State v. Stanfield
Decision Date | 07 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-1160.,COA98-1160. |
Citation | 134 NC App. 685,518 S.E.2d 541 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Larry D. STANFIELD. |
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Emmett B. Haywood, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Tisdale & Menefee, P.A., by Donald K. Tisdale, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellant.
On 13 July 1997, victims Tyrone Campbell (Campbell) and Reggie McKinney (McKinney) drove to the home of LuWanda Corn in Winston-Salem. Campbell and McKinney remained in the car while Campbell, the driver, began talking to Ms. Corn. Co-defendant Cory Beck (Beck), who was defendant's brother and was also known as Cory Stanfield, was on the porch of the Corn home. After the conversation between Corn and Campbell had continued for a few minutes, Beck yelled to Campbell and McKinney, asking if they had any "weed." When McKinney answered in the negative, Beck approached the driver's side of the car. Interrupting Campbell's conversation with Corn, Beck pulled a gun on the two men in the car and demanded their jewelry. Before McKinney and Campbell were able to comply, defendant walked up to the passenger side door, said and told McKinney to keep his hands where they could be seen. He stood against the side of the car so that McKinney could not open the door to run. Campbell surrendered some rings he was wearing to Beck, who hit Campbell with his pistol. McKinney told police after the robbery and again at trial that he handed his watch and gold necklace to Beck. However, Campbell initially told police that McKinney handed his (McKinney's) jewelry to defendant Stanfield, but later testified at trial that he did not know to whom McKinney handed his watch and necklace, though he added that Beck reached into the car. Beck told Campbell and McKinney not to look at him, to leave, and not to return or call the police. The victims left but called the police. McKinney later picked defendant out of a photo lineup and identified him at trial.
Defendant's first assignment of error pertains to discrepancies between statements made by McKinney and Campbell. McKinney's trial testimony also included some detail not in his written statement, e.g., that, during the robbery, defendant approached the car saying, then told McKinney to keep his hands where they could be seen. After the investigating detective testified as to the written statement taken from McKinney and after defense counsel elicited on cross-examination the discrepancies between the victims' statements, the prosecution asked the following series of questions on redirect examination:
Defendant characterizes this testimony by the detective as expert testimony regarding the recollection process of trauma victims and claims that the court erred in admitting this testimony when the witness had not been qualified as an expert. Defendant also asserts this testimony is a statement of the detective's opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses. We disagree. The law in North Carolina is settled that an expert may not express an opinion as to the believability of another witness. In State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 599, 350 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1986), during a first-degree rape trial, a pediatrician stated, "I think [the victim is] believable." The Aguallo Court applied State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 340, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567-68 (1986), in which our Supreme Court stated that the official commentary of Rule 608 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence establishes that "`expert testimony on the credibility of a witness is not admissible.' " In Heath, after being asked her opinion as to whether a mental condition could have caused the witness to fabricate a story, the witness' psychologist responded, "There is nothing in the record or current behavior that indicates that she has a record of lying." Id. Our Supreme Court held that this statement was improper expert testimony that bolstered the credibility of the witness. See id.
In contrast, even assuming the detective was testifying as an expert in this portion of his testimony (he had not been formally qualified or tendered as an expert but testified that he had investigated between 350 and 375 incidents involving trauma), he was not stating an opinion, but was instead relating his experience. His testimony was a recitation of the procedure he followed when working with trauma victims and the reason he followed it. The officer did not suggest any reason such belated recollection occurs, nor did he vouch for the accuracy of such recollection. Unlike the cases cited above, this testimony contained no opinion as to the credibility of the witness. This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error when it permitted the State, when cross-examining defendant about his prior convictions, to inquire into details that went beyond the nature of the crime, time and place of conviction, and punishment imposed. See State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 488 S.E.2d 769 (1997). Because defendant failed to object to this line of questions, he carries the burden of showing "(i) that a different result probably would have been reached but for the error or (ii) that the error was so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial." Id. at 385, 488 S.E.2d at 779. The particular portion of cross-examination to which defendant now objects is as follows:
Our review of this transcript satisfies us that the State's questions did not exceed the permissible scope of inquiry concerning defendant's prior convictions. Although some of these questions were objectionable as to form where the prosecutor asked about the underlying facts rather than the conviction itself ("[a]nd almost within a year you had some more cocaine on you, didn't you?"), no objection was made. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (1992). Moreover, the substance of the questions was appropriate. The prosecutor limited his inquiry to the facts supporting the conviction and did not elicit extraneous prejudicial details. Compare State v. Rathbone, 78 N.C.App. 58, 336 S.E.2d 702 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 200, 341 S.E.2d 582 (1986), with State v. Wilson, 98 N.C.App. 86, 389 S.E.2d 626 (1990). Where defendant's answers demonstrated confusion or evasion, the prosecutor properly sought clarification. This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the State to inquire about defendant's attitude concerning the law in general, referring to the following exchange:
Defendant did not object to this line of questioning.
Although a party may cross-examine a witness with respect to any evidence that tends to show feeling or bias of the witness with respect to a party or cause, see State v. McCall, 31 N.C.App. 543, 230 S.E.2d 195 (1976), "the criminal laws" are neither party nor cause. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that this evidence was inadmissible, defendant has...
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