State v. Squires

• Decision Date: 12 December 1908
• Citation: 15 Idaho 545,98 P. 413
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. ALBERT H. SQUIRES, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

98 P. 413

15 Idaho 545

STATE, Respondent, v. ALBERT H. SQUIRES, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 12, 1908

CRIMINAL LAW-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION-EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF DEPOSITION TAKEN AT INQUEST.

1. An information charging the defendant with the crime of murder and alleging that the defendant at a specified time and place, "then and there being, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a manner unknown strike, beat, wound and ill-treat the body and person of Robert Clemm, a human being; by reason whereof the said Robert Clemm sickened and languished with mortal sickness and feebleness of body," etc., and thereafter died from such injuries within a year and a day, is a sufficient allegation of the means whereby the homicide was effected and the manner of the commission of the same.

2. The rule of liberal construction of indictments and information has been adopted in this state. State v. Sly, 11 Idaho 110 followed and approved.

3. As a general rule, depositions taken at a coroner's inquest under the provisions of sec. 8382, Rev. Stat., are not admissible upon the trial of a person accused of having caused the death of the person over whose body the inquest was held.

4. Evidence in this case examined and held wholly insufficient to support the verdict and judgment or to justify the conviction of the defendant.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for the County of Latah. Hon. Edgar C. Steele, Judge.

Defendant was informed against and charged with the crime of murder. Upon the trial he was convicted of manslaughter and moved for a new trial, and thereafter appealed from the judgment and order denying his motion. Reversed.

Judgment reversed and a new trial granted.

Stewart S. Denning, and T. B. West, for Appellant.

The information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, nor does it conform substantially to the requirements of secs. 5337, 5338 and 5339, Rev. Stat., as it does not show in what manner he came to his death. (Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Owen, 1 Murphy (N. C.), 452, 4 Am. Dec. 571; White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179, 6 Am. Dec. 443; 2 Bishop's New Crim. Proc., secs. 514-522.) Under the stipulation in this case, the court ought to have permitted us to introduce the deposition of Martin taken before the coroner's jury. (Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 651, 23 P. 232, 7 L. R. A. 646; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409; Chicago St. P. M. M. Co. v. Meyers, 80 F. 361, 25 C. C. A. 486.) To justify conviction on circumstantial evidence, every fact necessary to the conclusion must be directly and independently proved by competent evidence, producing a moral certainty that the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt, and no one else, committed the offense. (Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Seymour, 10 Idaho 699, 712, 79 P. 825; State v. Mason, 4 Idaho 543, 43 P. 63; State v. Crump, 5 Idaho 166, 47 P. 814; State v. Marquardsen, 7 Idaho 352, 62 P. 1034; State v. Levy, 9 Idaho 483, 75 P. 227; State v. Kruger, 7 Idaho 178, 61 P. 463.)

J. J. Guheen, Attorney General, and B. S. Crow, for Respondent.

"The means of the commission of a homicide need not be charged under statutes requiring the indictment to contain a statement of the facts constituting the offense in plain and concise language." (State v. Sly, 11 Idaho 111-117, 80 P. 1125; Wharton on Homicide, 3d ed., p. 853; Littell v. State, 133 Ind. 577, 33 N.E. 417; Freeze v. State, 159 Ind. 597, 65 N.E. 915; Mathis v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 549, 47 S.W. 464; People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 388.) "A coroner's inquest is an ex parte proceeding, at which neither the prosecution nor defense are represented. The lack of cross-examination as an element in coroner's procedure makes such testimony inadmissible." (2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1374, and cases cited.)

AILSHIE, C. J. Sullivan, J., and Stewart, J., concur.

OPINION

AILSHIE, C. J.

The defendant was tried on the charge of murder, and was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve a term of three years in the state penitentiary. He appealed from the judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial, and that appeal was subsequently dismissed by this court. (State v. Squires, ante, p. 327, 97 P. 411.) He again appealed from the judgment and order. Counsel for the state moved to dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion for a new trial and to strike the statement of the case from the record; but subsequent to the argument and submission of the case, the attorney general has withdrawn that motion.

Appellant assigns the action of the court in overruling his demurrer to the information as error. The principal objection made to this information is directed against the charging part thereof, wherein it is alleged that the defendant did "then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously in a manner unknown, strike, beat, wound and ill-treat the body and person of Robert Clemm, a human being; by reason whereof the said Robert Clemm sickened and languished with mortal sickness and feebleness of body," etc., and thereafter, within a year and a day, died from such injuries.

Appellant insists that in order to make the information good the prosecutor should have charged the instrument with which the wound was inflicted, or at least its general character and the nature of the injury that was inflicted thereby. We cannot sustain that contention. The rule of liberal construction of indictments and informations has been adopted in this state. (State v. Sly, 11 Idaho 110, 80 P. 1125.) Under that rule this information is sufficient. The acts charged as constituting the offense are stated in "ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." (Sec. 7677, Rev. Stat.) The defendant was in no respect misled as to his defense by the language used in the information.

It is next insisted by appellant that the court erred in refusing to admit the deposition of one L. B. Martin, which was taken at the coroner's inquest. Upon the trial it was admitted by the prosecuting attorney that the witness Martin was at that time absent from the state. Thereupon the defendant offered in evidence the deposition given by the witness at the coroner's inquest. The prosecuting attorney objected to its admission on the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The court sustained the objection and excluded the deposition. We think it must be admitted as a general rule that depositions taken under our statute on the holding of an inquest are not admissible upon the trial of a person accused of causing the death of the person over whose body the inquest was held. (2 Wigmore on Ev., sec. 1374; State v. Grady, 83 N.C. 643; Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17; Head v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 265, 50 S.W. 352.) On the other hand, they are admissible like any other admissions, statements or declarations of a party for the purposes of impeachment when the proper foundation is laid. (State v. Corcoran, 7 Idaho 220, 61 P. 1034; Cox v. Royal Tribe, 42 Ore. 365, 95 Am. St. Rep. 772, note 4, 71 P. 73, 60 L. R. A. 620.) It has been held, however, in State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann. 1332, that a deposition taken at a coroner's inquest is admissible on the part of the defense; that in such case the state has produced the witness and taken the deposition, and that the state consequently has no right to object to its use, and that the defendant may waive his right to be present and cross-examine the witness, and that an offer to introduce it in evidence is a waiver. (See, also, Johnson v. State, 26 Tex. Ct. App. 631, 10 S.W. 235; United States v. Greene, 146 F. 796; Puls v. Grand Lodge, 102 N.W. 165, 13 N.D. 559.)

Under the provisions of sec. 8382, Rev. Stat., the coroner is required to take the testimony of witnesses examined by him in writing. By sec. 8383 it is made the coroner's duty in the event any person has been arrested, charged with causing the death of the deceased, to transmit the depositions to the magistrate before whom the prisoner is held, and it is thereupon made the duty of the magistrate to transmit such depositions, along with the depositions taken in his court to the clerk of the district court. The chief reason that exists for not allowing the introduction of depositions taken at the coroner's inquest, is that the inquest is ex parte, and the parties to the subsequent litigation have not had the right...