State v. Staat

• Decision Date: 21 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-148,91-148
• Citation: 48 St.Rep. 1041,251 Mont. 1,822 P.2d 643
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leo F. STAAT, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 643

822 P.2d 643

251 Mont. 1

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leo F. STAAT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 91-148.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Oct. 23, 1991.

Decided Nov. 21, 1991.

Noel K. Larrivee (argued), Larrivee Law Office, Missoula, for defendant and appellant.

Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Paul D. Johnson (argued), Mark Murphy, Asst. Attys. Gen., Helena, and George Corn, Ravalli County Atty., Hamilton, for plaintiff and respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

Appellant Leo G. Staat appeals from a jury verdict and trial court orders of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, finding appellant guilty of the offense of tampering with or fabricating evidence in violation of § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA (1989), a felony.

We affirm.

Appellant raises five issues on appeal.

1. Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress a confession made after a polygraph examination on the grounds that plaintiff's police officers' expressed or implied conduct resulted in a "custodial interrogation."

2. Whether the District Court erred in overruling appellant's objection to plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, which consisted of a secretly taped interrogation in appellant's home, violating appellant's right to privacy under Mont. Const. art. II, § 10, and appellant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.

3. Whether the District Court erred in allowing a conviction without any evidence of the offense charged other than appellant's confession.

4. Whether the District Court erred by not directing a verdict for appellant based on plaintiff's failure to offer sufficient evidence proving the necessary mental state for the crime charged.

5. Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's motion for a new trial on grounds that the prosecutor made inflammatory remarks during closing argument which were not supported by the record, thereby prejudicing appellant's right to a fair trial.

On the morning of December 16, 1989, appellant discovered the body of a close friend, Mary Higgins, at her residence in Stevensville. She had been the victim of a deliberate homicide. On the kitchen table, appellant discovered a note addressed to him by the victim. According to appellant, the note stated "[s]weetheart, I'm out for a walk, wait for me to come back." Appellant picked up the note and destroyed it. Appellant then notified the police from a local drug store about the killing. A full-scale police investigation was quickly launched.

The police questioned appellant on at least five separate occasions. The first occurred on December 16, 1989, in a police vehicle at the scene of the crime. Detective Maus interviewed appellant concerning the discovery of the body. Because the police discovered footprints and tire tracks left in the snow, appellant's shoes and car tires were photographed. This evidence indicated that appellant drove up to the victim's house and walked to her door twice before notifying the police.

Appellant was questioned at his residence by police officers on December 26, 1989, January 2, 1990, and on January 12, 1990. At the conclusion of the January 12, 1990, interrogation, Detective Horsfall requested that appellant submit to a polygraph examination. At first, appellant declined, but after repeated requests by the detective, appellant consented.

Throughout these interrogations the police secretly recorded their conversations with appellant by hiding a microphone in an officer's lapel. Appellant was unaware that he was being taped during these interrogations.

On the evening of January 16, 1990, a polygraph examination was conducted upon appellant in the basement of the Ravalli County Sheriff's Office. The entire examination lasted approximately four hours. After the polygraph, the police, dressed in plain clothes, began interrogating appellant. It was at that time that appellant confessed to reentering the victim's house and taking and destroying the note. At no time throughout the investigation, and specifically not before, during, or after the polygraph examination, did the police read appellant the Miranda warning. Two months later appellant was arrested and charged with tampering with or fabricating evidence in violation of § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA (1989).

On September 5, 1990, appellant filed a motion to suppress the statements he had made to investigating officers following the polygraph examination because he was never given a Miranda warning. On October 25, 1990, a suppression hearing was held. The District Court denied the motion on November 19, 1990. On November 26, 1990, a jury trial commenced. The trial concluded the following day with the jury finding appellant guilty. On December 10, 1990, appellant moved for a new trial which was denied by the District Court. Appellant was given a three year deferred sentence. Notice of appeal was timely filed on January 24, 1991.

I

Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress on the grounds that plaintiff's police officers' expressed or implied conduct resulted in a "custodial interrogation."

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that states may not use confessions or admissions resulting from "custodial interrogation" unless the proper Miranda warnings have been given. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706. The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Before determining whether the police should have given the appellant the Miranda warning, we must first determine whether there was "custodial interrogation."

This Court has established the following guidelines to determine what constitutes "custodial interrogation." If a person has no free right to leave, then the interrogation is custodial. State v. Ellinger (1986), 223 Mont. 349, 355, 725 P.2d 1201, 1204. "Custodial interrogation" can result from the expressed or implied conduct of police officers. State v. Osteen (1985), 216 Mont. 258, 265, 700 P.2d 188, 193. This Court looks to whether a "reasonable person" would not feel free to leave and has used six factors to determine "custodial interrogation."

[P]lace of interrogation, the time of interrogation, persons present during interrogation, whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given, the length and mood of interrogation, and whether or not the suspect was arrested following questioning.

State v. Lapp (1983), 202 Mont. 327, 331, 658 P.2d 400, 403.

Even though a suspect is questioned by police officers in a station house, the interrogation is not necessarily custodial unless there is a significant restriction of personal liberty. State v. Dannels (1987), 226 Mont. 80, 87, 734 P.2d 188, 193.

"Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' "

Dannels, 734 P.2d at 193 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719).

Miranda warnings might not be required even when a person is the focus of the investigation. Dannels, 734 P.2d at 190-91. The determination of what constitutes "custodial interrogation" is made on a case-by-case analysis.

In this case, the facts and circumstances did not rise to the level of "custodial interrogation." Appellant stated he was unconcerned about taking a polygraph. He volunteered to take the polygraph and drove to the sheriff's office without a police escort. The police did not threaten appellant with arrest, nor was he ordered to take the polygraph. Appellant was not placed under arrest either before or after the polygraph examination. After the post-polygraph interview, he was free to leave. None of the officers involved with the examination were in uniform. Toward the end of questioning, the record reflects that the appellant and the officers were joking and making idle conversation. After the examination, appellant went home. Moreover, the purpose of the polygraph examination was to develop information regarding the Higgins homicide, not to find information about tampering with the evidence. We have noted our extreme displeasure with the use of polygraph examinations and results in criminal trials and forbade their use in any proceeding in a court of law in Montana. State v. Staat (Mont.1991), 811 P.2d 1261, 1262, 48 St.Rep. 331. We hold that in this case, and under these facts, the District Court did not err in allowing appellant's confession into evidence.

II

Whether the District Court erred in overruling appellant's objection to plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, which consisted of a secretly taped interrogation in appellant's home, violating appellant's right to privacy under Mont. Const. art. II, § 10, and appellant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.

In State v. Brown (1988), 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364, the majority of this Court held:

[T]hat warrantless consensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations by the use of a body wire transmitting device, performed by law enforcement officers while pursuing their official duties, does not violate the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures nor the privacy ...