State v. Springer

• Decision Date: 11 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-391,91-391
• Citation: 63 Ohio St.3d 167,586 N.E.2d 96
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SPRINGER, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 167

63 Ohio St.3d 167

586 N.E.2d 96

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. SPRINGER, Appellant.

No. 91-391.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 15, 1992.

Decided March 11, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

When a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its sentencing deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and is unable to reach a unanimous verdict to recommend any sentence authorized by R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), the t rial court is required to sentence the offender to life imprisonment with parol e eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.

In December 1988, Mark B. Springer, appellant, was indicted in three separate counts for the aggravated murder of Rebecca Benton. Count One alleged that appellant purposefully murdered Benton with prior calculation and design with a death-penalty specification. Count Two charged appellant with the purposeful killing of Benton during the commission of an aggravated robbery with aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary specifications. Count Three charged appellant with the purposeful killing of Benton during the commission of an aggravated burglary with aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery specifications. Appellant was also indicted, in Counts Four and Five, for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, respectively.

Appellant was tried before a jury on all charges alleged in the indictment. The jury found appellant guilty on the two counts of aggravated felony murder (Counts Two and Three), and of all death-penalty specifications in connection with these two counts of aggravated murder. With respect to Count One of the indictment, appellant was found not guilty of aggravated murder (prior calculation and design), but guilty of the lesser included offense of murder. Additionally, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary as charged in the indictment.

Since appellant was found guilty on two counts of aggravated murder and specifications of aggravating circumstances in connection with each count, the jury was then required to recommend, after a full mitigation hearing, the sentences to be imposed upon appellant for his aggravated-murder convictions. ¹ After hearing all evidence in mitigation, the jury began its sentencing deliberations on September 13, 1989 at 12:00 p.m., and deliberations continued until the jury recessed that evening.

The jury resumed its deliberations on September 14. At approximately 3:40 p.m., the trial judge received a note from the jury indicating that the jury was "stalemated" and was, thus, unable to reach a unanimous verdict recommending one of the three available sentencing options for each of appellant's aggravated-murder convictions. ² The trial judge then gave the jury a supplemental instruction similar to the one approved by this court in State v. Howard (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 188, paragraph two of the syllabus, ³ and the jury resumed its deliberations for approximately two more hours before adjourning for the evening.

On September 15, the jury resumed its deliberations. At 11:00 a.m., deliberations were interrupted for the trial judge to respond to an inquiry by the jury as to whether the jurors were required to consider recommending a lesser sentence, i.e., a life sentence, if they were unable to unanimously recommend the sentence of death. This question was answered affirmatively and the jurors resumed deliberations. Shortly thereafter, deliberations were again interrupted for the trial judge to respond to yet another written communique from the jury with the following inquiry: "[I]f I feel the death penalty is the only decision I can fairly reach, must I change that decision just to reach a unanimous decision with the rest of the jurors * * *?" This question was answered affirmatively and, later, upon receiving one or more similar inquiries, the trial judge instructed the jury, in part, as follows:

" * * * I'd like to say at this time when in dealing with human affairs, problems of life must be reconciled between give and take. Page 6 [of the sentencing charge] says you shall recommend the sentence of death if you unanimously, and that means all twelve, find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. Now, if you do not so find you shall unanimously, which means all twelve, recommend either a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 20 full years of imprisonment or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 30 full years of imprisonment. Page eleven [of the sentencing charge] says, however, you should not surrender honest convictions in order to be congenial or to reach a verdict solely because of the opinion of other jurors. If you feel that it is impossible for you to reach a decision in this case, please report it to the Court. You will now be excused to resume your deliberations."

After further deliberations, the jury announced that it was hopelessly deadlocked and could not unanimously recommend any sentence. Subsequently, the trial judge discharged the jury upon the express determination that there was no probability the jurors would unanimously agree upon a verdict.

Thereafter, on October 12, 1989, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment for each of appellant's two aggravated-murder convictions. The trial court also sentenced appellant for the murder, aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions.

Appellant appealed to the court of appeals solely from the imposition of his sentences for aggravated murder. In his only assignment of error, appellant argued that the trial court erred by not imposing lesser sentences authorized by R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) for the aggravated-murder convictions, to wit: life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment. ⁴ Appellant did not appeal his aggravated murder convictions or his conviction or sentence for murder, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.

The court of appeals held that the trial court had no authority to impose sentence on Counts Two and Three of the indictment without a unanimous recommendation by the trial jury and that, therefore, the trial court should have declared a mistrial as to the guilt and penalty phases of appellant's trial on the two counts of aggravated felony murder. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's entry of conviction on Counts Two and Three of the indictment and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial on these two counts of aggravated murder with specifications.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Arthur M. Ney, Jr., Pros. Atty., and Ronald W. Springman, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Edward O. Keller, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Randall M. Dana, Public Defender, and David C. Stebbins, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The issue before us is whether the court of appeals erred in determining that the trial court had no authority to sentence appellant on Counts Two and Three of the indictment to terms of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court had authority to sentence appellant to the terms of life imprisonment without a sentencing recommendation by the trial jury and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

The framers of Ohio's death-penalty statute clearly did not contemplate the possibility of a hung jury in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial as is convincingly demonstrated by the absence of a provision in the statute governing the imposition of sentence under circumstances where, as in the case at bar, the trial jury is unable to unanimously recommend any sentence for the capital offense(s). Therefore, we are called upon today to establish the procedure governing the imposition of sentence under these circumstances.

R.C. 2929.03(C)(2) authorizes the imposition of one of three possible punishments for a defendant who has been found guilty of aggravated murder and one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances in connection with the aggravated murder. The possible...