State v. Stafford

• Decision Date: 01 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 848SC1098,848SC1098
• Citation: 77 N.C.App. 19,334 S.E.2d 799
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Allen STAFFORD.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 799

334 S.E.2d 799

77 N.C.App. 19

STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Allen STAFFORD.

No. 848SC1098.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 1, 1985.

Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Asst. Atty. Gen. Alfred N. Salley, Raleigh, for the State.

Barnes, Braswell & Haithcock by R. Gene Braswell and S. Reed Warren, Goldsboro, for defendant-appellant.

WEBB, Judge.

The appellant's only assignment of error is in regard to Dr. Ponzi's testimony in regard to the rape trauma syndrome. We believe this assignment of error has merit. Dr. Ponzi testified as to the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome. He then testified as to the symptoms Tammy Ingram told him on 13 July 1984 that she had. If this testimony was introduced to prove the symptoms which Tammy Ingram had so that the jury could then determine whether she had a rape trauma syndrome it was hearsay testimony. It was offered to prove the truth of what Tammy Ingram told Dr. Ponzi. See G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) for a definition of hearsay. We do not believe this testimony was admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803 provides in part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

....

(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment--Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

We do not believe this exception is applicable in this case. It is obvious that Tammy Ingram went to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 in preparation for going to court. She did not go for treatment. We do not believe we should hold she went for diagnosis. The commentary says this exception to the hearsay rule is based on the strong motivation for truthfulness when a patient is seeking treatment from a physician. For this reason we believe the diagnosis for which the exception to the hearsay applies should be a diagnosis for the purpose of treating a disease.

If the testimony were offered for the purpose of corroborating Tammy Ingram's testimony it would not be hearsay. Nevertheless a good part of it should have been excluded because Dr. Ponzi's testimony did not corroborate Tammy Ingram's testimony. Tammy Ingram testified that between December 1983 and July 1984 her weight went from 125 pounds to between 110 and 115 pounds. She also testified she made lower grades in school. Dr. Ponzi testified that she told him that she had a 15 pound weight loss, that she had been vomiting, that she cried a great deal, was emotionally labile, had a decreased school performance, had nightmares and dreamed about the incident. This testimony went far beyond corroborating the testimony of Tammy Ingram. It was error to admit it. See State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 185 S.E.2d 677 (1972). We hold this is an error requiring a new trial.

New trial.

BECTON, J., concurs in the result.

MARTIN, J., dissents.

BECTON, Judge, concurring in the result.

Considering the current social science and medical research on rape trauma syndrome, I conclude that Dr. Ponzi's testimony about rape trauma syndrome was reversibly prejudicial. First, although it may be a therapeutic tool, the rape trauma syndrome has not gained acceptability as a socio-medical scientifically reliable means for proving that a rape occurred. As the Minnesota Supreme Court said in State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (1982):

Rape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred. The characteristic symptoms may follow any psychologically traumatic event. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 236 (3d ed. 1980). At best, the syndrome describes only symptoms that occur with some frequency, but makes no pretense of describing every single case. C. Warner, Rape and Sexual Assault 145 (1980).

Some suggest that there are as many as fifty symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome today, many of which would be applicable to hijack victims, prisoners of war, kidnap victims, as well as others who have been subjected to psychologically traumatic events. Second, Dr. Ponzi did not testify about the reliability or validity of the rape trauma syndrome evidence in this case. Third, the history and purpose of the rape trauma syndrome concept suggests that it was not designed to prove that a rape in fact occurred. As the California Supreme Court observed in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 459, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (1984):

Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voiceprints or the battered child syndrome, rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the "truth" or "accuracy" of a particular event--i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred--but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors' clients or patients. ... [R]ape counselors are taught to make a conscious effort to avoid judging the credibility of their clients. ... "[W]hen a psychologist becomes judgmental, he/she has become entrapped in a major pitfall. ..."

Thus, as a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsistencies in their clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor do they conduct independent investigations to determine whether other evidence corroborates or contradicts their clients' renditions.

(quoting Kilpatrick, Rape Victims: Detection, Assessment and Treatment (Summer 1983) Clinical Psychologist 92, 94) (citation omitted). Finally and significantly, defendant did not raise "consent" as a defense. Use of the rape trauma syndrome when a defendant contends the victim consented is not as problematical as use of the syndrome when, as in the instant case, the defendant contends he did not engage in sexual intercourse with the victim. That is, when a defendant does not contest the fact that a rape occurred, but merely denies he committed it, rape trauma syndrome evidence may be irrelevant and prejudicial.

Although set in print, these words are not figuratively cast in stone for eternity. When, and if, the methodological flaws in rape trauma syndrome studies are avoided and the rape trauma syndrome gains general acceptance as a non-prejudicial tool to inform jurors about what course of action they should take, I would not hesitate to re-evaluate the position I take today.

Believing the jury could have been mislead by Dr. Ponzi's testimony, even though he offered no opinion, and that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value the evidence may have had, I concur in the result.

MARTIN, Judge, dissenting.

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Dr. Ponzi's testimony as to Tammy Ingram's symptoms, as related to him by Tammy and her mother, was inadmissible hearsay. I would find that his testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(4). Rule 803(4) excludes from the hearsay rule: "[s]tatements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." (emphasis added). The reason for the admission of such statements is grounded upon their reliability due to the declarant's motivation to assist the physician in diagnosis or treatment. Not only are statements by the patient admissible, but a statement made to a physician by a third person as to the patient's symptoms would also be admissible if made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment of the patient, and if the court determines that the statement is...