State v. Steed
| Decision Date | 09 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. WD–15–069.,WD–15–069. |
| Citation | 75 N.E.3d 816,2016 Ohio 8088 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Appellee v. Nathaniel STEED, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas A. Matuszak, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, David T. Harold and Channa B. Beard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Mollie B. Hojnicki–Mathieson, for appellant.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Nathaniel Steed, appeals the October 6, 2015 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Appellant sets forth four assignments of error:
{¶ 3} On April 16, 2015, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Ann Malone stopped a vehicle which was driven by appellant southbound on interstate 75 in Wood County, Ohio. The trooper approached appellant's vehicle and informed him that he was stopped for traveling outside of his lane numerous times. The trooper asked appellant for his driver's license, registration and proof of insurance, then inquired where he was going and from where had he come. The trooper observed that appellant displayed unusual actions and did not respond correctly to her questions. When the trooper returned to her patrol car she requested the dispatcher run appellant's driver's license, criminal history and the vehicle registration.
{¶ 4} After Trooper Malone heard back from the dispatcher, she returned to appellant's vehicle, told him to step out of the vehicle and go to the patrol car so she could run more information and make sure he was all right. Appellant exited the vehicle and walked to the patrol car with Trooper Malone. As the trooper patted down appellant, she felt a hard object by his waistband and asked him about it. Appellant became agitated, walked back to his vehicle and drove off. The trooper pursued appellant until he stopped the vehicle. Appellant was arrested. While in the patrol car, Trooper Malone gave appellant his Miranda rights.
{¶ 5} Trooper Malone informed other officers that appellant had something in his waistband when he was initially stopped, and may have discarded it from the vehicle because there was nothing in his waistband when he was taken into custody. One officer returned to the area of the initial traffic stop and found a black bag on the highway which contained pills and crushed pills.
{¶ 6} On May 21, 2015, the Wood County Grand Jury issued a six-count indictment against appellant. Count 1 charged appellant with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(3), a first degree misdemeanor; Count 2 charged appellant with tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) and (B), a felony of the third degree; Counts 3, 4 and 5 charged appellant with aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a), felonies of the fifth degree; and Count 6 charged appellant with possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(2)(a), a first degree misdemeanor. Appellant pled not guilty to all counts and filed a motion to suppress. A suppression hearing was held. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
{¶ 7} On August 6, 2015, the Wood County Grand Jury issued a second indictment against appellant. These new charges were ultimately dismissed.
{¶ 8} Following a trial, the jury found appellant guilty of all six counts of the original indictment. Appellant was sentenced to 40 months in prison. Appellant appealed.
{¶ 9} Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Appellant acknowledges the initial traffic stop was proper, but argues the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion of further criminal activity to extend the stop and require him to exit the vehicle "for a pat down." Appellant further claims he was not properly Mirandized so his statements to police should have been suppressed.
{¶ 10} The state counters when an officer witnesses a vehicle drift over lane markings, the officer has probable cause to pull over the vehicle. The state maintains due to the events which occurred, under the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Malone had probable cause to extend the traffic stop to determine if appellant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
{¶ 11} State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100. The appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact, as long as the facts are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. The appellate court applies a de novo standard of review to determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id. See also State v. Bragg, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–07–1162, 2007-Ohio-5993, 2007 WL 3317272, ¶ 4.
{¶ 12} Appellant argued in his motion to suppress before the trial court that the traffic stop and detention were undertaken without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Appellant claimed the length of the detention exceeded permissible bounds of a traffic stop to issue a citation or warning, thus all evidence obtained as a result of the stop and detention must be suppressed. Appellant further claimed he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights so all statements he made must be suppressed.
{¶ 13} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Malone testified that on April 16, 2015, at approximately 2:00 a.m., she saw the wheels of the vehicle appellant was driving cross over the dotted white line three times. After she saw the marked lane violations, she activated the patrol car's emergency lights. In the trooper's experience, the causes of marked lane violations could be a driver impaired with alcohol and/or drugs, a fatigued driver, a driver with a medical condition or driver inattention.
