State v. Stanley

• Citation: 60 Haw. 527,592 P.2d 422
• Decision Date: 22 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 6399,6399
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Lee STANLEY, also known as Jack Eli Stanley, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Hawai'i

Page 422

592 P.2d 422

60 Haw. 527

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Lee STANLEY, also known as Jack Eli Stanley, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 6399.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March 22, 1979.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A family court order waiving jurisdiction must be appealed from prior to the commencement of the criminal trial on the offenses charged.

2. The family court waiver of jurisdiction statute, HRS § 571-22 (1976), is not void for vagueness.

3. In view of the determination that waiver of jurisdiction is a critically important proceeding, such waiver requires a hearing, effective assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons by the family court.

4. While a statement of reasons need not be formal or necessarily include conventional findings of fact, the statement should

be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of full investigation has been met and that the waiver question has received the careful consideration of the family court, and it must set forth the basis for the waiver with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.

5. Where oral statements made by the family court at a waiver hearing, together with the remainder of the family court record of the case, reveal that a family court decision to waive jurisdiction was made after full investigation, that the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and that the reasons for the decision are sufficiently specific so as to permit meaningful review, the waiver of jurisdiction may not be overturned on the ground that the appellant was deprived of due process of law.

6. A decision by the family court to waive jurisdiction is discretionary, and such a decision will be overturned only if arbitrary as a mistaken abuse of discretion.

Alvin T. Ito and Pamela Jill Berman, Deputy Public Defenders, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Michael A. Lilly, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and MARUMOTO, Retired Justice, in place of KIDWELL, J., absent. ^*

OGATA, Justice.

Defendant-appellant Jack Lee Stanley (hereinafter appellant) challenges the constitutionality of the family court waiver of jurisdiction statute, HRS § 571-22 (1976), both on its face and as applied. This appeal results from appellant's conviction after a jury trial on charges of both murder ¹ and robbery in the first degree. ² We find no constitutional infirmity with respect to HRS § 571-22 (1976), and we therefore affirm the conviction.

Appellant was 16 years old at the time of the commission of these offenses. Proceedings were initiated against appellant on both charges in the family court of the first circuit. ³ Subsequently, the office of the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for waiver of jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 571-22 (1976). ⁴ Hearings on the petition for waiver were held before the family court on April 27 and June 1, 1976.

At the conclusion of the hearing held on June 1, 1976, the family court announced its decision to waive jurisdiction over appellant in favor of criminal prosecution in circuit court. A written order granting the petition for waiver was filed on June 2, 1976. ⁵

No appeal was taken by appellant from the family court order waiving jurisdiction. The grand jury indicted appellant for murder and robbery in the first degree, and he was tried in circuit court and convicted as charged. This appeal followed. ⁶

Subsequent to the submission of the briefs in this case, the State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This motion was heard together with argument on the merits of the case. We proceed first to discuss the State's motion.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

The State's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction is based principally on the contention that a family court order cannot be reviewed on an appeal from a circuit court judgment. ⁷ The State relies primarily upon People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal.3d 698, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976 (1976), and State v. Harwood, 98 Idaho 793, 572 P.2d 1228 (1977), for the proposition that a waiver-type proceeding may only be challenged Prior to commencement of the criminal trial on the offenses charged.

While we have commented on this issue in previous cases, no determination has been made by this Court as to whether a defendant may, subsequent to criminal conviction, choose to attack the propriety of the family court's decision to waive jurisdiction. In In re Doe I, 50 Haw. 537, 444 P.2d 459 (1968), this Court did hold that a waiver order is a final, appealable decision. However, it was questioned in Doe I whether an appeal of a family court waiver order might properly be taken from a circuit court judgment. As was stated in that case:

Even if such review is possible, the right to such review is a hollow one, for, by then, many of the safeguards (of the family court system), including freedom from adverse publicity, would have been irretrievably lost.

Id. at 539, 444 P.2d at 460. This Court nonetheless refrained in Doe I from deciding whether to disallow review of family court waiver orders in such situations.

