State v. Sprattling

• Decision Date: 17 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 22501.,22501.
• Citation: 55 P.3d 276,99 Haw. 312
• Parties: STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darrell T. SPRATTLING, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

55 P.3d 276

99 Haw. 312

STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darrell T. SPRATTLING, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22501.

Supreme Court of Hawai`i.

September 17, 2002.

Clayton K.F. Zane, on the briefs, for defendant-appellant.

Donn Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellee.

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, and Circuit Judge TOWN, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

Opinion of the Court by NAKAYAMA, J.

Darrell T. Sprattling appeals from the April 14, 1999 judgment of the district court of the first circuit, the Honorable George Y. Kimura presiding, convicting him of assault in the third degree, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712(1) (1993).¹ On appeal, Sprattling argues that: (1) the oral charge failed to allege "bodily injury," an essential element of the offense; (2) the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial; (3) the trial court plainly erred when it questioned witnesses during trial; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

We hold that: (1) pursuant to the post-conviction liberal construction rule adopted by this court in State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 657 P.2d 1019 (1983), Sprattling failed to show that the omission of the word "bodily" preceding the word "injury" prejudiced him or show that the oral charge could not be reasonably construed to charge a crime because of this omission; (2) the district court obtained a valid waiver of Sprattling's constitutional right to a jury trial; (3) the trial judge did not violate his duty to remain a neutral arbiter by questioning witnesses during the jury-waived trial; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Sprattling possessed the requisite mens rea necessary for a conviction of assault in the third degree, and that he was not justified in pushing Calistro Cuson. Accordingly, we reject Sprattling's contentions and affirm his conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 13, 1999, Sprattling made a pretrial appearance in which his attorney waived an oral reading of the charge. Defense counsel also requested a bench trial, "I've spoken to my client . . . and he understands what a jury trial is. And he has informed me that he wishes to waive his right to a jury trial." The district court conducted the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sprattling, you understand that you would have the right to a trial in circuit court with a jury where you would have an opportunity, through your attorney, to select 12 people from the community to sit as the jurors to make the decision on guilt or innocence in the case?

MR. SPRATTLING: Yes. I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. You understand that. But, by your attorney saying, though, that he's spoken to you that you're—that you would like to waive that right and remain in district court.

MR. SPRATTLING: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that correct? So, you— if you go ahead and waive that, then everything will be held here. You will not have a jury trial. It'll be a judge that will make the decision as to guilt or innocence if your matter goes to trial. You understand that?

MR. SPRATTLING: I understand that, sir.

THE COURT: And, that's what you wish to do? Remain in district court?

MR. SPRATTLING: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Sprattling. . . .

. . . .

A two-day bench trial commenced on February 22, 1999 and concluded on March 16, 1999. At the outset of trial, defense counsel requested "that the prosecution arraign the defendant." The prosecutor orally charged Sprattling as follows:

On or about December 20th (twentieth), 1998, in the City and County of Honolulu, you did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause injury to another person, to-wit, Calistro Cuson III, thereby committing the offense of Assault in the Third Degree in violation of Section 707-712(1) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.

(Emphasis added.) Sprattling pled not guilty, and the bench trial commenced.

At trial, Calistro Cuson, III, (Calistro) testified that on December 20, 1998, at around 2:30 p.m., he moved a shopping cart from a parking stall as his wife, Melinda Cuson (Ms. Cuson), waited to park their car. Just as he cleared the stall, a white truck drove from behind Ms. Cuson and parked in the stall. He approached the driver, and said, "What are you doing? We're gonna' park here." Sprattling stepped out of his vehicle, and walked toward Calistro. While Calistro did not remember if Sprattling's hands met his body, he fell and noticed that both of Sprattling's hands were outstretched with his palms open. The trial court found that "a confrontation of some sort," ensued, and subsequently, "[Calistro] was pushed and . . . fell backwards over the curb and sustained injuries," which included embarrassment, chest pains, and breathing problems.

