State v. Spotted Eagle

• Citation: 71 P.3d 1239,2003 MT 172
• Decision Date: 23 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-452.,02-452.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eugene SPOTTED EAGLE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

71 P.3d 1239

2003 MT 172

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Eugene SPOTTED EAGLE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 02-452.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Heard and Submitted April 11, 2003.

Decided June 23, 2003.

Laurie McKinnon, Choteau, Montana (argued), For Appellant.

Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Mark W. Mattioli, Assistant Montana Attorney General (argued), Helena, Montana; Chris Christensen, Pondera County Attorney, Conrad, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Appellant, Eugene Spotted Eagle, was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a felony, in the District Court for the Ninth Judicial District in Pondera County. He plead guilty to the charges and reserved the right to appeal the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss, in which he argued that his four prior uncounselled tribal court DUI convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence. We affirm the order of the District Court which denied Spotted Eagle's motion to dismiss.

¶ 2 The sole issue on appeal is whether valid uncounselled tribal court DUI convictions may be used to enhance a state DUI charge to a felony in a Montana court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 At approximately 10:30 p.m. on September 8, 2001, the Pondera County Sheriff's Department responded to a report that a pickup truck was parked on Dupuyer Road, west of Conrad, Montana. The Defendant, Eugene Spotted Eagle, was found slumped against the driver's door of the vehicle. The vehicle's engine was turned off and the keys were found in the ignition. Spotted Eagle submitted to a preliminary alcohol screening test that indicated he was under the influence of alcohol. He was taken to the Conrad police station where he refused to submit to a breath test.

¶ 4 On September 19, 2001, he was charged with operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA, in the Ninth Judicial District Court for Pondera County. Previously, Spotted Eagle had been convicted and jailed for driving under the influence of alcohol four times in Blackfeet tribal court. Consequently, the State prosecuted the offense as a felony pursuant to § 61-8-731, MCA.

¶ 5 Section 61-8-731, MCA, provides that a defendant who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent DUI is guilty of a felony rather than a misdemeanor. The statute provides the sentencing options for a felony DUI. Section 61-8-734(1), MCA, provides that a conviction from a federally recognized Indian tribe may be used to enhance a DUI sentence.

¶ 6 Spotted Eagle filed a motion to dismiss the felony charges and alleged that the four previous tribal convictions could not be used to enhance the charges against him in a Montana court because they were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He argued that, while he was represented by an "advocate" in the tribal court, representation by an advocate did not satisfy the right to counsel because advocates were not attorneys. Moreover, an affidavit filed with the District Court indicated that he did not waive the right to counsel. Consequently, he argued that those convictions could not be considered by the District Court. He further maintained that § 61-8-731, MCA, violated his right to due process because it is unconstitutionally vague—an argument not pursued on appeal.

¶ 7 In response, the State argued that the Blackfeet tribal court system provided Spotted Eagle with a pre-arraignment consultation by a "defender" (sometimes also referred to as an "advocate") and that the tribal court convictions were conducted in accordance with the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). A defender is trained by the Blackfeet tribal court to advise a defendant of possible consequences, penalties, and his or her rights under the ICRA. The State maintained Spotted Eagle was afforded all of the rights available pursuant to the ICRA and Blackfeet tribal code. Therefore, Montana was required to recognize those convictions. It further argued that § 61-8-731(1), MCA, was not void for vagueness.

¶ 8 The District Court concluded that neither the Blackfeet tribal code, nor the ICRA provided an absolute right to counsel in criminal proceedings, and held that the tribal DUI convictions were valid. The trial court factually distinguished United States v. Ant (9th Cir.1989), 882 F.2d 1389, a case relied upon by Spotted Eagle. The District Court noted that in Ant the tribal convictions were used by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt of the charges at issue and that the appellate court found irregularities in the procedure leading to Ant's tribal convictions. As regards Spotted Eagle's tribal court convictions, the court concluded that there were no irregularities—a point Spotted Eagle concedes on appeal. Furthermore, Spotted Eagle's Blackfeet convictions were not used to prove that he was guilty of the state DUI charge at bar. Spotted Eagle did not and does not, here, maintain his actual innocence of the underlying tribal court convictions.

