State v. O'Dell

Decision Date30 January 1918
Docket NumberNo. 23255.,23255.
Citation118 N.E. 529,187 Ind. 84
PartiesSTATE v. O'DELL.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sullivan County; William H. Bridwell, Judge.

Benjamin O'Dell was acquitted of an offense, and the State appeals. Appeal sustained.

Eli Stansbury, of Indianapolis, U. S. Lesh, of Huntington, Elmer E. Hastings, of Washington, Ind., Edward M. White, of Indianapolis, John G. McCord, of Pinevillage, and Martin L. Pigg, of Sullivan, for the State. John W. Lindley, of Sullivan, for appellee.

SPENCER, C. J.

Appellee was tried and acquitted on an affidavit which charges him with a violation of section 6675, Burns 1914. The state has appealed from the judgment of acquittal, and now seeks to present certain questions as to the interpretation of that statute. Appellee asserts that the appeal has not been properly perfected, but in this contention we find no merit. The first objection urged may be defeated through an application of the rule announced in Martin v. State (1897) 148 Ind. 519, 47 N. E. 930, that where a bill of exceptions is signed and filed on the same day, it will be presumed that the signature of the judge preceded the filing with the clerk. As to the remaining objections it is sufficient to say that the record clearly presents the rulings which are challenged by the state's appeal, and shows a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 2217, Burns 1914. The statute on which this prosecution was based provides in part:

“That it shall be the duty of every parent, guardian, or other person, in the state of Indiana, having control or charge of any child, to cause such child to attend regularly a public, private, or parochial day school, or two or more of such schools, during each school year for a term or period not shorter than that of the common schools of the school corporation in this state where the child resides. This section shall apply to every child not physically or mentally disqualified, as hereinafter provided, who shall be of the age of seven years and of not more than the age of fourteen years, and shall apply to every child of fourteen years or more and not more than sixteen years of age, who is not actually and regularly employed, during the hours of the common school of such school corporation, in a useful employment or service, or is not lawfully employed in a gainful service agreeably to the provisions of this act concerning the employment of children in gainful occupations.”

The provisions of the act which refer to physical or mental disqualification and to employment during school hours have no bearing on the issues here presented.

Statutes such as the above do not invade the right of a parent to govern and control his own children. (State v. Bailey [1901] 157 Ind. 324, 330, 61 N. E. 730, 59 L. R. A. 435;State v. Jackson [1902] 71 N. H. 552, 555, 53 Atl. 1021, 60 L. R. A. 739), and they are to be given a reasonable interpretation to the end that the best interests of the child and the state alike may be served (State v. Hall [1906] 74 N. H. 61, 63, 64 Atl. 1102).

Although, in appeals of this character, the principles of law involved are to be treated with reference to their general, rather than specific, application, the board inquiry may often be more accurately defined if its origin under actual circumstances is made to appear. The record in this case discloses that in the school year 1914-1915, appellee's daughter, then 12 years of age, attended district school No. 6 in Curry township, Sullivan county, and was regularly graduated therefrom in the spring of 1915, after having completed the full prescribed course of study ending with the eighth grade. During the following year she attended no public, private, or parochial day school of any character, although a public high school was maintained at Farmersburgh, in Curry township, within three miles of appellee's residence, but pursued...

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1 cases
  • Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • March 30, 2006
    ...would be supported by taxation. Indeed the term "common school" was widely understood to mean "public school." See State v. O'Dell, 187 Ind. 84, 118 N.E. 529, 530 (1918) (declaring that the phrase "common schools" is synonymous with "public schools" and includes high schools); Embry v. O'Ba......

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