{¶ 14} The patrol car Trooper Malone was driving was equipped with a video recorder which started recording one minute before the emergency lights were activated. The patrol car was also equipped with an audio recorder which started recording when the emergency lights were activated.
{¶ 15} Upon Trooper Malone activing the lights, appellant made a complete stop on the highway in the middle of the three lanes. Thereafter, appellant slowly drove the vehicle to the right lane, then over to the right shoulder and stopped. Appellant then put the vehicle into reverse and backed up toward the patrol car until Trooper Malone blew the horn for appellant to stop. The trooper noticed appellant was actively looking at her in his rearview mirror which indicated to her that he was not comfortable with her presence.
{¶ 16} Trooper Malone got out of her patrol car and approached the passenger side of the vehicle appellant was driving and asked to see his license, the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. Appellant produced his driver's license. Appellant asked why he has was stopped and the trooper advised him he traveled outside of his lane numerous times. The trooper questioned appellant about where he was coming from and where he was going. Appellant said he was coming from Michigan and going to Alabama. When asked why he was headed to Alabama, appellant said his wife was on dialysis. This response did not make sense to the trooper. Appellant then explained he was going to Alabama to bring some people back to help him with his wife. Trooper Malone detected appellant's speech was somewhat slurred, but she did not smell alcohol.
{¶ 17} Trooper Malone returned to the patrol car and called dispatch to run the vehicle's registration as well as appellant's license and criminal history. She asked for the criminal history because she felt there were several criminal indicators present. The trooper also requested a canine handler because "[a]t that point [she] had reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was criminal activity afoot with all the different indicators that were present." The trooper estimated about nine minutes elapsed from the time of her initial contact with appellant until she had "a canine responding to my location."
{¶ 18} Trooper Malone again returned to appellant's vehicle and asked him if he was on any prescription medication. Appellant replied he was on diet pills and had fibromyalgia
.
{¶ 19} Trooper Malone informed appellant he needed to step out of the vehicle and go to the patrol car so she could run some more information and make sure he was all right. A cell phone rang and appellant grabbed it and tried "to stash it underneath the front seat." The trooper instructed appellant to put his hands where she could see them. Trooper Malone told appellant several times to exit the vehicle.
{¶ 20} Appellant eventually exited the vehicle and walked towards the patrol car with Trooper Malone. The trooper asked appellant for consent to pat him down to make sure he did not have any weapons. The trooper stated she did not believe she needed appellant's consent to conduct the pat-down. Trooper Malone told appellant several times to put his hands behind his back. She started to pat him down in the waistband area and he moved. The trooper felt a hard object by appellant's waistband and asked him what he had. Appellant ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Allen v. Haviland
... ... forth the following facts [ 1 ] on direct appeal: ... {¶ 6} On September 26, 2014, Ohio State Highway Patrol ... Trooper Alejo Romero, III, was in the crossover of Interstate ... 75 in Wood County, observing southbound traffic ... drugs. Therefore, we hold that appellant's substantial ... rights ... were not prejudiced. See State v. Steed , ... 2016-Ohio-8088, 75 N.E.3d 816, ¶ 44-49 (6th Dist.) ... {¶ 49} Accordingly, appellant's ninth assignment of ... error is ... ...
-
State v. Clark
...¶ 100. The appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Steed , 2016-Ohio-8088, 75 N.E.3d 816, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). A de novo standard applies to determine if the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Brag......
-
Weathersby v. Commonwealth
...upheld pat-down searches in circumstances similar to appellant's case. See Byrd v. State, 458 A.2d 23, 25 (Del. 1983); State v. Steed, 75 N.E.3d 816, 826 (Ohio App. 2016). We find that the frisk of appellant was reasonable. Appellant also argues that Officer Komatz lacked probable cause to ......
-
State v. Moss
...controlled substance or a controlled substance analog." R.C. 2925.11(A). "Possession of drugs may be actual or constructive." State v. Steed, 75 N.E.3d 816, 2016-Ohio-8088, ¶ 55 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 329, 348 N.E.2d 351 (1976). Constructive possession, show......