¶ 9 Finally, the District Court noted that indirectly imposing Montana's constitutional right to counsel on tribal courts was contrary to Montana judicial policy. Consequently, the court denied Spotted Eagle's motion to dismiss and concluded that Montana judicial policy permitted those convictions to be used in state court to enhance the penalty for a DUI.

¶ 10 Subsequently, Spotted Eagle entered a guilty plea which was conditioned upon this Court's disposition of his motion to dismiss on appeal. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Spotted Eagle was committed to the Montana Department of Corrections for thirteen months, to be suspended upon successful completion of an approved alcohol treatment plan. He also received a five-year suspended sentence subject to parole and probation restrictions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 Whether a prior conviction can be used to enhance a criminal sentence is a question of law. State v. Ailport, 1998 MT 315, ¶ 6, 292 Mont. 172, ¶ 6, 970 P.2d 1044, ¶ 6. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether its conclusions are correct. Ailport, ¶ 6.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 May valid uncounselled tribal court DUI convictions be used to enhance a state DUI charge to a felony in a Montana court?

¶ 13 Spotted Eagle contends that the District Court was incorrect when it concluded that his tribal convictions could be used to enhance the State's DUI charge against him to a felony. He maintains that he was not represented by counsel in the Blackfeet tribal court. Therefore, those convictions violate his United States and Montana constitutional right to counsel.

¶ 14 The State responds that the Blackfeet tribal code, the ICRA, and Blackfeet cultural norms do not guarantee the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. It argues that the fundamental principles of tribal sovereignty and comity require the District Court to recognize the legitimacy of the tribal convictions in this case. To do otherwise would undermine the sovereignty of the Blackfeet court system and contradict Montana judicial policy.

¶ 15 A prior conviction is presumptively valid. Once the fact of a prior conviction is established, the defendant bears the burden of producing direct evidence that the prior conviction was invalid. State v. Okland (1997), 283 Mont. 10, 18, 941 P.2d 431, 436. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, guarantee indigent defendants the right to representation by court-appointed counsel when facing criminal charges in federal or state court. Okland, 283 Mont. at 14, 941 P.2d at 433.

¶ 16 In Scott v. Illinois (1979), 440 U.S. 367, 372-74, 99 S.Ct.1158, 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a misdemeanor criminal proceeding where the defendant is not actually sentenced to imprisonment. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to state proceedings pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Scott, 440 U.S. at 371, 99 S.Ct. at 1161. It further concluded that an uncounselled conviction that resulted in imprisonment, violated the Sixth Amendment and was invalid. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74, 99 S.Ct. at 1162.

¶ 17 One year later, in Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 227-28, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 1587-88, 64 L.Ed.2d 169, a majority of the Court held that a prior uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, constitutional under Scott, could nevertheless not be collaterally used to convert a second misdemeanor conviction into a felony under the applicable Illinois sentencing enhancement statute. The per curiam Opinion in Baldasar stated no rationale for the result, referring only to the "reasons stated in the concurring opinion." Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224, 100 S.Ct. at 1586.

¶ 18 However, in Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745, the Supreme Court reversed course. The Nichols majority held that a valid uncounselled conviction may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense. The Court reasoned that an enhancement statute only penalizes the defendant for the subject offense and does not change the penalty imposed for the prior conviction. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746-47, 114 S.Ct. at 1927. The Court remarked that judges traditionally consider prior convictions and prior criminal behavior when sentencing a defendant for criminal convictions. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747, 114 S.Ct. at 1927-28. Sentence enhancement was cited as consistent with that judicial policy. ¶ 19 In Nichols, the defendant was not sentenced to a prison term in the prior uncounselled conviction and, therefore, the right to counsel was not implicated:

Accordingly we hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, that an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison

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