State v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 04 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. COA12–1354.,COA12–1354. |
| Citation | 745 S.E.2d 375 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Edward Jason STANLEY. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by the State from order entered 3 April 2012 by Judge Lindsay R. Davis, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William P. Hart, Jr., for the State.
Glenn Gerding, for Defendant–Appellee.
The State appeals from an order granting a request by Defendant Jason Edward Stanley that his name be removed from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court's order is “invalid” on the grounds that “this remedy is not available during a criminal proceeding” and on the grounds that the trial court erroneously concluded that the sex offender registration program was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. After careful consideration of the State's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the State's appeal should be dismissed.
On 18 April 2002, Defendant was convicted of feloniously abducting children in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–41. The incident which led to Defendant's conviction involved three children, two of whom were Defendant's daughters and the third of whom was his step-daughter. At the time of the incident: in question:
[D]efendant and his wife took her three children on a trip out of North Carolina in contravention of a custody order which granted custody to the children's maternal grandmother. Defendant considered all three children to be his, but was technically only the father of two of the children; defendant was not the biological or adoptive father of one of the children, though he was her stepparent at the time of the abduction. It appears that there was no allegation of any sexual misconduct by defendant against any of the three children during the abduction or at any other time. Despite his convictions for abduction, defendant failed to register on the Sexual Offender and Public Protection Registry[.]
State v. Stanley, 205 N.C.App. 707, 708, 697 S.E.2d 389, 389,disc. review denied,364 N.C. 440, 702 S.E.2d 798 (2010) ( Stanley I ). Stanley I, 205 N.C.App. at 708, 697 S.E.2d at 389–90. The State appealed from the portion of the trial court's order which ruled that Defendant did not have to comply with the registration requirement. In Stanley I, we held that, under the relevant statutes, the word “parent” included only natural or adoptive parents and did not extend to more informal relationships such as the one between Defendant and the child whose abduction had triggered the registration requirement. Stanley I at 710, 697 S.E.2d at 391.
On 29 November 2010, Defendant was again indicted for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.11. On 30 December 2011, Defendant filed a dismissal motion and petition for removal from the sex offender registry. On 1 February 2012, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant's motion and ordering that the charge that had been lodged against him be dismissed and that his name be removed from the sex offender registry. On 3 February 2012, the trial court entered an order striking the 1 February 2012 order. On 29 March 2012, the trial court conducted a second hearing concerning the issues raised by Defendant's filing. On 3 April 2012, the trial court entered an order dismissing the charge of failure to register as a sex offender that had been lodged against Defendant and ordering that Defendant's name be removed from the sex offender registry.
On 1 May 2012, the State noted an appeal from the trial court's order. On 12 September 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the State's appeal for alleged violations of N.C. R.App. P. 4(a) (). On 2 October 2012, the State filed a response to Defendant's motion in which it “request[ed] to limit its appeal to the civil portion of the order[.]” On 12 October 2012, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss “as to the portion of the order dismissing the indictment” while refusing to dismiss the State's appeal from the civil component of the order.
On 16 January 2013, Defendant filed a motion with this Court seeking the dismissal of the State's appeal on the grounds that the provisions of N.C.R.App. P. 4(a)(a) should be deemed applicable to both aspects of the trial court's order and opposing the State's request that we issue a writ of certiorari in order to allow review of the challenged portion of the trial court's order on the merits. On the same date, Defendant filed a motion seeking dismissal of the State's appeal and denial of the State's request for the issuance of a writ of certiorari on the grounds that the State had failed to adequately preserve the issues that it sought to present to this Court. On 17 January 2013, the State filed a response to Defendant's motions in which it argued that its appeal from the trial court's order had been noted in a timely manner and that this Court did have jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal.
As we understand the record, the State clearly failed to preserve the issue that it seeks to raise before this Court for purposes of appellate review. During the first hearing on Defendant's motion, which was conducted on 1 February 2012, Defendant offered the testimony of Mary Ellen Conley, the grandmother and legal custodian of the children, concerning Defendant's relationship with the children. In addition, Defendant argued that, given the fact that there was no sexual component to the abduction charge, the sex offender registration requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him on the grounds that it interfered with his fundamental right to associate with his children. More specifically, Defendant argued that, as applied to him, the sex offender registration law was “unconstitutional both under substantive due process and under overbreadth analysis.” The Assistant District Attorney who represented the State at this hearing agreed that Defendant had a fundamental right to associate with his children and stated that he had “never seen any evidence of any kind that would indicate that [Defendant] has committed any sex crimes.” The prosecutor also concurred with Defendant's constitutional analysis, stating that:
[I]t does seem based on the totality of the circumstances that there's some degree of fundamental unfairness to this individual to have to register under these circumstances[.] ... [A]s applied to him there does seem to be some ... degree of ... unfairness at least with regard to characterization of him as a sex offender.... [H]ad this individual been convicted of any ... sort of sex crime, then his abridgement of his freedom to associate with his children or any other children ... [would be] warranted by status as a sex offender.... But as applied to this individual who has not committed any sex crime ..., it's a difficult case for the State because ... this individual's just going to keep getting arrested ... until a court rules that it's inapplicable in ... his situation based on some constitutional principle.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's request and ordered that the charge against Defendant be dismissed and that Defendant's name be removed from the sex offender registry.
Subsequently, the trial court learned that Defendant's entire criminal record had not been presented at the first hearing, struck its order, and conducted a second hearing at which evidence was presented concerning misdemeanors of which Defendant had been convicted that had not been discussed at the first hearing. At this second hearing, Defendant offered the testimony of several witnesses, including that of one of his daughters and that of his step-daughter. After presenting evidence in support of his motion, Defendant's trial counsel urged the trial court to consider the constitutional arguments made at the first hearing and asserted that the sex offender registration statute was unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. At the time that the trial court requested a response from the State, the prosecutor said that:
Your Honor, the State was in agreement with the Court's decision the last time. Defendant is really not a sex offender. There's no doubt about that. Kind of an unusual situation in terms of what the underlying—was in the first case, especially in light of the fact he's essentially the only father that...
To continue reading
Request your trial