State v. Stearns

• Decision Date: 04 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 58186-0,58186-0
• Citation: 830 P.2d 355,119 Wn.2d 247
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Coyle STEARNS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 247

119 Wn.2d 247

830 P.2d 355

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Coyle STEARNS, Petitioner.

No. 58186-0.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

June 4, 1992.

Wesley S. Johnson, Longview, for petitioner.

C.C. Bridgewater, Cowlitz County Prosecutor, David R. Koss, Chief Civil Deputy, Kelso, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice.

James Coyle Stearns was convicted of possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. See RCW 69.50.401(a). Stearns appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of "manufacture". The Court of Appeals held that no instructional error was committed and affirmed the conviction. We likewise uphold Stearns' conviction, but solely on the ground that Stearns is precluded from challenging the jury instruction for the first time on appeal.

At trial, Stearns admitted possessing methamphetamine but denied any intent to manufacture or deliver. He testified he had purchased the methamphetamine for his own use, but admitted dividing the drugs into smaller packages. The State argued to the jury that the repackaging constituted manufacturing of the drug. Alternatively, the State argued Stearns intended to deliver the drug to others.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements of the crime. The judge defined "manufacture" as "the production, preparation, compounding, processing, directly or indirectly, as well as the packaging or repackaging of any controlled substance." The judge derived this definition from former RCW 69.50.101(m): ¹

"Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container, except that this term does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for his own use or the preparation, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a controlled substance:

(1) by a practitioner as an incident to his administering or dispensing of a controlled substance in the course of his professional practice, or

(2) by a practitioner, or by his authorized agent under his supervision, for the purpose of, or as an incident to, research, teaching, or chemical analysis and not for sale.

Stearns did not object to this definition of "manufacture", nor did he propose his own instruction on this point. The jury convicted Stearns of the charged crime.

Stearns appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's definition of "manufacture". He argued the trial judge should have instructed the jury that repackaging does not constitute manufacturing if the actions were simply part of preparing the drug for personal use. See former RCW 69.50.101(m), quoted above. The State responded to the merits of this challenge, but also contended that Stearns was precluded from challenging the jury instruction for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but in doing so chose not to address whether Stearns' challenge could be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Stearns, 59 Wash.App. 445, 447 n. 1, 799 P.2d 270 (1990). The Court of Appeals instead proceeded directly to the merits of Stearns' appeal and concluded that the trial judge did not err in defining "manufacture" for the jury. Stearns, at 446-47, 799 P.2d 270. We granted Stearns' petition seeking review of this decision.

The threshold issue we must decide is whether Stearns may challenge the jury instruction on appeal when he did not raise this issue in the trial court. ² We begin with the controlling provisions of RAP 2.5(a):

The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the following claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: (1) lack of trial court jurisdiction, (2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted, and (3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right....

Under this rule, an appellate court generally will review only those issues properly raised in the trial court. State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). Stearns argues that the third exception listed in RAP 2.5(a)--manifest error affecting a constitutional right--entitles him to appellate review.

The application of these principles is well settled in the context of jury instructions. As long as the instructions properly inform the jury of the elements of the charged crime, any error in further defining terms used in the elements is not of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 880, 822 P.2d 177 (1991); State v. Fowler, 114 Wash.2d 59, 69-70, 785 P.2d 808 (1990); Scott, 110 Wash.2d at 689-91, 757 P.2d 492; State v. Ng, 110 Wash.2d 32, 44-45, 750 P.2d 632 (1988). Even an error in defining technical terms does not rise to the level of constitutional error. Lord, 117 Wash.2d at 880, 822 P.2d 177; Scott, 110 Wash.2d at 689-90, 757 P.2d 492.

The elements of the crime charged against Stearns are straightforward: unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. RCW 69.50.401(a); see State...