State v. Standifer
| Decision Date | 18 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 54290-2,54290-2 |
| Citation | 110 Wn.2d 90,750 P.2d 258 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Marvin STANDIFER, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Seattle King Co. Public Defender, Scott A. Reiman, Seattle, for petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Donna Wise, Deputy, Seattle, for respondent.
A jury convicted defendant of second degree theft. The trial court granted defendant's motion for arrest of judgment. The State appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment. State v. Standifer, 48 Wash.App. 119, 737 P.2d 1058 (1987). We reverse the Court of Appeals.
Defendant was charged and convicted under RCW 9A.56.040(1)(c): "(1) A person is guilty of theft in the second degree if he commits theft of: ... (c) A credit card". RCW 9A.56.010(3) defines credit card:
any instrument or device, whether incomplete, revoked, or expired, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, charge plate, courtesy card, or by any other name, issued with or without fee for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services, or anything else of value, including satisfaction of a debt or the payment of a check drawn by a cardholder, either on credit or in consideration of an undertaking or guarantee by the issuer.
The proof showed that defendant stole a Rainier Bank Machine card. The cardholder was an acquaintance of defendant. Defendant had an opportunity to obtain the holder's personal identification number. That machine card permitted access to Rainier's automated teller machine, known as a cash machine. Upon entry of the account number together with a personal identification number, cash could be withdrawn from the depositor's checking account.
The cash machine is linked to an off-site mainframe computer. The programming of the mainframe permits verification of the account number and the personal identification number. If the mainframe computer is functioning, it will not permit a withdrawal in excess of the funds in the account. However, if the mainframe is not functioning, the cash machine will still dispense cash even though it creates an overdraw on the account, which happened here. The data in the cash machine is stored and then passed into the mainframe when the mainframe is back on line. If the mainframe is operational, an attempted withdrawal in excess of funds in the account will not succeed and the card is retained by the machine. If there is an overdraft, the bank customer is liable for the excess withdrawal pursuant to a depositor's agreement executed when the customer opened the account.
For purpose of this case, the operative language of the statute is as follows: Credit card means " any instrument ... whether known as a credit card ... or by any other name ... issued ... for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money ... either on credit or in consideration of an undertaking or guarantee by the issuer ..." Factors 1 and 2 are obviously present. The question is whether these facts satisfy the third or fourth element. Was the card used to obtain money on credit or in consideration of an undertaking by the bank?
Defendant contends: (1) the statute defining "credit card" is not ambiguous and does not include a cash machine card; (2) alternatively, if the statute is read to potentially include this type card, it is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the defendant; and (3) the statute, as construed by the Court of Appeals, is a denial of due process for failure to give fair notice of what is proscribed. If the statute is not ambiguous and does not include the transactions by Standifer using the bank card, no further issues need be considered.
In dissecting the statute to determine whether these facts constitute a crime, our objective and authority is to ascertain legislative intent as expressed in the statute. State v. Bernhard, 108 Wash.2d 527, 533, 741 P.2d 1 (1987). If the language is not ambiguous, there is no need for judicial interpretation. State v. Theilken, 102 Wash.2d 271, 275, 684 P.2d 709 (1984). Words are given the meaning provided by the statute or, in the absence of specific definition, their ordinary meaning. Theilken, at 276, 684 P.2d 709; State v. Bodey, 44 Wash.App. 698, 703, 723 P.2d 1148 (1986).
We turn first to the State's argument that one function of the cash machine card is to obtain money on credit because it is possible to obtain cash in excess of the account balance if the mainframe computer is down. The applicable statutory element on this point is that the card be "issued ... for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money ... on credit ..." It is clear that the card was not issued for use of the cardholder to obtain money on credit. The testimony was that access to the cash machine was not intended to permit such withdrawals. Such was possible only by the fortuitous circumstance of the mainframe being off-line for a few...
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