The concerns expressed in Doe I were subsequently recited in In re Doe, 57 Haw. 413, 558 P.2d 483 (1976). In Doe, the appellant appealed to this Court directly from the family court order waiving jurisdiction, and he moved for a stay of enforcement of the waiver order pending appeal. Although we ultimately denied the motion to stay due to inadequacy of the appellate record, we nonetheless expressed serious concern in Doe for the preservation to a minor of the safeguards of the family court system.

The logic of our holding in John Doe I supports the motion for a stay of execution. The threat to appellant is the same, whether it is the lack of a stay of execution, rather than the lack of a direct avenue of appeal, which may cause the appellant to be subjected to criminal prosecution before review of the waiver order can be had.

57 Haw. at 415, 558 P.2d at 485.

More recently, however, we briefly noted the contrary concern that direct appeal of a waiver order with stay of execution may engender difficulties through possible delay in the onset of trial. In re Dinson, 58 Haw. 522, 574 P.2d 119 (1978). However, no resolution of the issue was necessary in In re Dinson, supra, and we went on to state that "(t)hese problems appear to be more susceptible to legislative than judicial solution." Id. at 526, 574 P.2d at 122 n. 4.

Upon careful reconsideration of this entire problem, however, we are convinced that, absent legislative resolution, this issue can and should be resolved by this Court in favor of a requirement of direct appeal from a family court order waiving jurisdiction. We have found the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Chi Ko Wong, Supra, to be persuasive:

(S)ound practical considerations demand that a juvenile court finding of unfitness and certification (waiver) order should not be reviewed on appeal from a criminal judgment of conviction. To allow a defendant who has been convicted in the superior court to question on appeal the propriety of the juvenile court's finding would afford him an opportunity to secure a reversal of a judgment of conviction even though he was found guilty after an errorless trial. Such a defendant should not be allowed to silently speculate on a favorable verdict and then after an adverse judgment is entered proclaim that the juvenile court's finding was erroneous. Moreover, it is in the accused's best interest to seek immediate relief from an improper finding in the juvenile court so he may be spared the burden and public scrutiny associated with a criminal trial. Additionally, the delay inherent in criminal prosecutions may substantially prejudice a juvenile court reconsideration of its prior finding of unfitness should the cause be remanded after a review of criminal proceedings.

18 Cal.3d at 712, 135 Cal.Rptr. at 401, 557 P.2d at 985 (citations and footnote omitted). The Supreme Court of Idaho has adopted this reasoning in full in State v. Harwood, Supra, and has thus held that review of a waiver order must be sought before the charges have proceeded to trial.

On balance, the approach taken by the courts in People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, and State v. Harwood, supra, appears best-suited to serving the interests at stake. As stated in People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra :

(A) timely review . . . may spare a minor the burden of an unnecessary trial and thus promote justice and judicial economy. It also assures that, if warranted, reconsideration by the juvenile court will be made on timely information without the need for updated reports and affidavits.

18 Cal.3d at 713, 135 Cal.Rptr. at 402, 557 P.2d at 986; See Note, Review of Improper Juvenile Transfer Hearings, 60 Va.L.Rev. 818, 836-38 (1974). We have weighed these considerations against possible problems associated with delay in the onset of trial pending appeal, and we are satisfied that any threat to the successful operation of the trial process can be minimized by the careful exercise of discretion in deciding whether to stay execution of the waiver order pending appeal. ⁸ Therefore, we hold that a family court order waiving jurisdiction must be appealed from prior to the commencement of the criminal trial on the offenses charged. ⁹

Due to the absence of clear direction in our previous cases regarding the proper time for challenging a waiver order, however, we believe it proper to apply the rule announced today only prospectively. People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra. Hence, our holding will only affect adult criminal proceedings commenced subsequent to the issuance of this opinion. The State's motion to dismiss the appeal will thus be denied.

We now go on to consider the merits of appellant's claims.

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HRS § 571-22 (1976)

A. Facial Constitutionality

Appellant first argues that HRS § 571-22 (1976) is void for vagueness for...