State v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 29 February 1932
• Citation: 159 A. 116
• Parties: STATE v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

159 A. 116

STATE

v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 1932.

Report from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Action by the State of Maine against the Standard Oil Company of New York. On report from superior court.

Judgment for defendant.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, FARRINGTON. and THAXTER, JJ.

Clement F. Robinson, Atty. Gen., for the State.

Woodman. Skelton & Thompson, of Portland, for defendant.

DUNN, J.

The case is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, to determine whether or not the action is maintainable.

The declaration counts on chapter 12, §§ 70 to 86, both inclusive, of the Revised Statutes 19.30. These statutory provisions impose, and otherwise relate to, an excise tax of four cents a gallon, on dealings in internal combustion fuels (in the present instance, gasoline, respecting which interstate transportation is at an end), in Maine.

The validity of the statute, which excludes the imported commodity, while it continues subject to the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States (article 1, § 8. cl. 3), is conceded.

The sole problem is one of interpretation.

In March, 1931, the defendant was, within the meaning of the statute, a "distributor" of gasoline. It operated numerous retail filling stations, in various parts of the state, but was chiefly engaged in the sale of gasoline to dealers, who in turn sold the product to ultimate consumers. It used, during the said month, in the regular course of its business, as fuel for its own motor vehicles, 20,590.2 gallons of gasoline.

On such use of gasoline, the defendant refused to pay a tax; hence this action by the Attorney General. The amount in dispute is $823.61.

The case is said to be the first of its kind under the excise tax statute, and the question whether the tax falls, not only on motor fuel sold, but also on that which the distributor used in propelling his vehicles, new.

The distinction between an excise tax based on sales, and one based on use of property, is obvious. Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 V. S. 499, 49 S. Ct. 188, 73 L. Ed. 475.

Inquiry is: Has the Legislature laid a tax upon the use, as well as upon the sale, of gasoline (constituting part of the stock of the "distributor") in domestic trade.

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate intention. Tremblay v. Murphy, 111 Me. 38, 88 A. 55, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1074; Bowen v. Portland, 119 Me. 282, 111 A. 1.

In construing statutes, courts expound the law; they cannot extend the application of a statute, nor amend it by the insertion of words.

Section 79 of the statute, in so far as recital seems essential, defines a "distributor" as a person, etc., "who imports * * * for sale or for his or its own use * * * any internal combustion engine fuels as herein defined for use in this state. * * * "

This language is not, on first reading, as clear as it might be.

The office of the section is, however, only that of defining the terms employed in other sections. Besides defining "distributor," the section defines "internal combustion engine," and "internal combustion engine fuel."

Section 80 lays "an excise tax * * * upon said internal combustion engine fuels sold within this state and for the uses defined...