State v. Spruell
| Decision Date | 26 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 22092-6-I,22092-6-I |
| Citation | 57 Wn.App. 383,788 P.2d 21 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Earlie Allen SPRUELL, Roy Lester McLemore, Defendants, Luther Mathis Hill, and each of them, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Theresa B. Doyle, Washington Appellate Defenders, for appellant, Luther Mathis Hill.
Cynthia Gannett and William Lipscomb, King County Deputy Pros. Attys., for respondent, the State.
Luther Mathis Hill appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine. We reverse.
A search warrant was executed on January 8, 1987, at the home of Earlie Allen Spruell at 4708 S. Cloverdale Street in Seattle. Police officers forced open the front door using a battering ram, and as they entered the house, two men, later identified as Roy McLemore and Luther Hill, were in the kitchen. McLemore was seated at the kitchen table, and Det. Gary Greenbaum testified to his impression that Hill had just moved from the table. Hill was not seen actually sitting at the table. On the kitchen table, Greenbaum observed a small scale, baking soda, alcohol, several vials, white powder residue, a razor blade, McLemore's driver's license, and a set of car keys.
Det. Sgt. Charles McClure, stationed at the rear of the house, testified that a few seconds after the police entered the front door, he heard what sounded to him like a plate hitting the back door. When he entered through the back door, McClure observed a white powder residue alongside the door, additional white powder located in the doorjamb, and a plate located about a foot and a half from the door. There were chunks of white powder on the floor and caked powder between a chair and cupboards. The white powder in the kitchen was collected in a narcotics envelope and later identified at trial as cocaine. There was insufficient powder residue on the plate for testing. A fingerprint of Hill's was found on the plate. A paper bindle containing white powder was found in the waistband of McLemore's pants.
In addition to the cocaine found in the kitchen, 11 or 12 grams of marijuana were found on the floor in the kitchen a large paper bag containing approximately 190 grams of marijuana was found in a bedroom, and a Colt .357 Magnum was found on the bed alongside the bag.
McLemore and Hill were found guilty of possession of cocaine, and Spruell was found guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana.
Hill argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence of actual or constructive possession of cocaine. He also argues there was insufficient evidence that he was anyone's accomplice. The State's response to Hill's argument relies upon his presence in the kitchen, his fingerprint on the plate, and Hill's "flight" from the kitchen table, to sustain the State's contention that Hill had actual physical control over and custody of the cocaine.
In appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and reject the challenge if a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Baeza, 100 Wash.2d 487, 670 P.2d 646 (1983). A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. State v. Theroff, 25 Wash.App. 590, 608 P.2d 1254 (1980).
The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of actual or constructive possession. Actual possession occurs when the goods are in the actual physical possession of the defendant. Constructive possession means that the defendant has dominion and control over the goods. State v. Callahan, 77 Wash.2d 27, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969).
The evidence is insufficient to support a finding of actual physical possession of the cocaine. On this issue, the facts cannot be distinguished from Callahan, where the court found the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding of actual possession. The Callahan facts reflect that when the police entered the houseboat, the defendant and another were seated at a desk on which were pills and hypodermic syringes. A cigar box containing drugs was on the floor between the two men. The defendant admitted that two guns, two books on narcotics, and a set of broken scales of a type used for measuring drugs found in the houseboat belonged to him. He further admitted that he had actually handled the drugs earlier that day.
From this evidence, the Callahan court concluded that there was no evidence that the defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs, other than his close proximity to them at the time of his arrest and the fact that the defendant told the officers he had handled the drugs earlier. The Callahan court then stated at page 29, 459 P.2d 400:
Since the drugs were not found on the defendant, the only basis on which the jury could find that the defendant had actual possession would be the fact that he had handled the drugs earlier and such actions are not sufficient for a charge of possession since possession entails actual control, not a passing control which is only a momentary handling. See United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425, 431 (7th Cir.1958).
The Callahan court then proceeded to resolve the case on the basis of whether the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs. The fact that another occupant of the houseboat testified that the drugs were his influenced the court's decision on the issue of constructive possession, but was not a factor in the court's determination that the defendant did not have actual physical possession of the drugs. The facts of Callahan on the issue of actual physical possession cannot be distinguished from the facts of the case before us. Hill's fingerprint on the plate proves no more than that he touched the plate. The fingerprint evidence against Hill can have no more weight on an issue of actual possession than the defendant's admission in Callahan that he physically handled the drugs earlier in the day.
We reject the State's contention that the facts here show evidence of "flight" by Hill. The evidence shows he was standing in the kitchen at the time the police entered. Apparently, the claim of flight is based upon the inference that he got up out of the chair when the police broke through the front door using a battering ram. This evidence does not amount to evidence of "flight," as there is no evidence that Hill made any effort to leave the premises in order to avoid arrest or took any action that could rationally be attributed to a consciousness of guilt. State v. Bruton, 66 Wash.2d 111, 401 P.2d 340 (1965).
The evidence being insufficient to sustain a finding of actual...
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...qualifying conviction necessary to prove second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. However, citing Callahan, State v. Spruell, 57 Wash.App. 383, 788 P.2d 21 (1990), and Cote, he argues that the evidence demonstrates only his proximity to and momentary handling of the firearm and, thus......
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...v. Callahan, 77 Wash.2d 27, 459 P.2d 400 (1969); State v. Gutierrez, 50 Wash.App. 583, 592, 749 P.2d 213 (1988); State v. Spruell, 57 Wash.App. 383, 388, 788 P.2d 21 (1990). In those cases, the evidence presented was insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference of dominion and control. In......
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...to establish constructive possession; other facts must enable the trier of fact to infer dominion and control. State v. Spruell, 57 Wash.App. 383, 388-89, 788 P.2d 21 (1990). But the ability to reduce an object to actual possession is an aspect of dominion and control. Echeverria, 85 Wash. ......
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