State v. Sprouse, 6795
| Decision Date | 24 October 1941 |
| Docket Number | 6795 |
| Citation | 118 P.2d 378,63 Idaho 166 |
| Parties | STATE, Respondent, v. ORA W. SPROUSE, Appellant |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
FELONIOUS HOMICIDE - MURDER - MANSLAUGHTER - APPEAL AND ERROR-MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT.
1. Evidence that defendant and deceased were personal friends that on day of homicide they had drunk intoxicating liquor in sufficient quantities to cause them to fight over a dispute regarding ownership of a part of a bottle of beer, and that defendant on sudden quarrel and heat of passion fired shot which killed deceased was insufficient to sustain conviction of murder, but was sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter. (I. C. A. secs. 17-116, 17-1101, 17-1106.)
2. Manslaughter is an offense included in charge of murder. (I C. A. secs. 17-1101, 17-1106.)
3. Voluntary intoxication is no excuse for commission of a felonious homicide but it may be taken into consideration in determining the existence or non-existence, on the part of accused of malice aforethought, which distinguishes "murder" from "voluntary manslaughter." (I. C. A. secs. 17-116, 17-1101, 17-1106.)
4. Under statute to effect that the Supreme Court may reverse affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, the Supreme Court will, in proper case, modify a conviction of murder of first degree to a conviction of manslaughter, and direct that judgment be entered accordingly. (I. C. A. secs 17-1107, 19-2413, 19-2721.)
5. Where evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction of first degree murder but was sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter, judgment was modified so as to reduce conviction from first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter and case was remanded with directions to fix punishment therefor accordingly. (I. C. A. secs. 17-1107, 19-2413, 19-2721.)
The foregoing syllabus is by West Publishing Company, that following is by author of opinion.
I. While voluntary intoxication is no excuse for the commission of a felonious homicide, it is to be taken into consideration in determining the existence or non-existence, on the part of the accused, of malice aforethought, which distinguishes murder from voluntary manslaughter.
II. Pursuant to I. C. A., 19-2721, to the effect that the supreme court may reverse, affirm or modify a judgment or order appealed from, it will, in a proper case, modify a conviction of murder of the first degree to a conviction of manslaughter, and direct that judgment be entered accordingly.
APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Gem County. Hon. Thomas E. Buckner, Judge.
From a judgment of conviction of murder of the first degree, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Modified and affirmed.
Affirmed.
Geo. C. Huebener, for Appellant.
The rule that drunkenness is no defense does not apply to the full extent where a specific intent or motive is an essential element of the offense charged. If, at the time of the commission of such an offense, the accused was by intoxication so entirely deprived of his reason that he did not have the mental capacity to entertain the necessary specific intent which is required to constitute the crime, he must necessarily be acquitted; and in like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness should be considered in determining the degree of the crime. This is so, not because drunkenness excuses the crime, but because, if the mental status required by law to constitute the crime be one of specific intent or of deliberation and premeditation, and drunkenness excludes the existence of such mental state, then the particular crime charged has not been in fact committed. (16 C. J., Sec. 2373-2374, pp. 975-976; 16 C. J., Sec. 83, p. 107-108 and note 56; 16 C. J., Sec. 84, p. 109, and notes 64-65; People vs. Leonardi, 143 N.Y. 360, 38 N.E. 372; 30 C. J., Sec. 454, p. 223; Lancaster vs. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 575; State vs. Rumble, 81 Kans. 16, 25 LRANS 375; State vs. Kidwell, (W. Va.) 59 S.E. 494, 13 LRANS 1024; Commonwealth vs. Snyder (Penn.) 25 LRANS 376.)
Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, J. R. Smead, Leo Breshnahan, Robert M. Kerr, Jr., and M. Casady Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
Intoxication has nothing to do with the distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter. It should be considered only on the question of capacity to form the premeditated and deliberate intention to kill which charcterizes murder of the first degree. (People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; Pirtle v. State, (Tenn.) 9 Humph 663; People v. Langton, (Cal.) 7 P. 843.)
The record shows appellant and Roger E. Allen met in Emmett, May 26, 1939, and, during the day, they drank a considerable quantity of beer; that in the late afternoon they took some beer with them and started, in a pick-up truck driven by Allen, to the home of appellant, located about four and a half miles northwest of Emmett; that they stopped in front of the home of Pete Chavis and offered him a drink, which he declined; that, accompanied by Chavis, they continued in the truck toward appellant's home; that en route they drank beer several times and, as a result of their drinking during the day, they became, and were, under the influence of alcohol; that they continued to be very friendly, each toward the other, until they reached appellant's home. The truck was stopped about thirty feet from appellant's house, where he alighted from it. A dispute arose between Allen and appellant over the ownership of some beer remaining in a bottle from which they had been drinking. The dispute resulted in a fight between them during which Allen knocked appellant down and fell on him. Appellant got up, entered his house, procured a .22 caliber rifle, came out with it and fired a bullet which struck Allen and killed him. Appellant was charged with, and convicted of, murder of the first degree. He moved for a new trial, which was denied, and the case is here on his appeal from the judgment of conviction and from the order overruling his motion for a new trial.
A careful study of the record convinces us the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of murder, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter, which is an offense included in the charge of murder. Murder is defined by our code, § 17-1101, thus:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought."
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