During and following the testimony of each witness, the trial judge posed a multitude of questions regarding the events that led up to and occurred during the confrontation. In addition to the information elicited from the attorneys, the court asked Calistro whether he was angry when he saw Sprattling drive into the stall that he was clearing for his wife. The court also queried Calistro as to the position he found himself after Sprattling "pushed" him.

Ms. Cuson testified that a confrontation occurred between Calistro and Sprattling. During the course of their heated discussion, Sprattling "rushed and . . . pushed [her] husband." Ms. Cuson stepped out of her car, and noticed a "big guy," Sprattling's brother-in-law Elmer Wright, taunt Calistro. The trial court asked Ms. Cuson, among other things, whether she and Calistro were drinking or felt tired on the night of the incident, the direction in which Calistro fell after he was pushed, and Wright's and Calistro's size.

Sprattling presented a justification defense by offering testimony from his wife, Carla Sprattling, and himself in support of his claim of self-defense. Carla testified that she did not witness Sprattling push Calistro. During the course of and following Carla's testimony, the court questioned Carla as to the events that led to the confrontation. Augmenting the information elicited during direct examination, the court asked Carla whether there was "a fear that some confrontation might occur" when she saw Calistro confront Sprattling. The court also inquired whether she was afraid of ensuing events when Elmer exited the truck:

Q: Did Elmer get out of the car before you or did you get out before Elmer?

A: He got out before me.

Q: First?

A: Yes.

Q: So, when Elmer got out, you [sic] know that there was gonna' be some problems?

A: Yes.

Q: And, so, you got out?

A: Yes.

Sprattling testified that he pushed Calistro, but did so to defend himself. He claimed that Calistro was the aggressor, and "brushed his chest up against [him]." After exchanging words, Sprattling told Calistro "to get outta' my face and pushed him [away.]" The court also queried Sprattling as to the events that transpired on December 10, 1998. It determined that Sprattling was a soldier stationed in Hawai`i who went to basic training at Fort Jackson and fought in combat while stationed in Bosnia. The court also inquired whether Sprattling, Carla, and Elmer heard Calistro confront Sprattling.

The court found Sprattling guilty as charged. The instant appeal was timely filed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Oral Charge

"It is well settled that an accusation must sufficiently allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged[.]" State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 212, 915 P.2d 672, 686 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Put differently, the sufficiency of the charging instrument is measured, inter alia, by whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he [or she] must be prepared to meet[.] A charge defective in this regard amounts to a failure to state an offense, and a conviction based upon it cannot be sustained, for that would constitute a denial of due process. Whether an indictment . . . sets forth all the essential elements of [a charged] offense. . . is a question of law, which we review under the de novo, or "right/wrong," standard.

Id. (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai`i 280, 293-94, 933 P.2d 617, 630-31, reconsideration denied, 84 Hawai`i 496, 936 P.2d 191 (1997) (alterations in original).

B. Constitutional Question

The validity of a criminal defendant's waiver of his or her right to a jury trial presents a question of state and federal constitutional law. Likewise, the validity of a statute based upon equal protection and due process of law is a question of constitutional law. "We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case. Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong standard." State v. Hanapi, 89 Hawai`i 177, 182, 970 P.2d 485, 490 (1998) (quoting State v. Mallan, 86 Hawai`i 440, 443, 950 P.2d 178, 181 (1998)) (citations omitted).

State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai`i 63, 67, 996 P.2d 268, 272 (2000).

C. Harmless Error

[E]rror is not to be viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract. It must be examined in the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be entitled. In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error may have contributed to conviction. State v. Heard, 64 Haw. 193, 194, 638 P.2d 307, 308 (1981) (citations omitted). If there is such a reasonable possibility in a criminal case, then the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judgment of conviction on which it may have been based must be set aside. See Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402-03, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991)[.]

State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 99-100, 997 P.2d 13, 25-26 (2000) (some citations

...