State v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

• Decision Date: 12 July 1933
• Docket Number: 242.
• Parties: STATE v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

170 S.E. 134

205 N.C. 123

STATE v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY et al.

No. 242.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

July 12, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Cranmer, Judge.

Action by State against the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and others. From a judgment striking out amendment to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Judgment sustaining demurrers to complaint for insufficiency of facts to constitute cause of action held binding on another judge of same court on motion to strike out amendment.

Amendment containing allegations similar to those in original complaint to which demurrers were sustained for insufficiency of facts to constitute cause of action, and omitting to state facts previously adjudged essential, held properly stricken out by another judge of same court.

Civil action to declare illegal certain lease and commission contracts made by defendants respectively with various persons, firms, or corporations, under which the latter sell to the public the gasolines and lubricating oils marketed by the several defendants, and to enjoin the defendants, each and all, from further entering into such contracts on the ground that they are in contravention of C. S. §§ 2559-2574 chapter 53, relating to monopolies and trusts.

Separate demurrers were interposed by the several defendants on the grounds (1) that there is a misjoinder of parties and causes and (2) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

At the November term, 1932 the demurrers were overruled on the first ground and sustained on the second, with leave to amend within 30 days, Sinclair, J., presiding and finding:

"That the complaint alleges facts and circumstances, proof of which upon trial would be competent upon all allegation of an understanding or agreement among the defendants to create a monopoly or to restrain competition in violation of the statute, but that it does not allege any understanding or agreement, tacit or otherwise, by the defendants; neither does it sufficiently allege any specific acts which would of themselves constitute in law prevention of independent competition or amount to restraint in trade or commerce.

"In the absence of some allegation of a common understanding or agreement by the defendants in reference thereto, the business methods and processes in use by the defendants are not inconsistent with the idea of the common use of approved business methods in open competition by the defendants.

"There is no averment of any specific fact or facts, which of themselves would constitute a monopoly or the prevention of competition, and in the opinion of the Court, an averment of a general conclusion is not sufficient to constitute a cause of action."

Within the time allowed an amendment to the complaint was filed in the form of an additional paragraph as follows: "23. And in the said acts and things done and performed by the said defendants, as set out in the original complaint and the amendment thereto, the said defendants acted in concert and in pursuance of agreements, contracts, combinations and understandings, expressed or implied, and with a common purpose to control and raise the price of the commodities sold by them, and to restrain trade and commerce in the State of North Carolina in the sale and distribution of such petroleum products, and that said agreements, contracts, combinations and understandings, expressed or implied, by, between and among the said defendants, and each of them, were intended to, and did, operate to prevent open, free and independent competition in the sale and distribution of petroleum products in the State of North Carolina, and were intended to and did operate to control and increase the price of said petroleum products, to hamper, lessen and restrain trade and commerce therein, and were in restraint of free and lawful competition in the sale and distribution of such petroleum products in this State, and in violation of chapter 41, Public Laws of 1913, now chapter 53 of the Consolidated Statutes, and particularly sections 2559-2564 thereof."

Separate motions were thereupon filed by the several defendants to strike out said amendment "upon the ground that it is not responsive to said decision, judgment and order filed November 12, 1932, in that there is contained therein no averment of any facts which would constitute a monopoly or the prevention of competition, and no averment of any specific fact or facts sufficient to remedy the defects in the complaint which was by the Hon. N. A. Sinclair adjudged not to state a cause of action."

It was further observed upon the argument of said motions that the amendment was not materially unlike paragraph 22 of the original complaint, which had previously been held insufficient on demurrer, and which said paragraph is as follows: "22. By the...