State v. Spratt, 256
Decision Date | 03 November 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 256,256 |
Citation | 144 S.E.2d 569,265 N.C. 524 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE, v. Ronald James SPRATT. |
Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton, Asst. Atty. Gen. Parks H. Icenhour, and Staff Atty. William B. Ray, Raleigh, for the State.
Peter L. Reynolds, Charlotte, for defendant.
Defendant contends there is prejudicial error in that the court failed 'to charge and instruct the jury on the element of felonious intent.'
The bill indictment alleges, in pertinent part, that defendant 'on the 23rd day of December, 1964, * * * unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, having in possession and with the use and threatened use of firearms * * *, to wit, a .32 caliber pistol, whereby the life of Dwight Blackmon was endangered and threatened, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, forcibly, violently and feloniously attempt to take, steal and carry away lawful money of the United States * * * from the presence, person, place of business * * * of Dwight Blackmon and Minute Markets, Inc. * * *' (Italics ours.)
The case was submitted to the jury on the charge of attempt, as alleged in the bill. An attempt to take money or other personal property from another under the circumstances delineated by G.S. § 14-87 constitutes, by the terms of that statute, an accomplished offense, and is punishable to the same extent as if there was an actual taking. State v. Parker, 262 N.C. 679, 138 S.E.2d 496.
The judge instructed the jury, inter alia, as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the foregoing excerpt from the charge contains a sufficient statement of all of the elements of the offense charged, including that of intent.
A taking with 'felonious intent' is an essential element of the offense of armed robbery, of attempt to commit armed robbery, and of common law robbery, and it is prejudicial error for the court to charge that defendant may be convicted of such offense even though the taking was without felonious intent. State v. Chase, 231 N.C. 589, 58 S.E.2d 364. The comprehensiveness and specificality of the definition and explanation of 'felonious intent' required in a charge depends on the facts in the particular case. There must be some explanation in every case. State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 136 S.E.2d 595. But, where the evidence relied on by defendant tends to admit the taking but to deny that it was with felonious intent, it is essential that the court fully define the 'felonious intent' contended for by the State and also explain defendant's theory as to the intent and purpose of the taking, in order that the jury may understandingly decide between the contentions of the State and defendant on that point. In other words, where the evidence is susceptible of conflicting inferences on the question of intent, develops a direct issue on that point and makes intent the battleground of the case, full and explicit instructions on this phase is required. State v. Lawrence, supra. For instance, as in Lawrence, defendant may contend that his conduct in taking the property amounts only to a forcible trespass. There is a material...
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...procure, or command the principals Devine, Locklear, and Watkins to commit the attempted armed robbery. In State v. Spratt, 265 N.C. 524, 526, 527, 144 S.E.2d 569, 571, 572 (1965), our Court enunciated the principle that while G.S. 1--180 requires the court to 'declare and explain the law a......
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Williams v. State
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