State v. Sprunger
| Decision Date | 26 August 2013 |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES D. SPRUNGER |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Cumberland County
Ronald Thurman, Chancellor
This is a forfeiture case. Appellant was convicted of a Class B felony for sexual exploitation of children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1003. Appellant tendered his home computer to a repair shop. Upon examination of the hard drive, the technician discovered unlawful images and notified local law enforcement. A search warrant was subsequently executed for Appellant's home, where parts of the computer in question were discovered. After Appellant's arrest, a forfeiture warrant was executed and, after his mortgage indebtedness was satisfied, proceeds from the sale of Appellant's real property were forfeited to the State pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1008. Appellant appeals the forfeiture of these proceeds. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.
and Remanded
Charles D. Sprunger, Only, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; William E. Young, Solicitor General; Benjamin A. Whitehouse, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee, State of Tennessee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1On July 4, 2008, Appellant Charles D. Sprunger contacted McKinley Tabor, a computer technician in Crossville, Tennessee, complaining that a virus had disabled his personal computer. Mr. Sprunger made arrangements to drop his computer off with Mr. Tabor on July 8, 2008. According to Mr. Tabor's testimony, Mr. Sprunger was anxious to get the computer repaired and informed Mr. Tabor that the computer was used for Mr. Sprunger's business, Trinity Lawn Service. When Mr. Tabor received the computer, it was partially disassembled, and its external shell case had been damaged and partially removed. Upon initial examination of the data stored on the computer, Mr. Tabor found a large number of child-pornography images; he immediately contacted law enforcement.
John Haynes, an investigator with the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department, reviewed the images and obtained a search warrant for Mr. Sprunger's home at 2286 Peavine Road, Crossville, Tennessee (the "Property"). The search warrant was executed on the evening of July 8, 2008. According to Detective Haynes' testimony, when Mr. Sprunger answered the door, the officers explained that the warrant was based upon the images found on Mr. Sprunger's computer and that the officers were at the Property to search for additional child pornography. Detective Haynes testified that Mr. Sprunger responded: "You won't find anymore." (Emphasis added). Indeed, the search revealed no additional child pornography in the home; however, the search revealed a room containing computer equipment, including the missing parts of the computer that had been delivered to Mr. Tabor. Exhibit 5 to the October 21, 2011 hearing was a compilation of photos, taken by Detective Haynes, showing the missing parts of the computer in question lying on the floor of Mr. Sprunger's home. In addition, Detective Haynes testified that the room where the missing computer parts were found also contained power outlets and an internet connection.
Detective Haynes testified that Mr. Sprunger was taken into custody and, after being advised of his rights, signed a waiver and agreed to talk with Detective Haynes. Concerning the conversation he had with Mr. Sprunger, Detective Haynes testified:
He told me that the computer in question that he had dropped off at Mr. Tabor's, he had had for two to three years; he had used it at his business; he kept it in his home; and he was the only onethat had access to it.
Based upon this evidence, on May 19, 2009, Detective Haynes obtained a forfeiture warrant for Mr. Sprunger's Property. The forfeiture warrant, which was admitted as trial Exhibit 6, states that Mr. Sprunger was in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1004.2 General York clarified that, although Mr. Sprunger had initially been charged with violation of Section 39-17-1004, the indictment was subsequently amended and the State proceeded against Mr. Sprunger for violation of Section 39-17-1003.
On August 19, 2010, after a jury trial, Mr. Sprunger was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1003.3 He wassentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for commission of a Class B felony.
On October 4, 2010, Appellee State of Tennessee (the "State"), through District Attorney General Randy York, filed a complaint for a restraining order under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1006,4 and for judicial forfeiture under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-17-1008, which provides, in relevant part: "Any conveyance or real or personal property used in the commission of an offense under this part is subject to forfeiture under the provisions of title 40, chapter 33, part 2." The complaint was filed against Appellant and Highland Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Highland"), seekingforfeiture of Appellant's Property. The complaint acknowledged that the Property was encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of Highland, as mortgagor, in the principal sum of $84,000.00, with a balance owing of $47,813.65. Highland had already initiated foreclosure proceedings against the Property at the time the complaint was filed and it was permitted to conclude those proceedings. The trial court then directed that excess proceeds in the amount of $31,606.26 be turned over to the Clerk and Master, and Highland was dismissed from the case.
On October 21, 2011, the trial court heard the forfeiture case. Appellant participated, pro se, by telephone. Following the hearing, the court ruled that the State had established that Appellant's Property was subject to forfeiture and ordered that the proceeds from the foreclosure sale be forfeited to the State and divided as provided by statute. On October 24, 2011, the trial court entered a final forfeiture order, which is the subject of this appeal.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 28, 2011.5 On April 17, 2012, nearly five months after the notice of appeal was filed, Appellant filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to include a transcript of the forfeiture warrant hearing in the record. This transcript was not introduced into evidence at the October 21, 2011 trial, nor did Mr. Sprunger raise any objection regarding the sufficiency of the forfeiture warrant in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on August 23, 2012, after finding that Appellant had not asked for the transcript during the Chancery Court proceedings and had made no objection to the lack of such a transcript. Appellant filed a second motion on November 15, 2012, seeking to include a transcript of the hearing on the first motion to supplement. The trial court denied the motion on December 13, 2012.
Mr. Sprunger raises several issues for review. We perceive that there are three dispositive issues, which we state as follows:
Before turning to the issues, we first note that we are cognizant of the fact that Mr. Sprunger has proceeded pro se throughout these proceedings. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere. As explained by this Court:
Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's adversary. Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.
Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).
Because this case was tried by the court, sitting without a jury, this Court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's decision with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's findings of fact, unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). For the evidence to preponderate against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greaterconvincing effect. Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); The Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). This Court reviews the trial court's resolution of legal issues without a presumption of correctness. Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tenn. 2001).
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