatham was then taken by the policeman to the police station. He and another officer then drove to the eastern portion of the city to a point where they had learned that the incoming train had stopped. There they met the appellant and Ludlum, who stated they had left the train at that point for the purpose of looking at some property in that locality. At this time it was far into the night and dark. While one of the policemen detained the two prisoners, the other sought for the whisky, and soon found it near the railroad tracks. The appellant and his associate when arrested were within about half a block of the whisky and were walking towards it and were the only persons on the street in that immediate neighborhood. The whisky and the prisoners were taken to the police station at Spokane. At first the appellant denied any connection with or knowledge of the whisky. On the way to the station he said to the policeman, 'You have the liquor; you don't need us, and you might as well turn us loose,' and advised the policeman to hide and keep a part of the whisky and turn the balance into police headquarters. At the station the appellant made a confession, stating that most of the whisky belonged to Cheatham, but that one suit case, containing about 12 quarts, belonged to him, and that he had brought it along from Butte, thinking he might pay his expenses or give it to his friends in Spokane; that the liquor had all been thrown from the train when it had stopped in East Spokane, and that he and Ludlum had left the train for the purpose of guarding the whisky, while Cheatham went on into the city, got an auto, and brought it to where they left the train. Certainly, this testimony is amply sufficient to bring the case within the rule of State v. Gray, supra.

It will not be necessary to discuss appellant's next assignment of error, because it is based on a motion to take the case from the jury for the reason that the corpus delicti had not been sufficiently proven.

It is further contended that the court's instruction No. 6 was erroneous. That instruction was to the effect that, if the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt 'that the defendant was in possession of the liquor described in the information, such possession and proof thereof is prima facie evidence that said liquor was so held and kept for the purpose of the unlawful sale or disposition thereof. * * *' It is contended that this instruction would be proper as applied to a charge of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, but was not proper as applied to the charge of having liquor in possession for the purpose of sale, which charge, under the statute, is denominated 'bootlegging.' In the first place, we do not see how the appellant is in position to raise this question, because the jury did not find him guilty of bootlegging, but found him guilty of having possession of intoxicating liquor. In any event the instruction was properly given, because under the so-called prohibition act (Laws 1917, p. 61) it is provided:

'In any prosecution for the violation of * * * this act, it shall be competent to prove that any person. * * * had in his possession any intoxicating liquor other than alcohol, and such possession and proof thereof shall be prima facie evidence that said liquor was so held and kept for the purposes of unlawful sale and

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