State v. Stanley
| Decision Date | 17 November 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 14979,14979 |
| Citation | 168 W.Va. 294,284 S.E.2d 367 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia v. Mary Jo STANLEY. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where police, lacking probable cause to arrest, ask suspects to accompany them to police headquarters and then interrogate them intermittently for seven hours during which time they are not free to leave or their liberty is restrained, the police have violated the Fourth Amendment.
2. A confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is inadmissible. The giving of Miranda warnings is not enough, by itself, to break the causal connection between an illegal arrest and the confession. In considering whether the confession is a result of the exploitation of an illegal arrest, the court should consider the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession; the presence or absence of intervening circumstances in addition to the Miranda warnings; and the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct.
3. "In order to determine if there is evidentiary insufficiency that will bar retrial under double jeopardy principles such determination is made upon the entire record submitted to the jury and not upon the residual evidence remaining after the appellate court reviews the record for evidentiary error." Syl. pt. 5, State v. Frazier, W.Va., 252 S.E.2d 39 (1979).
Beckett, Burford & James and Robert H. Burford, Huntington, for appellant.
Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen., and Marianne K. Hoover, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.
Appellant, Mary Jo Stanley, appeals her conviction of second-degree murder in the Circuit Court of Cabell County. On the evening of 4 July 1978 the appellant shot her father in the back of the head as he was beating the appellant's mother. The two women, though shocked by what had transpired, eventually decided to put the body in the family car and drive it out of town. By taking the victim's watch and ring, they hoped to make it appear that a robbery and murder had taken place. Returning to their house in another car they called the police and made a missing person report.
On 6 July 1978 the Wayne County Sheriff's Department discovered the body in the car and notified the Huntington Police Department. Officer Tom Bevins of the Huntington Police Department first talked with the victim's family on that date.
On 11 July 1978 Officer Bevins returned to the victim's house and asked the appellant, her mother and her children to come down to the police department to assist in giving information about the deceased. When the four family members got to the police station at approximately 4:00 p. m., they were told to sit and wait until a room became available for questioning. The police interrogated the appellant's daughter who was nine months pregnant at the time, first. After about an hour with her, Officer Bevins questioned the appellant's mother for nearly an hour and a half. At approximately 8:00 p. m. the appellant was questioned. The appellant's son was questioned last. At about 11:00 p. m. Officer Bevins began questioning the appellant again. During this period of questioning he took a tape-recorded statement from her in which she admitted shooting her father during a domestic fight. Officer Bevins then obtained arrest warrants for the appellant, her mother and her son; at around 2:00 a. m. on 12 July he called the appellant's attorney.
Although the appellant and her family were never told that they were free to leave the police department, the trial court found that initially their freedom of action had not been deprived in any significant manner. The appellant and her family were not physically abused, threatened or promised leniency. The trial court, however, also found that the interrogation became accusatory and the appellant was no longer free to leave the police department after the interrogation of her son. At approximately midnight the appellant's uncle came to the police station to speak with the family members; however, he was warned to leave the department unless he wanted to be jailed for "disrupting an investigation." The trial court determined that probable cause to arrest the appellant did not exist until after the appellant's statement was taken. Before each interrogation, Bevins gave the family members their Miranda warnings and he had them sign waivers after each had given a tape-recorded statement.
Appellant asserts that her conviction should be reversed because the State's case was based upon the inadmissible statements of the appellant. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.
Shortly after the appellant's trial the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). In Dunaway police picked up the defendant on less than sufficient information to get an arrest warrant. Although the police did not tell Dunaway that they were putting him under arrest, they treated him as if he were. After being given the Miranda warnings at police headquarters, Dunaway made statements and drew sketches that later were used against him at trial. After determining that such restraint was greater than that permitted under the "stop and frisk" exception to the probable cause requirement enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny, 1 the Court determined that the police had violated Dunaway's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court then held that the statements and the drawings were inadmissible because they were the direct result of the unconstitutional seizure of the suspect.
Dunaway serves to enforce the policy of the Fourth Amendment which forbids arrests except upon the issuance of a warrant or, in extraordinary cases, upon such probable cause as would have permitted a warrant to be issued. Dunaway does this by foreclosing the temptation for "law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the ...
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State v. Hopkins
...most definitely circumvent a finding of de facto arrest. See State v. Wyant, 174 W.Va. 567, 328 S.E.2d 174 (1985); State v. Stanley, 168 W.Va. 294, 284 S.E.2d 367 (1981). Most disputed cases concerning custody arise when there is silence on the part of the investigating officer and the ques......
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State v. Boswell, 15099
...v. Canby, 162 W.Va. 666, 252 S.E.2d 164 (1979). We have also adopted the principles in Dunaway v. New York, supra, in State v. Stanley, 168 W.Va. 294, 284 S.E.2d 367 (1981).6 Atchley cited these cases: State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn.1980); State v. Johnson, 414 A.2d 477 (R.I.1980)......
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...Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, supra. See also State v. Stanley, 168 W.Va. 294, 297 n. 1, 284 S.E.2d 367, 369 n. 1 (1981). Indeed, " 'it may be the essence of good police work' to maintain the status quo with a brief stop that allo......
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State v. Moss
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