StatE v. SponaugLe et al.
| Decision Date | 30 November 1898 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | StatE v. SponaugLe et al. |
That clause of section 6, Art. XIII, of the State Constitution, forfeiting land for the failure of the owner to enter it for taxation, is not in violation of that clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution restraining states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (p, 417).
The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution does not itself define "due process of law." What was such before its adoption continues such It does not prohibit a state from future, new legislation, action, or proceedings necessary, in its judgment, in the administration of its government, so it bear alike on all similarly circumstanced, and be not unusual, oppressive, or arbitrary action, assailing the essential rights of the person. (p. 424).
Due process of law does not always require judicial hearing. It does in matters of purely judicial nature, but not in matters of taxation or matters purely administrative. (p. 424)
It is with the Supreme Court of the United States to determine finally whether legislation or action under state authority is due process of law. (p. 424),
What is due process of law? (p. 418).
Laches will not bar a landowner from assailing a tax sale of his land, when there is no actual possession under the tax title. (p. 431).
Laches is not imputable to the State. Statutes of limitation now run against the State. (p. 431).
A sale of land for taxes is without warranty by the State, and it is not prevented thereby from setting up its right under forfeiture for omission to enter the land for taxes either before or after the tax sale. (p. 432).
If a sale for taxes is made and the tax purchaser pays taxes thereafter, the receipt of such taxes will not operate, on the theory of estoppel in pais by conduct, to prevent the State from setting up against the tax purchaser a title to land, by forfeiture, for failure of the former owner to enter it for taxation subsequent to or before the tax sale. If the tax title be valid, it would prevent such forfeiture for taxes after the tax sale from its own force, not on the theory of estoppel. (p. 432).
A sale of land for taxes, valid to pass title of the owner, will prevent its forfeiture for failure to enter it for taxes in the name of the former owner for years subsequent to the tax sale. (p. 348).
An omission, in a list of sales of land for taxes, to state the estate of the owner, will not annul the tax deed. (p. 433).
Appeal from Circuit Court, Randolph County.
Suit by the State against G. W. Sponaugle and others. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Frank Woods, for appellants.
Flick & WestEnhaver, for the State.
Brannon, President:
This was a chancery suit in the circuit court of Randolph County, in the name of the State, against Sponaugle and others, to sell a tract of one thousand two hundred acres of land patented by Virginia to Jacob Sponaugle in 1852, the State claiming title by reason of forfeiture of the land to the State because of its omission from the tax books for five successive years subsequent to 1872.Jacob Sponaugle conveyed the land to his children, and they were made defendants, as also E. A. Cunningham, who claimed interests in the land by purchase from some of them. The answer of the children of Sponaugle admitted the forfeiture and the liability to sale. Cunningham filed a petition setting up his interests, admitting the forfeiture, and asking to be allowed to redeem the land. This petition and cross bill attacked and sought to set aside a tax deed, and title under it, of the Condon-Lane Boom & Lumber Company. This company was made a defendant to the State's bill, as claiming title to the land; alleging that its claim was void and ineffectual against the State's title under the forfeiture, and that the land was liable to sale under its title by forfeiture. The Condon-Lane Boom and Lumber Company demurred to the bill, and answered setting up that its claim to the land was based on a sale to Cresap in 1871 for taxes for years prior thereto delinquent in the name of Jacob Sponaugle, which tax title had come by conveyance to it, and that this sale rendered the land not taxable after 1871 to Sponaugle, but to Cresap and those claiming under him, and that taxes had been charged and paid in their names for the years in which it was omitted in Sponaugle's name, and for which the forfeiture was alleged to exist. It claimed that, if the land was forfeited, it took the benefit of the forfeited title, by reason of alleged possession under the color and claim of title arising from said tax deed and payment of taxes. The decree held the land forfeited, that the lumber company had no title, that its tax title was void, and allowed Cunningham and others claiming interests under Sponaugle to redeem from the forfeiture. The lumber company appeals.
The demurrer and answer of the lumber company challenge the title of the State as conferred by forfeiture, and assert that it had no title under which to attack said company, and is not entitled to sell the land; and this on the theory that section 6, Art. XIII, of the West Virginia Constitution is repugnant to Art. XIV of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in its provision, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." If this is so, the State has no title to the land. No definite definition none but the most general has been or can be given of "due process of law." The best the courts can do is to say, in each case as it arises, whether a given act or proceeding in the particular matter is due process of law. It depends how the question arises; that is, upon the matter or transaction involved. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97. What would be due process if done under the police power or taxing power might not be, in many cases would not be, if not done under either of those powers. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 714. A horse may be lawfully seized and sold, without judge or jury, for taxes; but an individual or officer or court or legislature, without trial, generally could not do this. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 97, Justice Bradley said: "In judging what is due process of law, respect must be had to the cause and object of taking, whether under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the power of assessment for local improvements, or none of these; and, if found to be suitable or admissible in the special case, it will be adjudged to be due process of law, but, if found arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, it may be declared to be not due process of law." The clause of the State Constitution in question makes it the duty of the landowner to put his land on the tax books, and provides that "when for any five successive years after the year 1869, the owner of any tract of land containing 1000 acres or more, shall not have been charged on such books, with state tax on said land, then by operation hereof, the land shall be forfeited and the title thereto vested in the state." This provision is to be justified under the taxing power of the state. Its purpose was to raise revenue from vast quantities of land which had been persistently and intentionally omitted by the owner for years from the tax books, and escaped all taxation. What is the limit of the taxing power, except by express provision of the Constitution? It scarcely has any. It is so nearly unlimited from sheer necessity. It in volves the operations, nay, the very existence, of government. It is an original power, inherent in every government. Cooley, Const. Lim., 587, does not lay it down too broadly as follows: Burroughs, Tax'n, 1, 3. "All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation." Justice Field said in State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall., 319: In Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210, the Supreme Court held that "the states, as a general rule, have the right of determining the manner of levying and collecting taxes on private property."
The states succeeded to the power of taxation of the English parliament after the Revolution, and possess it yet; and we must...
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