State v. Stanfield, 80-2066-CR
| Decision Date | 18 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-2066-CR,80-2066-CR |
| Citation | 105 Wis.2d 553,314 N.W.2d 339 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Carl STANFIELD, d/b/a Canine College, Ltd., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Jonathan P. Siner, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner; Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., on brief.
Roland J. Steinle, Jr., Cedarburg, for defendant-appellant.
There are two issues presented on this review. First, is intent or negligence an element of the crime of mistreating animals, sec. 948.02, 1 Stats.1975. Second, was sufficient evidence presented to convict defendant-appellant Carl A. Stanfield, (Stanfield) of being party to the crime of mistreating animals, set forth in secs. 939.05 2 and 948.02, Stats.1975. We hold that sec. 948.02, does not require proof of intent or negligence and that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the jury verdict convicting Stanfield. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
In November, 1976, Stanfield was charged with seven counts of being a party to the crime of mistreating animals. Following an eleven-day jury trial in Milwaukee county court, he was found guilty on three counts and not guilty on the other four. The following evidence was presented at that trial.
Stanfield testified as follows: He was the owner and operator of Canine College. He has used that tradename since the early 1960's operating as a sole trader until 1976, when he incorporated the dog-training business as Canine College, Ltd., of which he was the principal owner. He conducted dog obedience classes and trained individual dogs at the homes of their owners. He also contracted with persons to individually train dogs away from the owner's home. He would arrange to have the dogs picked up and delivered to persons with whom he had made contractual arrangements to train the dogs.
Stanfield further testified that one of the places with which he had contracted to train dogs was Pleasant Run Farms, near Fond du Lac, a kennel operated by Don Woods and Debbie Ullman. Stanfield provided food and supplies to Pleasant Run Farms and would send dogs to be trained. Woods and Ullman would train the dogs and were given the right to use the name Canine College. Stanfield would also help Woods and Ullman sell dogs which they had.
Stanfield testified that he used a method of training which involved a spiked collar and a short piece of chain which the handler rattled or threw at the dog to get its attention. He also used a stick with a piece of chain attached which he would throw at the dog if it were not responding properly. Persons with whom he contracted to train dogs under the auspices of Canine College also used this method. Other persons testified that, when training their dogs, Stanfield would strike the dogs with the stick and advised others to do so. There was also testimony that Stanfield possessed and advocated the use of an electric cattle prod to shock dogs if the above methods did not work.
The three counts which Stanfield was convicted of involved mistreatment of dogs belonging to Karen Nimmer, Marie Van Wormer and William Towne. It was stipulated that the Towne and Nimmer dogs were picked up from and returned to their owners by agents of Canine College pursuant to a contract between the owner and Canine College. Testimony established that this was also true concerning the Van Wormer dog. None of the owners were told where their dogs would be trained.
Ms. Nimmer testified that her dog, a Doberman Pinscher puppy, was in good shape, was housebroken, and had a pleasant disposition when she contacted Canine College. At that time it was gaining an average of four pounds a week. She talked to Stanfield twice while her dog was being trained and Stanfield informed her that the dog was doing fine but was not eating properly. When the dog was returned, it was thin, had pimples all over its body, was limping, the hair around its nose had worn off, it had diarrhea and acted dejected and frightened. The dog had gained no weight during its stay at Canine College and was no longer housebroken. She took the dog to the veterinarian several times within a short period of time following its return from Canine College to treat the maladies from which her dog was suffering when it was returned to her. She also stopped payment on her check to Stanfield and called him to express her shock at the condition of her dog.
Ms. Van Wormer testified that her dog, a Great Dane puppy, was friendly, docile, and got along well with small animals and children. She contacted Canine College and arranged to have the dog trained. While her dog was at Canine College, she spoke with Stanfield on the phone five times. Stanfield told her that the dog did not adapt well to male trainers, had not been eating right and had rubbed fur off of its back since it was too large to get through the door of the kennel run. When Stanfield returned the dog, he would not let Ms. Van Wormer see her dog until she had paid him. The dog had lost thirty pounds, had a large lump behind its ear and raw spots on its back, legs and tail and acted frightened and confused. The dog never regained its former personality and became mean and irritable, prompting Ms. Van Wormer to give him away shortly thereafter.
Mr. Towne testified that his dog, a Doberman, was healthy, playful and friendly with children. He contacted Stanfield to have the dog trained. He spoke with Stanfield once or twice while the dog was away being trained and Stanfield assured him that the dog was doing well. When the dog was returned, after four weeks training, it had scratches on the inside of its legs, scabs inside of its ears, its feet were bleeding and it was excreting a malodorous sticky substance from its mouth. Because of this excretion, and the dog's overall listlessness after it returned, Mr. Towne took the dog to a veterinarian and it eventually regained its health.
Upon his conviction, Stanfield was placed on two years probation with the first thirty days to be served in the county jail. He was ordered to pay a $600 fine, make full restitution to the three owners whose dogs he was convicted of mistreating, pay all the costs of the action, and perform seventy-five hours of community service work 3.
Stanfield appealed his conviction to the Milwaukee county circuit court, which upheld the trial court verdict and sentence. He then appealed to the court of appeals which reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court with orders to dismiss the complaint. The court of appeals held sec. 948.02, Stats., to require proof of intentional or negligent cruelty to animals, and found insufficient evidence to sustain the state's burden of proof. The court of appeals noted that the evidence was sufficient to convict under the current statute, 4 stating:
"Although the evidence would clearly justify a strict liability finding sufficient to impose a forfeiture under the present law, at the time the occurrences involved in this case the penalty imposed brought the crime within the definition of a misdemeanor and required proof of scienter."
This court granted the state's petition to review the court of appeals decision, and because we construe sec. 948.02, Stats.1975, as not requiring proof of intent or negligence, we reverse.
Our first concern is determining the elements necessary to a conviction of being party to the crime of mistreating animals. Cruelty to animals is a particularly despicable offense because of the relative helplessness of animals when faced with inhumane humans willing or even anxious to mistreat them.
Pursuant to sec. 939.05, Stats., a person may be convicted of a crime if he directly commits it or intentionally aids and abets its commission. Section 948.02, Stats.1975, makes it illegal for a person to "treat any animal, whether belonging to himself or another, in a cruel manner." "Cruel" is defined by sec. 948.02, Stats.1975, as "causing unnecessary and excessive pain or suffering or unjustifiable injury or death." 5
The court of appeals held that negligence or criminal intent is an element of sec. 948.02, Stats. It based this conclusion on State v. Collova, 79 Wis.2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977), wherein this court interpreted the crime of driving after one's drivers license was revoked as requiring proof of intent despite the fact that the applicable statute did not mention criminal intent. However, Collova is not applicable to this case.
Collova interpreted a provision of the vehicle code. The crime of mistreating animals is part of the criminal code. Section 939.23, Stats.1975, contains guidelines as to whether criminal intent is an element of an offense set forth in the criminal code.
In Collova, this court recognized the validity of sec. 939.23, but held it inapplicable to that case because the statute at issue was part of the vehicle, rather than the criminal code. 6
Section 948.02, Stats., contains none of the words which sec. 939.23 sets forth as indicative of the element of intent. The predecessor to sec. 948.02, sec. 947.10(1)(a), Stats.1971, explicitly required proof of intent. 7
Section 948.02 was created by ch. 314, sec. 6, Laws of 1973. Senate Bill 16 which became ch. 314, contained the following Legislative Council note pertaining to sec. 948.02: 8
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