State v. St. Jean
Decision Date | 23 June 1995 |
Docket Number | 94-1472,Nos. 94-1132,s. 94-1132 |
Citation | 658 So.2d 1056 |
Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1475 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Beyard ST. JEAN, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Noelvil SOIRELUS, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant State of Fla.
James Dickson Crock, of James Dickson Crock, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appellee Beyard St. Jean.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee Noelvil Soirelus.
Beyard St. Jean was driving his vehicle up I-95 in Volusia County with Noelvil Soirelus as his passenger. When St. Jean weaved into another lane, a deputy sheriff stopped him and gave him a warning. Without contradiction, St. Jean then consented to a search of his vehicle. St. Jean and Soirelus were standing outside the vehicle as the officer commenced the search.
The officer found a flowered bag on the floorboard on the passenger side of the vehicle. When he started to search this bag, St. Jean and Soirelus fled the scene. Unsurprisingly, the bag contained over two kilograms of cocaine. When apprehended, both St. Jean and Soirelus were charged with trafficking in cocaine.
Both St. Jean and Soirelus filed a c-4 1 motion to dismiss, contending that the irrefutable facts establish the State's inability to prove that either defendant had constructive or actual possession of the flowered bag since it was found in a common area of the vehicle and carried the fingerprints of neither defendant. By traverse, the State asserted that each defendant had dominion and control over the cocaine and knowledge of its presence. The court granted both motions to dismiss. The State appeals; we reverse.
We have elected to consolidate these cases for the purpose of this opinion.
First, we find that under the facts of these cases, a c-4 motion was an inappropriate vehicle to challenge the issue of knowledge as an element of constructive possession. The court in State v. Duran, 550 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), held:
Generally, the issue of knowledge, as an element of constructive possession, Brown v. State, 428 So.2d 250 (Fla.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 3541, 77 L.Ed.2d 1391 (1983), is an ultimate question which a jury must decide on factual inferences; it is not subject to a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). State v. Farrugia, 419 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). See also S.T.N. v. State, 474 So.2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) ( ); Cummings v. State, 378 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (, )cert. denied, 386 So.2d 635 (Fla.1980); State v. Alford, 395 So.2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) ( ).
Second, even if the c-4 motions properly raised the issue, the judge failed to give proper effect to the evidentiary value of the admitted flight. Our supreme court has long recognized:
The rule is that, when a suspected person in any manner endeavors to escape, or evade a threatened prosecution, by flight, concealment, resistance to a lawful arrest, or other ex post facto indication of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact may be shown in evidence as one of a series of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred. Whart. Crim. Ev. (9th ed.) Sec. 750, and citations; Carr v. State, 45 Fla. 11, text 16, 34 So. 892 (quoting Blackwell v. State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224 (1920)).
Daniels v. State, 108 So.2d 755, 760 (Fla.1959).
Also in Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666, 670 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3227, 49 L.Ed.2d 1221 (1976), Rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct. 194, 50 L.Ed.2d 157 (1976), the court stated the rule as "when a suspect endeavors to evade prosecution by flight, such fact may be shown in evidence as one of the circumstances from which guilt may be inferred." It is necessary, of course, that there be some evidence other than the flight to show that the fleeing was to avoid prosecution. Merritt v. State, 523 So.2d 573 (Fla., 1988). Here, where the defendants fled just as the officer was opening the bag containing over two kilograms of cocaine (or, more to the point, containing minimum fifteen-year jail terms), it is hard to imagine any other motivation that would cause the owner (or the passenger for that matter) to abandon the vehicle along I-95 and take to the woods. 2
Even though the supreme court in Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292, 294-95 (Fla.1992), held that thereafter it would be inappropriate for the court to instruct on flight, it did not do away with the evidentiary value of flight...
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Fisher v. Fla. Attorney Gen. & Sec'y
...as an element of constructive possession is an ultimate question which a jury must decide on factual inferences. State v. St. Jean, 658 So. 2d 1056, 1057 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). "In considering a (c)(4) motion the trial judge may not try or determine factual issues nor consider the weight of c......
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State v. Paleveda, 98-05003.
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Jacobs v. State, 98-1965.
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