State v. Stallman
| Decision Date | 16 March 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 9146,9146 |
| Citation | 79 A.2d 611,78 R.I. 90 |
| Parties | STATE v. STALLMAN. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., John F. O'Connell, Special Counsel, Providence, for State.
Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Providence, for defendant.
This is a complaint and warrant charging the defendant with violating a specific section in an ordinance of the city of Cranston relating to the licensing of persons removing rubbish and waste material therein. In the superior court defendant pleaded not guilty and, having waived a jury trial, was tried by a justice of that court. He was found guilty as charged and thereafter duly prosecuted his bill of exceptions to this court.
He is now relying upon two exceptions, the first to the denial by the trial justice of a motion made at the conclusion of the evidence that the complaint and warrant be dismissed and defendant be found not guilty, and the second to the decision of the trial justice adjudging defendant guilty on the evidence presented. The material portions of the ordinance allegedly violated are as follows:
The evidence, which is undisputed, disclosed that defendant lives in the city of Providence; that on the afternoon of January 20, 1950 he was driving a dump truck in a southerly direction on Warwick avenue, a street in the city of Cranston; that he turned into a vacant lot which was private property and had begun to dump the load which was in his truck when he was stopped by a Cranston police officer who compelled him to pick up what he had dumped; and that the policeman asked defendant for his license to remove rubbish or waste material but the latter did not produce any. It appeared in evidence that one had previously been issued to him but that it had expired before the above date. The defendant did not testify, no evidence on his behalf was introduced, and at the conclusion of the state's evidence he rested his case.
In support of his exceptions defendant contends that he was wrongly convicted and and that his motion to dismiss should have been granted. He argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the offense with which he was charged, in that the state offered no evidence whatever to show that he was not 'a house-holder transporting rubbish or waste material gathered on his own premises' as set out in the ordinance. The defendant urges that it was a necessary part of the state's case to show that he did not come under such exception. On the other hand the state argues that the burden, in the first instance, was on the defendant to present evidence showing that he came within the above exception because it was in the nature of an affirmative defense, and as a consequence of his failure to do so the case against him on the present record was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon consideration it is our opinion that in the circumstances the position taken by the state is sound. While a defendant never has the burden of proving his innocence, and on the whole case the state always has the burden of establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless after the state has made out a prima facie case the burden of adducing evidence to support an affirmative defense devolves upon him. Especially is this true when as a justification or excuse a defendant is relying on a fact the subject matter whereof lies peculiarly within his knowledge and relates to him personally. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 571, 572, 573; 53 C.J.S., Licenses, § 71; Underhill Crim.Evid. (4th ed.) § 52; 153 A.L.R. 1277. State of Indiana v. O'Dell, 187 Ind. 84, 118 N.E. 529; Cole v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 169 Va. 868, 879, 193 S.E. 517.
In the instant case no question of criminal pleading is involved. The issue raised by defendant relates merely to the question whether in a proceeding of this nature the state or the defendant is required as part of their respective cases to introduce evidence relating to the applicability of the exception contained in the ordinance in question. For that reason G.L.1938, c. 625, § 5, has no direct application here under the holding of this court in State v. St. Angelo, 72 R.I. 412, 52 A.2d 513, where such section was discussed and held to deal only with matters of criminal pleading.
Whether or not such an exception in a statute or ordinance is part of the offense described therein or is merely an excuse or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Neary, 77-454-C
...of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution (State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 95, 196 A.2d 138 (1963); State v. Stallman, 78 R.I. 90, 79 A.2d 611 (1951)), the burden of going forward with the evidence may indeed shift from side to side, and this same burden may properly devolve......
-
State v. Gabriau, 96-38-C
...of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution (State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 95, 196 A.2d 138 (1963); State v. Stallman, 78 R.I. 90, 79 A.2d 611 (1951)), the burden of going forward with the evidence may indeed shift from side to side, and this same burden may properly devolve......
-
State v. Currie, 38913
...its burden of proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant must be acquitted.' 13 In State v. Stallman, 78 R.I. 90, 93, 79 A.2d 611, 612, the court '* * * While a defendant never has the burden of proving his innocence, and on the whole case the state always ha......
-
State v. Brown
...that the prosecution refused to stipulate to the seating of more than twelve jurors on the deliberating panel. See State v. Stallman, 78 R.I. 90, 93, 79 A.2d 611, 612 (1951) (“[T]he state always has the burden of establishing [a defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt * * *.”). Further......