State v. Stafford

Decision Date18 October 2011
Docket Number40156-8-II
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JAMES RANDALL STAFFORD, Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Penoyar, C.J.

James Randall Stafford appeals his conviction of third degree assault of a law enforcement officer, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted a police officer's testimony that a police dispatcher had advised him that Stafford would "assault police officers when they arrived on scene." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 133. Because the trial court should not have admitted this irrelevant evidence, and because the erroneous admission of this evidence prejudiced Stafford, we reverse his conviction.

FACTS

I. Background

On September 18, 2009, Officer Perry Houts and Sergeant Kim Yamashita of the Washougal Police Department and Clark County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Nicholls responded to a disturbance at a property in Washougal, Washington. Stafford lived on the property with his mother. When the officers arrived on the scene, they spoke with Stafford's relatives near the property's main residence. The relatives told the officers that Stafford had made "threats." RP at 118.

The officers proceeded to Stafford's recreational vehicle (RV), which was located about 75 feet away from the main residence. Stafford had locked himself inside. The officers informed Stafford that he was under arrest for harassment and ordered him to exit the RV. When Stafford refused, the officers attempted to enter through an open window. Using a knife, Yamashita cut the window screen to allow Nicholls to tear it off. Stafford was "moving around frantically" in the RV, causing it to "rock[] back and forth." RP at 75.

When Nicholls removed the window screen, Yamashita attempted to push a shelving unit that was blocking entry out of the way. Yamashita was struck by objects that came out of the window. Yamashita testified that, although it was dark in the trailer, she could see Stafford's arm make a throwing motion. Nicholls testified that he could not see inside the trailer, but that the objects emerged from the trailer "at quite a high rate of speed." RP at 116. Stafford denied throwing any objects at the officers; he testified that the objects fell off the shelving unit when Yamashita tried to push it out of the way.

After the incident at the window, Stafford exited the RV. He was agitated and aggressive, and he refused to comply with the officers' orders to stop and get on the ground. The officers used a taser to subdue and arrest him. The State charged him, in relevant part, with third degree assault of a police officer.[1]

At trial, Stafford's counsel cross-examined Nicholls as follows:

Q: When you got to the scene of this incident, you talked to the relatives?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Okay. And at that time, you formed an opinion to arrest Mr. Stafford, based upon what they told you; isn't that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All right. You didn't solicit or get his side of the story?
[STATE]: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance.
[DEFENSE]: He's the officer that made the decision to arrest.
THE COURT: This question may be answered. You may answer it.
A: At that point in time, no, I did not solicit his.
Q: All right. Now you tried a crowbar on the door of the camper; is that correct?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: All right. But you did not have an arrest warrant at that time?
A: No, sir; I did not.
Q: You didn't have a search warrant?
A: No, sir; I did not.
Q: This would not have been a hot pursuit case?
A: With the facts we had had from the family and dispatch in regards to the threats that were made—
Q: And those—
A: —I—
Q: And those were from the family, not Mr. Stafford or anything; correct?
A: Correct.
Q: Now were you aware that they were having a running argument at that time?
A: I was unaware of that.

RP at 117-19.

Before its redirect examination of Nicholls, the State moved the trial court outside of the jury's presence for permission to ask Nicholls "what he heard from dispatch" in order to explain the officers' manner of arrest. RP at 124. In an offer of proof, Nicholls testified that dispatch informed him that "Mr. Stafford was being irrational and would assault police officers if they had arrived on the scene." RP at 126. Stafford objected, arguing that this testimony was hearsay, highly prejudicial, and irrelevant. The trial court ruled that it would allow Nicholls's testimony because Stafford had "open[ed] the door a crack" about the officers' state of mind when they approached the scene. RP at 127. At the State's request the trial court agreed to provide a limiting instruction.

Accordingly during the State's redirect of Nicholls, the following exchange occurred:

Q: [Y]ou also said you were informed some things from Dispatch; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q: Relating to what you were informed—can you tell the jury relating to what you were informed about Mr Stafford—
THE COURT: Stop.
Q: —by Dispatch?
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I am now instructing you that the answer to this question you're not to accept it as truth, but only to—for it to be shown how it affected this officer's conduct at the scene. Okay? You may answer.
A: Thank you, Your Honor. Dispatch advised that Mr. Stafford was acting irrational and that he would assault police officers when they arrived on scene.

RP at 132-33.

During deliberations, the jury sent a written note to the trial court, which asked, "Did the objects fly out of the window before Officer Yamashita pushed on the shelf[?]" Clerk's Papers (CP) at 54. The trial court responded "Rely on the evidence presented in court." CP at 54.

The jury convicted Stafford of third degree assault. He appeals.

ANALYSIS
I. Admission of Evidence

Stafford contends that the trial court erred by allowing Nicholls to relate the content of the dispatcher's statement. He argues that this testimony was irrelevant. We agree.

We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 181, 189 P.3d 126 (2008). Abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision to admit evidence is "manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." Magers, 164 Wn.2d at 181 (quoting State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995)).

A. Relevance

Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. ER 402. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." ER 401.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). A statement is not hearsay if offered to explain its effect on the listener rather than the truth of its content. See State v. Roberts, 80 Wn.App. 342, 352, 908 P.2d 892 (1996); State v. Jessup, 31 Wn.App. 304, 315, 641 P.2d 1185 (1982). But even if an out-of-court statement is offered to explain its effect on the listener, it is not admissible unless it is relevant. See State v. Edwards, 131 Wn.App. 611, 614, 128 P.3d 631 (2006); see also State v. Stamm, 16 Wn.App. 603, 559 P.2d 1 (1976) ("Out-of-court statements are admissible to show a declarant's state of mind only if said state of mind is 'relevant to a material issue in the cause.'") (quoting State v. Murphy, 7 Wn.App. 505, 509, 500 P.2d 1276 (1972)).

Edwards is instructive.

There, an officer testified that a confidential informant told him that the defendant sold cocaine. Edwards, 131 Wn.App. at 614. On appeal, the parties debated whether the confidential informant's statement was hearsay. Edwards, 131 Wn.App. at 614. The State argued that the statement was not hearsay because it explained why the officer initiated an investigation of the defendant. Edwards, 131 Wn.App. 614. But the Edwards court rejected this argument, holding that the officer's state of mind was not relevant to the issue of whether the defendant had sold cocaine. 131 Wn.App. at 614.

In State v. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. 277, 787 P.2d 949 (1990), the court addressed a similar issue. In that case, a resident surprised a burglar in her house, causing the burglar to flee. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 278. The burglar hid or dropped a videocassette recorder (VCR) in some bushes behind the house. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 278. Later that day, neighbors observed a man get out of a car and use a blue jeans jacket to push his way through the bushes. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279. The neighbors called the police and reported the car's license number. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279. The police dispatcher relayed the license number to the responding officer and told the officer about the blue jeans jacket. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279-80. The officer stopped the car about three blocks from the burgled house and noticed a blue jeans jacket on the car's passenger seat after the defendant exited the vehicle. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279. The officer searched the jacket and discovered a watch and jewelry that had been taken in the burglary. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279. At trial, the officer testified, over the defendant's objection, that the dispatcher had told him that the suspect used a blue jeans jacket to push his way through the bushes. Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279. The State argued that the testimony was not inadmissible hearsay; rather, the State offered it "to show the officer's state of mind in explaining why he acted as he did." Aaron, 57 Wn.App. at 279-80. On appeal, the court held that the officer's testimony that the dispatcher told him about the blue jeans jacket was not relevant:

If the legality of the search and seizure was being challenged, either at a suppression hearing or at trial, the information available to the officer as the basis for his
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