State v. Sprigg
| Decision Date | 22 March 1927 |
| Docket Number | 5655. |
| Citation | 137 S.E. 746,103 W.Va. 404 |
| Parties | STATE v. SPRIGG. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted March 15, 1927.
Rehearing Denied May 4, 1927.
Syllabus by the Court.
An opinionative statement of a witness, even though it be a conclusion unsupported by such facts as are necessary to constitute a road a public road, where no objection is urged thereto upon trial, cannot be challenged for the first time in this court as incompetent and insufficient.
Where such witness is permitted to testify that a certain road is a public road, and no effort is made on behalf of the defendant to test the sources of his information, or question his statement that the road in question is in fact a public road it must be assumed that more specific and definite proof of the fact that the road is lawfully a public road was waived.
A reviewing court should not reverse a criminal case on the facts which have been passed upon by the jury unless the court can say that there is reasonable doubt of guilt, and that the verdict must have been the result of misapprehension, or passion and prejudice.
Error to Circuit Court, Lewis County.
Joseph Sprigg was convicted of driving a motor vehicle on a public road while intoxicated, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Herbert M. Blair, of Weston, for plaintiff in error.
Howard B. Lee, Atty. Gen., and J. Luther Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.
Defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Lewis county for operating a motor vehicle upon the public road in said county while in an intoxicated condition. He was found guilty as charged, and the court entered judgment thereon, sentencing him to 60 days' imprisonment in the county jail and adjudging him to pay a fine of $50. From said judgment defendant prosecutes this writ of error.
Counsel for defendant argues that the public character of the highway was not established. A constable of Lewis county and a resident of Jane Lew testified that on the night of the offense he was returning home in his Ford coupé from Clarksburg, where he had been on business; that he saw a car ahead zigzagging from one side of the road to the other; that he attempted to pass several times, and did succeed in passing said car at the bridge coming into Jane Lew; that he stopped in Jane Lew under a street light near the high school and stopped defendant's car when it came up; that the smell of liquor oozed out into his face; that he arrested defendant; and that there were other cars on the highway. This information was given in response to the question: "State what you know, if anything, about him (referring to defendant) driving an automobile upon the public road in this state, in this county, in the month of September, 1925?" Witness' answer, in view of the limitations of the question propounded, fixed the facts testified to as having occurred on the public road. B. D Cayton, who was picked up by the constable at the Lewis county line and accompanied him into Jane Lew, testified that it was a cement road 16 feet wide, referring to it as a state road. Such statements, together with other testimony to the effect that divers cars were on the road going in the direction of Clarksburg and cars other than those driven by the constable and the defendant going in the direction of Jane Lew; that the defendant and the constable were both using the road for the purpose of reaching Jane Lew--all tended to show the public character of it. It is significant that the defendant did not object to the statements of the constable and Cayton, and did not attempt to disprove the public character imputed to it. Parties have a right to try their case on evidence which is not of the quality or character required by law; and where such evidence is admitted without objection, it is the right and duty of the court or jury to give it the same consideration as if it were legal evidence. Primary evidence to support a witness' statement that a road is a public road is...
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State v. McGilton
...of guilt and that the verdict must have been the result of misapprehension, or passion and prejudice.’ Syl. pt. 3, State v. Sprigg, 103 W.Va. 404, 137 S.E. 746 (1927).” State v. Biehl, 224 W.Va. 584, 587, 687 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2009). A reasonable juror could have found that the petitioner st......
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State v. McCoy
...of guilt and that the verdict must have been the result of misapprehension, or passion and prejudice.' Syl. pt. 3, State v. Sprigg, 103 W.Va. 404, 137 S.E. 746 (1927)." Syl. pt. 1, State v. Easton, 203 W.Va. 631, 510 S.E.2d 465 (1998). In this case we are called upon to address issues invol......
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State v. Leep
...doubt of guilt and that the verdict must have been the result of misapprehension, or passion and prejudice." Syllabus point 3, State v. Sprigg, 103 W.Va. 404, 137 S.E. 746 (1927). Syl. pt. 1, State v. Easton, 203 W.Va. 631, 510 S.E.2d 465 (1998). Mindful of this general standard of review, ......
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State v. Anderson
...doubt of guilt and that the verdict must have been the result of misapprehension, or passion and prejudice.” Syllabus Point 3, State v. Sprigg, 103 W.Va. 404, 137 S.E. 746 (1927). 3. “Pursuant to Rule 1.11 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the fact that an assistant prosec......